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Abstract 
 
Inaction by UN peacekeeping troops in the face of the commission of genocide in Srebrenica and 
Kigali raised significant questions regarding the duty owed by UN peacekeeping forces to those 
under their protection. Recent court judgments have recognised that the Netherlands and Belgium 
were to a certain extent legally responsible to protect those under the care of each state’s 
peacekeeping troops, and that also the role of individual peacekeeping commanders may be 
questioned. While peacekeeping commanders may have a moral responsibility to act, it is not 
realistic to argue that peacekeeping commanders have a legal duty to do so. As a result, the use of 
the existing options to establish criminal liability for a failure to act under domestic and 
international law would not be justified in relation to the conduct committed. 
 
This thesis argues that alternative options to the existing forms of criminal responsibility for 
military commanders should be considered, possibly focusing more clearly on failing to fulfil a 
norm of protection that is specific to peacekeeping and distinct from protective obligations under 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Establishing law tailored to 
the context of peacekeeping would be an important step towards clarification of the obligations 
and responsibilities held by military commanders in UN peacekeeping missions.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
 
It is the duty of an individual, moreover a soldier and a peacekeeper, to ensure the protection of a 
defenceless civilian population under imminent threat of physical violence. Avoiding this 
responsibility is to avoid one’s obligation to go to the assistance of someone whose life is under 
threat. [The Department of Peacekeeping Operations] must ensure that Troop Contributing 
Nations fully understand and fulfil their commitments when they sign up to providing troops. 
(…)1  
 
 
Statements like the one above are undoubtly associated with the failed peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs) in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina back in the 1990s. This however, was a 
comment made in the context of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC),
2
 another example of an operation where peacekeeping troops 
could not protect the civilian population. The same report held that ‘[t]he behaviour of [the 
contingent], which was moreover meant to be an intervention battalion and MONUC’s reserve, 
which [the troop-contributing country] deployed in full knowledge of the situation in DRC, and 
which raised objections and backed out of certain of its crucial obligations, was totally and utterly 
unacceptable (. . .)’3. The International Crisis Group referred to specific incidents involving 
MONUC:  
 
On 10 May, MONUC was informed of the likely assassination of Nyakasanza’s parish priest and 
other Hema clerics. It refused to intervene or even accompany the vicar-general to the parish after 
the massacre. On 11 May, a man was kidnapped from the MONUC compound. Uruguayan 
officers were informed but refused to intervene. The person was then executed less than 100 
metres away. On 11 May MONUC refused to escort to its compound nineteen Catholic 
seminarians who were under death threat and in hiding.
4 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, ‘Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations. Successes, 
Setbacks and Remaining Challenges’ (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs 2009) 252 quoting the first Force Commander of MONUC, End of Duty report, 31 
December 2003, 8-10. The author was not able to access this report herself. 
2
 This quote refers to the atrocities that were committed by Hema and Lendu militias in the Ituri area of the DRC 
after Uganda withdrew from the region. 
3
 End of Tour Report, 8-10 (n 1). 
4
 International Crisis Group, ‘Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri’, Africa Report no. 64 (ICG, 13 June 2003) 
12. 
14 
 
Other more recent examples of peacekeepers not intervening in situations in which this may have 
been expected are the mass killings in Darfur (2004) and the execution of 150 civilians in the 
Congolese area of Kiwanja, and the lack of protection offered to civilians in both South Sudan 
(2008)
5
 and North Kivu (DRC, 2008).
6
  
 
The more prominent examples that will be key to this thesis are the failures to intervene in Kigali 
and Srebrenica. On 11 April 1994, the Belgian peacekeeping battalion (Kibat) based in Kigali 
(Rwanda) withdrew from a school where protection had been offered to 2000 civilian refugees. 
The next day, these refugees were brutally killed by the militia who had been waiting outside for 
the Belgians to leave. On 11 July 1995, history seemed to repeat itself. The Bosnian Serb Army 
(BSA) overran Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), which had been designated a UN safe 
haven. The Dutch peacekeeping battalion (Dutchbat) felt it had no option other than to allow the 
BSA to evacuate the compound. Under the pressure of BSA commander Colonel General Ratko 
Mladić, Dutchbat expelled hundreds of men from their compound and refused entry to thousands 
of others. In the following days, about 8000 Muslim men and boys were killed near the enclave. 
In answering the question whether these people could have been successfully protected by the 
Dutch battalion, differing views were held by the respective courts. Where the Hague District 
Court found  that the killings would have been substantially less likely had the troops offered 
protection,
7
 the Hague Court of Appeal thought this could not be said with enough certainty and 
therefore estimated that the chances of survival would have been 30 per cent.
 8
 The decisions to 
withdraw (Kigali) and surrender (Srebrenica) were subject to critical scrutiny, since the 
peacekeepers had already witnessed crimes being committed against the ethnic group under their 
protection at the time of that decision.  
 
These two cases have become symbolic of the difficulties faced by UN peacekeeping operations 
in fulfilling the expectations of protection that their very presence raises. The other examples 
                                                          
5
 Erin a Weir, ‘The Last Line of Defense: How Peacekeepers Can Better Protect Civilians’ [2010] Refugees 
International 1, 13. 
6
 Ibid 4. 
7
 The Hague District Court 16 July 2014 (Mothers of Srebrenica v the Netherlands 2014), 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:8562,  paras 4.331-4.333.  
8
  The Hague Court of Appeals 27 June 2017 (Mothers of Srebrenica v the Netherlands 2017),  
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:1761, para 67.1. 
15 
  
mentioned above can therefore only be seen in the light of what happened in Kigali and 
Srebrenica. The emerging case law on state responsibility in which the Netherlands and Belgium 
were held responsible for their failures to act against genocide yielded different results. The most 
recent judgment handed down in June 2017
9
 confirmed the partial responsibility of the 
Netherlands for its role in the deportation of 300 men from the Dutch United Nations (UN) 
compound in Srebrenica. With that judgment, the Appelate Court of the Hague overruled an 
earlier judgment of 2014 by the Hague District Court in which a full causal nexus between the 
Dutch troops’ conduct and the killings was established.10 In contrast, an interim judgment in 
Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and others v Belgium and others (hereafter: Mukeshimana) handed 
down by the Brussels District Court held the Belgian state responsible for failing to act against 
genocide. In this judgment, the Belgian commanders were furthermore held responsible under 
civil law for failing to act in the face of war crimes being committed.
11
 As such, the Brussels 
District Court implicated that the Belgian commanders should have acted and that legal 
consequences may arise where a commander failed to do so.  
 
In a similar vein, a committee of the most eminent criminal law experts in the Netherlands 
advised the Dutch Public Prosecutor to bring charges against the Dutchbat officials in relation to 
criminal complaints by Hasan Nuhanović and the Mustafić family against the Dutchbat 
commanders to the effect that they were at least partly responsible for the genocide and/or war 
crimes committed in Srebrenica.
12
 The committee saw scope for criminal responsibility. Five 
years later however, on 29 April 2015, the Arnhem Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal made 
against the Public Prosecutor’s refusal to file charges against Karremans cum suis.13 Some 
suggested that the decision might have been political, given that the Public Prosecutor and later 
                                                          
9
  The Hague Court of Appeals 27 June 2017 (Mothers of Srebrenica v the Netherlands 2017),  
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:1761. 
10
 Mothers of Srebrenica v the Netherlands 2014 (n 7) para 4.182. 
11
 Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and others v Belgium and others, Brussels Court of First instance, RG No 04/4807/A, 
07/15547/A, ILDC 1604 (BE 2010), 8th December 2010. 
12
 NOS Redactie Binnenland, ‘Vervolging Karremans dichterbij’, 9 May 2012 <http://nos.nl/artikel/371427-
vervolging-karremans-dichterbij.html> accessed 25 April 2017. The advisory opinion given by the Committee was 
an internal matter and has therefore not been published. Even the parties to the complaints procedure were not able 
to access the Committee’s report. As such, the exact reasoning of the Committee cannot be discussed. Its general 
conclusions were, however, publicly available. See also Mustafić-Mujić and others v the Netherlands App No 
49037/15 (30 August 2016) paras 35-37. 
13
 Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden 29 April 2015 (Mustafić & Nuhanović v Karremans, Franken & 
Oosterveen), ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:2968. 
16 
 
the Arnhem Court of Appeal disregarded the opinion of the expert committee. However, in 2016 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) did not find ‘that the investigations were 
ineffective or inadequate’,14 arguing that 
 
[t]he composite result of all these investigations is that specific and detailed official records now 
exist reflecting the circumstances in which Mr Rizo Mustafić, Mr Ibro Nuhanović and Mr 
Muhamed Nuhanović fell into the hands of the VRS and there is no lingering uncertainty as 
regards the nature and degree of involvement of Lieutenant Colonel Karremans, Major Franken 
and Warrant Officer Oosterveen respectively.
15
 
 
On that note the ECtHR dismissed any critique regarding the political reluctance of the Dutch 
state to prosecute the Dutchbat officials. However, this does not take away the concern that the 
exclusive assignation of criminal jurisdiction to the troop contributing country (TCC) is a 
potential weakness of the legal framework applicable to peace support operations.
16
 Where the 
effectiveness of disciplinary sanctions in deterring future misconduct in questionable,
17
 the Zeid 
report flags out another ‘fundamental problem’: ‘In respect of military members of national 
contingents, troop-contributing countries are often reluctant to admit publicly to acts of wrong 
doing and consequently lack the will to court-martial alleged offenders’.18 The same report notes 
that  
 
troop-contributing countries frequently complain that evidence gathered by mission boards of 
inquiry and in prior preliminary investigations is either not sufficient under their national law for 
use in subsequent judicial or court martial proceedings or has not been gathered in a manner 
required by their law. (…) In addition, peacekeeping missions do not have available on a routine 
basis expert personnel to assist in their investigations, nor do they have assistance from an expert 
prosecutor from the troop-contributing countries concerned who could advise on the requirements 
for subsequent action.
19
  
 
                                                          
14
 Mustafić-Mujić and others v the Netherlands (n 12) para 106. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Roisine Burke, ‘Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional Immunity’ (2011) 16 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 63, 67; Richard J Wilson and Emily Singer Hurvitz, ‘Human Rights Violations 
by Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia’ (2014) 21 Human Rights Brief 2, 3-4. 
17
 Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany, ‘The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding: A New Incentive for 
States to Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of National Peacekeeping Contingents?’ (2011) 16 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 321, 331. 
18
 UNGA ‘A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations’ (24 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/710 (‘Zeid Report’) para 67 (a). 
19
 Ibid para 28. 
17 
  
In the light of the Kigali and Srebrenica cases, one might question whether the exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction of the TCC would be suitable to apply to the cases at hand, and whether it would be 
preferable for international criminal courts to have jurisdiction over the conduct under review. 
The role of international criminal law in punishing misconduct by peacekeepers has been 
explored in relation to the alleged involvement of peacekeepers in acts of sexual violence.
20
 
Regarding the failure to act in PKOs however, the discussion in international law has not yet 
moved beyond discussing the role of the state. This might be because individual criminal liability 
for a failure to act is much debated to begin with. Another reason may be that an active role for 
international courts in the adjudication of peacekeepers could make states more reluctant to 
provide troops to PKOs.
21
 
 
It follows that the Dutch and Belgian cases sparked a debate in international law scholarship that 
addressed the limits of state responsibility and the limits of peacekeeping,
22
 but failed to address 
the question of the legal position of military commanders. Considering their disputed role in the 
                                                          
20
 Deen-Racsmany (n 17); Melanie O’Brien, ‘Sexual Exploitation and Beyond: Using the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court to Prosecute UN Peacekeepers for Gender-Based Crimes’ (2011) 11 International 
Criminal Law Review 803; Noelle Quenivet, ‘The Role of the International Criminal Court in the Prosecution of 
Peacekeepers for Sexual Offences’ in Roberta Arnold (ed), Law enforcement within the framework of peace support 
operations (Brill 2008). 
21
 The argumentation is generally that criminal jurisdiction is exclusively assigned to the TCC to not discourage 
states even further from contributing troops to PKOs, see Felicity Lewis, ‘Human Rights Abuses In U.N. 
Peacekeeping: Providing Redress And Punishment While Continuing Peacekeeping Missions For Humanitarian 
Progress’ (2014) 23 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 595, 599. 
22
 See i.e. Tom Dannenbaum, ‘Killings At Srebrenica, Effective Control, And The Power To Prevent Unlawful 
Conduct’ (2012) 61 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 713; Tom Dannenbaum, ‘Translating The Standard 
Of Effective Control Into A System Of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should Be Apportioned For 
Violations Of Human Rights By Member State Troop Contingents Serving As United Nations Peacekeepers’ (2010) 
51 Harvard International Law Journal 113; Andre Nollkaemper, ‘Dual Attribution: Liability of the Netherlands for 
Conduct of Dutchbat in Srebrenica’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1143; Vassilis P Tzevelekos, 
‘Reconstructing the Effective Control Criterion in Extraterritorial Human Rights Breaches: Direct Attribution of 
Wrongfulness, Due Diligence and Concurrent Responsibility’ (2015) 36 Michigan Journal of International Law 129; 
Berenice Boutin, ‘Responsibility Of The Netherlands For The Acts Of Dutchbat In Nuhanović And Mustafić: The 
Continuous Quest For A Tangible Meaning For “Effective Control” In The Context Of Peacekeeping’ (2012) 25 
Leiden Journal of International Law 521; Otto Spijkers, ‘Bystander Obligations at the Domestic and International 
Level Compared’ (2014) 6 Goettingen Journal of International Law 47; Amir Čengić, ‘The Netherlands v. 
Nuhanović & The Netherlands v. Mustafić-Mujić et al (Sup. Ct. Neth.), Introductory Note’ (2014) 53 International 
Legal Materials 512; Peter Rowe, ‘United Nations Peacekeepers and Human Rights Violations: The Role of Military 
Discipline: A Response to Dannenbaum’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal Online 69; August Reinisch, 
‘To What Extent Can and Should National Courts “Fill the Accountability Gap”?’ (2014) 10 International 
Organizations Law Review 572; Nico Schrijver, ‘Beyond Srebrenica and Haiti’ (2014) 10 International 
Organizations Law Review 588; Siobhan Wills, ‘Continuing Impunity of Peacekeepers: The Need for a Convention’ 
[2013] Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 47. 
18 
 
course of events, it appears justified to look beyond the confines of state responsibility and to 
focus on the individual obligations and potential responsibility of peacekeeping commanders, 
particularly in relation to civilian protection. Over the last decade, the protection of civilians has 
become a priority in UN peacekeeping operations.
23
 Good examples of operations with 
protection-focused mandates are the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
24
 and the United Nations 
Organisation Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO).
25
 This increased focus on civilian 
protection also reinforces the need for a clear understanding of the extent to which peacekeeping 
can offer that protection. More important, the extent to which the commanders are tasked with 
protecting civilians must be determined.  
 
If such obligations or tasks are identified, the question arises how the UN, TCCs and the 
international community deal with failures to fulfil these obligations or tasks. That the excessive 
use of force could cause liability and that the law is less clear on whether inaction may result in 
individual liability, results in peacekeeping troops averting the risk of accountability by choosing 
inaction over action.
26
 It is therefore of importance to look into the available accountability 
mechanisms and see what options are available to sanction a potential failure to act or 
contribution to the commission of a serious crime. That also requires us to look into the 
classification of the commanders’ conduct and whether it would fall under the jurisdiction of a 
domestic or international court. 
 
If it is a matter of international law, the options may be limited. The criminal responsibility of 
military commanders in armed conflict has been implemented by means of the command 
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responsibility doctrine.
27
 However, the context in which the doctrine has been used has always 
been one of armed conflict; the commander usually belongs to one of the warring parties. How 
can this apply if the commander belongs to an impartial third party? And how does the doctrine 
apply if the duty held by the commander is not based on his or her control over subordinates but 
on a relationship of protection? Scholars have looked at command responsibility in detail and 
have discussed the duties placed upon a superior to act to prevent and punish crimes (that are 
about to be) committed by their subordinates.
28
 However, these works failed to explore the 
possibility of a relationship of care between a military commander and civilians in PKOs. The 
developments in the Netherlands and Belgium imply that it is worth exploring this option at least 
under domestic law, and arguably also under international law. The assessment of a peacekeeping 
commander’s responsibility for failing to act under domestic or international law may require a 
critical and more elaborate review of rules under domestic and international law. This should not 
be limited to a relationship between the commander and the principal perpetrator, but may be 
extended to an assessment of the relationship between the commander and the civilian population 
that the commander’s troops came to protect.  
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This legal assessment of a failure to act on part of the commander depends to a great extent on 
the definition of the commander’s duty to act and its demarcation. One might question whether 
only legal duties give rise to legal responsibility, or whether having the capacity to act may result 
in liability as well. Considering the serious implications that failing to act had in Srebrenica and 
Rwanda, this needs to be addressed.
29
 The rationale underlying criminalisation of inaction 
depends on whether the inaction is considered active or passive perpetration and whether inaction 
may amount to criminal activity at all. Luc Walleyn, who represented the plaintiffs in 
Mukeshimana, compared the active crime of rape with the inaction of the Belgian commanders 
and declared: ‘If one consciously decides to surrender three thousand people to a group of 
murderers, I consider that at least as horrible as [the active crime of] rape. A soldier bears 
responsibility for the civilian population’.30 This responsibility is arguably part of the 
commander’s professional responsibility and may have its foundations in domestic or 
international law, as a doctor may owe a duty to do everything within his or her capabilities to 
save a patient on the operating table. Is that duty any different for a peacekeeping commander in 
relation to civilians under his or her care?
31
 
 
This research aims to answer the question of whether peacekeeping commanders could be held 
accountable for a failure to act against serious crimes committed against the civilian population 
they came to protect. Throughout the thesis it will become clear that this also requires assessing 
whether peacekeeping commanders have an obligation to act against such serious crimes being 
committed under domestic and international law. These assessments will be made using the cases 
of the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders as examples, but also by placing the 
analysis into the context of contemporary PKOs.  
 
If peacekeepers are allegedly involved in the commission of crimes on the territory of the host 
state, the host state normally has criminal jurisdiction over that crime based on the principle of 
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territorial jurisdiction.
32
 However, it has been accepted for centuries that the army is the ‘agent of 
the sovereign and functions under the permissions and limitations that the sovereign placed on 
it’.33 This thought is reflected in international agreements that prevent the host state from 
exercising that jurisdiction and instead, determine that the TCC has full criminal jurisdiction over 
its peacekeepers. The immunity of military personnel from criminal jurisdiction by the host state 
in PKOs is regulated by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the host state 
and the UN.
34
 Paragraph 47(b) of the Model SOFA assigns jurisdiction over crimes committed on 
host state territory to the TCC: ‘military members of the military component of the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective 
participating States in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in [the 
host country/territory]’.35 The rationale behind criminal jurisdiction for the TCC is to ensure a 
fair legal process where the local laws in the host state may be undemocratic or the law 
enforcement system may be dysfunctional due to a situation of armed conflict.
36
  
 
In assessing how the failure to act of peacekeeping commanders could be sanctioned, this thesis 
compares domestic and international criminal law approaches to inaction. While domestic law is 
more advanced in criminalising failures to act, the ad hoc tribunals have been influential in 
developing such responsibility on the international level. The thesis demonstrates the 
transformative effect that the jurisprudence of these courts has had on developing these complex 
forms of liability in international criminal law. Since the developments mainly took place in 
recent times, the jurisprudence of post-Second World War trials will only provide context to the 
issues discussed, but will not be considered in detail in the main parts of chapters 4 and 7. The 
jurisprudence of the ICC has not had a real effect on the discussion on omission and bystander 
liability yet, but has been important in the development of the command responsibility doctrine.
37
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The eligibility of the existing doctrines will be assessed based on the three general principles of 
criminal law: the principles of culpability, legality and fair labelling.
38
 Although the last principle 
is also known as ‘fairness’, the concept of ‘fair labelling’ has been recognised as such39 and 
seems of specific relevance in explaining some of the complexity experienced in criminalising 
inactive behaviour.  
 
The individual culpability principle requires that people are only held responsible for their own 
personal conduct.
40
 Or as the ICTY Appeals Chamber held in its Tadić judgment: ‘nobody may 
be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or 
in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa)’.41 As will become clear throughout the 
thesis, an important issue with criminalising inaction is that often someone will be incriminated 
based on another person’s conduct. Only if the liability is assigned based on a failure to act and 
not because of the criminal result that followed such a failure to act, the defendant would be held 
responsible for his or her failure to act alone.  
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The second principle is that of legality, which is also described as nulla poena nullum crimen sine 
lege or more simply as a combination of the principles of non-retroactivity, the prohibition of 
analogy, the principle of certainty and the prohibition of uncodified legal provisions.
42
 The crime 
should be clear prior to the act taking place, for people to know of the rule existing.
43
 The rule 
can be found in article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and article 22 (and article 23) of the Rome Statute (RS) and serves to protect the individual by 
recognising the individual’s weakness in the legal system.44 It ensures that the criminality of 
conduct is foreseeable.  
 
In the light of the cases under review, the third principle, fair labelling, is arguably most important 
for the peacekeeping commander. Fair labelling refers to the idea that the stigma attached to the 
defendant should be proportionate to the actual wrongfulness.
45
 Together the three principles 
provide a benchmark for judiciary to assess whether criminal liability would be appropriate. The 
following section sets out the structure of the thesis in more detail. 
 
1.2 Structure  
 
Chapter 2 describes the course of events in Srebrenica and Kigali that supported the legal 
proceedings to which reference is made above. Then the legal steps taken in Dutch and Belgian 
domestic courts will be discussed in more detail. Before legal accountability arises, the state must 
fulfil its duty to investigate under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). An attempt to hold the Dutch commanders accountable for their positive contribution to 
the crimes committed by the Bosnian Serb Army in Srebrenica was unsuccessful. Criminal 
responsibility for a failure to protect could thus be more suitable. Chapters 3 and 4 therefore look 
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into the option of establishing liability for a criminal omission, which requires a legal duty to act. 
The factual and legal findings of the Dutch and Belgian cases discussed in chapter 2 will be 
applied in assessing whether the conduct of the commanders would reach certain thresholds set 
for individual criminal responsibility by omission under domestic and international law. Both the 
literature, the law and jurisprudence on omissions is considered and attention will be given to the 
different views represented by each of these sources. On the domestic level a further comparison 
will be made between common and civil law. These findings will then be compared with the 
stance taken towards this matter in international criminal law in chapter 4.  
 
Both domestic and international law could be relevant; domestic law because a peacekeeping 
commander is always bound by its domestic law and may be adjudicated by its domestic court, 
and international law is valuable as a guideline to interpreting international law in domestic 
courts. For example, the RS is of relevance since the signatories to the RS, eg the Netherlands 
and Belgium, have implemented the Statute in their domestic legal systems. As discussed above, 
the general reluctance to prosecute military officials in the domestic realm is another reason to 
consider the limits and value of international law in this regard.  Chapter 4 will also assess 
whether international criminal courts have jurisdiction over the conduct under review, and to 
what extent international law could be of significance in adjudicating the commanders’ conduct 
in domestic courts. The comparative analysis also provides insights into the modality of criminal 
liability attached to the accused: does the liability solely refer to failing to fulfil a legal duty or 
does the liability extend to the consequences of that failure, making the non-actor an accomplice 
to the commission of the crime? 
 
Chapter 5 builds on the domestic case law in the Netherlands and Belgium in assessing the extent 
to which the commanders may have had a duty to protect, as required for a criminal omission to 
arise. It also analyses international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law 
(IHL) and the interpretation thereof to see to what extent it applies to peacekeeping commanders 
and what norms within these paradigms may contribute to an obligation to act. Protection is 
defined differently in IHL and IHRL, and in the context of peacekeeping. This troubles the 
argument made by some scholars who argue that protective norms stemming from these legal 
paradigms apply in PKOs, but should be interpreted in a contextual way. Negative obligations of 
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protection are then explained as positive obligations depending on the context in which they are 
being applied. This chapter will argue that there may be an expectation of protection, but that 
there is no legal duty to do so. The expectation extends to the idea that commanders should do 
everything within their means to protect the civilian population. This may include monitoring the 
security situation, reporting and undertaking steps to request further support for the civilians 
under their care. This could be defined as a moral duty, which could be included in the mandate 
on the one hand, but could also be derived from their profession as a trained and higher ranked 
soldier. The expectation is furthermore strengthened by the TCC’s extraterritorial obligation to 
guarantee the non-derogable human rights to the civilian population in the area under their 
control. Although it is difficult to define an appropriate type of responsibility for failing to fulfil a 
moral duty, bystander responsibility as discussed in chapter 6 and 7 may be suitable for this 
purpose. 
 
A bystander witnesses a crime without having a specific duty to act. While omission liability 
requires a specific legal duty to act and the attendant failure to fulfil that duty, bystander 
responsibility criminalises inaction based on the encouraging or approving effect of someone’s 
inactive presence at the scene of the crime. The presence of the defendant with a certain authority 
(eg a commander) near or at the scene of the crime may have an encouraging effect on the 
perpetrators of a crime. Similarly, the presence of an individual with a certain authority can be 
interpreted as tacit approval of the crimes taking place. In international law this may be framed as 
aiding and abetting through encouragement or tacit approval. In some domestic laws this is 
referred to as ‘presence at the scene of the crime’ or ‘not distancing oneself from a crime’. I will 
argue here that despite the focus on the positive effect of the defendant’s presence, the underlying 
rationale might be that the defendant’s authority raised an expectation to act, which I will refer to 
as a general duty or moral obligation.  
 
The degree of liability
46
 assigned to the defendants for both omission and bystander liability is 
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high. Also, the liability extends to the criminal result instead of creating responsibility for the 
actual failure to act. If we then consider the general principles of criminal law to assess whether it 
would be just to apply these modes of liability to the Dutch and Belgian commanders, it seems 
unlikely that the commanders could be held responsible using these forms of liability. Using the 
principles of culpability, legality and fair labelling indicates that the outcomes would not be 
foreseeable because, in part, the requirements applied in the judgments under review differ from 
the elements required by law. Also, the label attached to peacekeeping commanders would seem 
disproportionate to their actual role in the commission of the crimes. In addition, the 
peacekeepers would not be held responsible for their own conduct (a failure to act), but for the 
crime committed by the principal(s).  
 
Chapter 8 offers an outlook on liability for inaction for peacekeeping commanders from a 
normative perspective. It lists alternative options to the criminal liability discussed. The 
development of a separate doctrine for peacekeeping commanders within international criminal 
law is one alternative discussed here, but this chapter also explores the use of tort liability in the 
domestic realm as a reasonable alternative to criminal liability. In particular, if a legal obligation 
to act would apply to the peacekeeping commander (eg through the domestic law of the TCC), a 
type of civil responsibility could arise that is similar to failing to meet a due diligence obligation 
by states. Some of these alternatives may however contribute to the further fragmentation of 
international law; a development not always considered desirable. Therefore, this thesis also 
looks into the option of developing a separate legal paradigm applicable to PKOs. This separate 
paradigm could then include a clearer definition of what peacekeeping commanders are legally 
required to do, without harming the interpretation of current law.  
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Chapter 2: Peacekeeping Failures and their Legal Aftermath 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
To answer the main question of whether the peacekeeping commander can be held accountable 
for failing to act against serious crimes committed against civilians who he or she came to protect, 
let us first return to the cases that triggered the debate on this matter. This chapter focuses on the 
two cases that have touched on accountability for peacekeeping failures: the actions brought in 
relation to the withdrawal of the Belgian battalion from Kigali (April 1994) and the fall of the 
enclave in Srebrenica (July 1995). Then the domestic court cases in Belgium and the Netherlands 
regarding the liability of these TCCs will be considered. Before focusing on the role of the 
individual commanders within a PKO in more detail, section 2.4 sets out the command and 
control structure within such operations. In the fifth section, we will then turn to the Dutch 
criminal complaint procedure, Mustafić & Nuhanović v Karremans, Franken & Oosterveen, in 
which the individual criminal responsibility of the Dutch peacekeeping commanders has been 
assessed. Although it focused on a positive contribution to the commission of crimes and 
command responsibility under Dutch criminal law, this case demonstrates that establishing 
liability for such a positive contribution to crimes committed by others faces several obstacles. 
However, as we will then discuss, it is important that the TCC launches an effective investigation 
into potential complicity in the commission of criminal conduct, since the ECHR requires this of 
its signatories. 
 
2.2 Case Studies 
 
2.2.1 Kigali
47
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Following the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement on 4 August 1993, the United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was developed to oversee the implementation of the 
agreement. The first phase of UNAMIR included the creation of a ‘secure area’ in the Rwandan 
capital of Kigali. The mandate, adopted on 5 October 1993 (UNSC Resolution 872)
48
 called on 
the force to ‘contribute to the security of the city of Kigali’.49 It was the Belgian infantry 
battalion, Kibat, which took responsibility for the strategic positions in the city to fulfil this 
task.
50
 
 
The Rwandan genocide was sparked to a large extent by the death of President Habyarimana, 
whose plane was shot down on 6 April 1994. The tensions were running high within hours after 
this attack, which led Prime Minster Agathe Uwilingiyimana to seek refuge on the UN 
Volunteers compound on 7 April 1994.
51
 The next day, Prime Minister Uwilingliyimina was 
found dead and 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed by Interahamwe militias.
52
 Different 
hypotheses were raised afterwards on why the peacekeepers were killed. One option raised was 
that the peacekeepers were ‘considered responsible’ for the death of president Habyarimana.53 
Another option was that the peacekeepers witnessed the killing of Prime Minister 
Uwilingliyimina, but the Belgian Inquiry Committee considered this unlikely as they were not 
present when she was killed.
54
 More likely, it was part of a political plan to force the withdrawal 
of the Belgian contingent, which would allow the militias greater freedom to act as they saw fit.
55
 
Depicting the Belgians as the ones who downed President Habyarimana’s plane was part of that 
plan.
56
 This sparked political executions of which the UN, despite guarding these politicians’ 
houses, seemed unaware or to which a blind eye was turned.
57
 Despite being present, UNAMIR 
soldiers did not even attempt to prevent the abduction and severe mistreatment of Judge 
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Kavaruganda and his family. To provide some form of protection to politicians likely to be 
targeted in further attacks, the UN soldiers took them to the École Technique Officiele (ETO), a 
secondary school, at the outskirts of Kigali.
58
 About 2000 Rwandan civilians sought protection in 
the school between 7 and 11 April 1994, while members of the Rwandan militia stood outside.
59
 
Captain Luc Lemaire was the commander of the Belgian battalion residing in the ETO.
60
 In 
response to the threat of the militia, Colonel Luc Marchal (sector commander in Kigali and 
commander of the Belgian battalion)
61
 instructed Lemaire to evacuate ‘only the white people’ 
from the school.
62
 Despite requests by some refugees to be evacuated with the French and 
Belgian ‘expatriates’, these requests were denied.63 Meanwhile, the Belgian contingent was 
preparing its own withdrawal from the school.
64
  
 
When the Belgian contingent withdrew from the school on 11 April, its forces left men, women 
and children in the hands of the Rwandan soldiers and Interahamwe militia members standing 
outside.
65
 The refugees tried to get on the UN jeeps as they left, warning the peacekeepers that 
they were leaving them in the hands of their murderers. Mrs Mukeshimana, the wife of the 
former minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the Belgian battalion that her husband and others 
would be killed with machetes.
66
 Despite knowing this, the Belgians refused to evacuate her 
husband.
67
 The French battalion that arrived at the ETO at a later stage agreed to bring the former 
minister to the French Ambassador.
68
 The Belgian military commander however did not allow 
them to do so.
69
 The refugees, including Mr Mukeshimana, were tortured, raped and massacred 
after the troops had left.
70
 Inquiries held by the UN and the French and Belgian governments 
attempted to assign responsibility for the decision to withdraw the troops. Captain Lemaire 
declared in the Belgian inquiry that Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Dewez, commander of Kibat II, 
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authorised him to abandon the refugees with the approval of Colonel Marchal.
71
  
 
The UN considered that the withdrawal endangered the situation of the civilians even further: 
 
During the early days of the genocide, thousands of civilians congregated in places where UN 
troops were stationed, i.a., the Amahoro Stadium and the Ecole Technique at Kicukiro. And when 
UNAMIR later came to withdraw from areas under its protection, civilians were placed at risk. 
Tragically, there is evidence that in certain instances, the trust placed in UNAMIR by civilians left 
them in a situation of greater risk when the UN troops withdrew than they would have been 
otherwise.
72
  
 
The UN report furthermore clarified that, when the UNAMIR contingent at ETO left, there 
‘could not have been any doubt as to the risk of massacre which awaited the civilians who had 
taken refuge with them’.73 Additionally, the UN inquiry confirmed that  
 
the manner in which the troops left, including attempts to pretend to the refugees that they were 
not in fact leaving, was disgraceful. If such a momentous decision as that to evacuate the ETO 
school was taken without orders from the Force Commander, that shows grave problems of 
command and control within UNAMIR.
74
  
 
The report suggested that the decision to withdraw was taken by the Belgian commanders within 
UNAMIR.
75
 The Belgian parliamentary investigation, finalised in 1997, indicated that the 
division of command positions was anything but well organised. The Canadian Force 
Commander, Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, had decided relatively late that Kibat would 
have a separate sector commander, Luc Marchal. Marchal was added to the chain of command 
after the staff had been prepared for their mission.
76
 The circumstances in which Marchal had to 
operate were difficult, due to the lack of proper organisation.  
 
The objective of UNAMIR was defined as ‘contributing to the security and protection of 
displaced persons, refugees and civilians in danger in Rwanda, by means, including the 
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establishment and maintenance, where possible, of safe humanitarian areas’.77 The withdrawal of 
the Belgian troops left the impression that the Belgians had prioritised their own security at the 
expense of the lives of the refugees who stayed at the ETO.  
However, the UN was also critical of its own duty. In its report the committee held that 
 
[f]aced in Rwanda with the risk of genocide, and later the systematic implementation of a 
genocide, the United Nations had a duty to act which transcended the basic principles of 
peacekeeping. In effect, there can be no neutrality in the face of genocide, no impartiality in the 
face of an effort to exterminate part of a population.
78
  
 
In doing so, the UN highlights a main difficulty in carrying out PKOs in such complex 
circumstances: the practice of PKOs has undermined the traditional principles of peacekeeping. 
These principles are host state consent, impartiality of the troops and the non-use of force.
79
 
 
2.2.2 Srebrenica 
 
On 18 April 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 819 which established the safe 
area in and around the East Bosnian town of Srebrenica.
80
 The Dutch battalion, Dutchbat I, took 
positions in the area from 1 March 1994, with their main task being the defence of the enclave 
against external attacks. When Dutchbat III took over on 18 January 1995
81
 the Bosnian Serb 
Army (BSA) had increased its power over the area substantially. As a result, Dutchbat was 
restrained in its abilities to carry out its defensive task. Two infantry companies of about 300 men 
were divided over 8 observation posts. In contrast, the Serb army consisted of 1000-2000 well-
equipped troops and the Bosnian army had 3000-4000 ill-equipped men and women at its 
disposal.
82
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In the days preceding the fall of the enclave, some 25000 refugees moved towards the UN 
compound in Potočari, near Srebrenica, as the situation in the town of Srebrenica deteriorated. 
Only 5000 could access the compound. The other 20000 had to remain outside the compound 
with no real protection in place.
83
 Although there was no specific instruction to do so, the gates of 
the compound were closed. The decision to close the gates ensured at least that ‘the situation was 
clear’ as Major Franken, deputy commander of Dutchbat III, stated in his witness hearing.84 He 
added that ‘the compound was most suitable to gather people considering their mission to prevent 
human suffering. The compound could be easily supervised’.85 
 
The attack leading to the fall of the enclave started on 6 July and lasted for a week. The BSA 
targeted the Dutchbat compound, with some of the observation posts being under severe attack.
86
 
The military observers in the sector ‘North-East’ reported that Dutchbat personnel were being 
targeted by BSA soldiers. Although the BSA formed a serious threat to both Dutchbat and the 
Bosnian Muslims, Lieutenant Colonel Karremans refused to return the weapons to the Bosnian 
Muslims taken from them as part of the mission’s mandate ‘to disarm the warring parties’.87 
Although the BSA did not aim for the invasion of the entire enclave, this became its objective as 
it became clear to its soldiers that the Dutch offered little resistance to the attacks.
88
 30 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers were taken hostage on 9 July, when the BSA took over the enclave.
89
  
 
By this time, air support had been granted: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
agreed to carry out precision attacks on 11 July. Due to miscommunications however, these 
attacks never took place.
90
 In June 2015, the publication of several documents that had remained 
secret since 1995, caused further upheaval regarding the question who cancelled the air support 
and on what grounds this decision was based.
91
 Regardless of the exact course of events, 
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Karremans reported to Dutch and UN authorities that he was in a difficult position. He wrote in 
his report to the authorities in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Tuzla and The Hague that ‘there are now more 
than 15000 people within one square kilometre, including the battalion, in an extreme[ly] 
vulnerable position: the sitting duck position, not able to defend these people at all’.92 He further 
observed: 
 
I am responsible for these people [yet] I am not able to: defend these people; defend my own 
battalion; find suitable representatives among the civilians because the official authorities are for 
certain reasons not available; find representatives among the military authorities because they are 
trying to fight for a corridor to the Tuzla area, and will not show up anyway because of purely 
personal reasons; manage to force ARBiH [Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina] 
troops to hand over their weapons ... In my opinion there is one way out: negotiations today at the 
highest level: United Nations Secretary-General, highest national authorities and both Bosnian 
Serb and Bosnian Government.
93
  
 
In the difficult circumstances that had arisen, Karremans requested the preparation of an 
evacuation plan. This was finalised on 12 July. The plan included the evacuation of small groups 
of people in buses provided by the international community.
94
 When the plan was carried out, the 
BSA only allowed women and elderly men to enter the buses. The BSA soldiers stressed that the 
able-bodied men were taken away to be questioned and would be treated in compliance with the 
Geneva Conventions.
95
 Dutchbat could not monitor this, since they could not escort each bus 
individually.
96
 While evacuating the compound, Dutchbat noticed that men and women were 
being separated, that men were being physically abused and that the men’s passports were burned 
before they entered the buses. Meanwhile, gunshots were audible, since the hills reverberated 
with the sound of the continuous killings taking place.
97
 Additionally, Dutchbat soldiers noticed 
the next day that groups of men were kept separate from others on a football pitch. Bodies of men 
who appeared to have been executed were found by Dutch soldiers near the compound.
98
 The 
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UN's chief political officer in Bosnia, Philip Corwin, already reckoned that the situation would 
not end well for the Muslim population, as he wrote in his diary on 12 July:  
 
Not a single one of us believes that the Moslem population of Srebrenica will be safe. The 
pattern is all too familiar, and it is a pattern used by Croats and Moslems as well. The draft-age 
men will be separated from their families, then tortured, imprisoned, executed. Women will be 
raped. Mass graves will be hurriedly dug to hide the evidence.
99
 
 
That same day, the remaining refugees in the compound hall were sent away from the Dutch 
base.
100
 Dutchbat’s local personnel could stay and were to be evacuated with Dutchbat. A list was 
drawn up with the names of the Dutch soldiers and 29 other individuals working for them at the 
time.
101
 Rizo Mustafić, working as an electrician, was on this list.102 None of the BSA soldiers 
had raised any objections to Karremans’ instruction to Major Franken to evacuate the local 
employees with the Dutchbat soldiers.
103
 Despite his name being on the list, Mustafić was told by 
personnel officer Adjutant Berend Oosterveen to leave the compound, although Mustafić 
declared that he would stay.
104
 Franken stated in his later witness accounts that he told 
Oosterveen after this incident that this was an ‘immense stupidity’.105 Mustafić was indeed forced 
to leave the compound. His remains were found in 2010. 
 
The situation of Hasan Nuhanović, working as interpreter, was different. He was told that he 
would be evacuated with the Dutch soldiers.
106
 His family residing at the compound however was 
not granted the same level of protection. Nuhanović very well knew of the fate of the men who 
were ‘evacuated’ and taken to the hills of Potočari. After sharing his concerns with the Dutchbat 
staff, Franken decided that no exception could be made for Nuhanović’s family members. Major 
De Haan, UN military observer, later stated that he and the other officials believed this was the 
only chance for Nuhanović and his family to leave the compound.107 To save Nuhanović and his 
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family, De Haan made serious efforts to put the names of the Nuhanović family on the list of 
personnel that could be evacuated with Dutchbat.
108
 Franken however, noticed that De Haan lied 
about Nuhanović’ brother being a new employee, and crossed out his name off the list.109 
Franken allowed Nuhanović’s father to stay at the compound with his son Hasan. This would 
mean leaving his youngest son, Nuhanović’s younger brother, to go onto the buses alone.110 His 
father refused to let him get on the bus alone, and he accompanied his son on the bus leading to 
an almost certain death. Franken acknowledged later that he sent these people off the Dutch base 
in the awareness that they would be killed.
111
 It is this awareness and the observations made 
during the evacuation that indicate that the incompetence of the commanders may have been 
worthy of blame. The next section describes in more detail which legal steps were taken after the 
events in Kigali and Srebrenica and assesses the main conclusions drawn by the courts regarding 
the conduct of the battalions and their commanders. 
 
2.3 Legal Steps taken in Domestic Courts 
 
2.3.1 Belgium: Prosecutor v Marchal and Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and others v Belgium and 
others 
 
Belgium’s involvement in the UNAMIR peacekeeping operation resulted in two court cases in 
Belgium. The first, Prosecutor v Marchal,
112
 considered the criminal and civil responsibility of 
Sector Commander Colonel Marchal for the death of the 10 Belgian paratroopers. The second 
case, Mukeshimana
113
 dealt with the civil liability of both the state and the Belgian military 
commanders for the decision to withdraw the troops from the ETO and the consequences this 
decision arguably had. 
 
In the first case, Marchal was charged with the commission of involuntary homicide in relation to 
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the 10 Belgian paratroopers who were killed by the Interahamwe militias on 7 April 1994.
114
 The 
Court concluded that Marchal did not act negligently in failing to prevent their deaths. In its 
discussion of the law, the military court held that ‘the lack of foresight does not have to be the 
immediate cause of involuntary manslaughter. Causation by negligence, lack of foresight or 
precaution suffices’.115 The Court held that a low threshold for the mens rea would be sufficient. 
Although the military auditor had argued that Marchal could have foreseen the situation 
considering the ongoing hate campaign against the Belgian peacekeepers, the Court argued that a 
lack of precaution could not be demonstrated. The final assessment of Marchal’s liability was 
based on a test of reasonableness, whereby the Court assessed whether another commander in the 
exact same circumstances would have acted in the same way.
116
 Only when ‘the personal abilities 
of the defendant for responsibility exceed those of a normally prudent and reasonable person’, 
would an exception be made and the defendant’s responsibility be determined without applying 
the reasonableness test.
117
  
 
The military judge held that foreseeability and awareness could not be considered, since events 
taking place after the tortious act should not be taken into account.
118
 Foreseeability and 
awareness are mentioned as examples that cannot fulfil the element of ‘knowledge’.119 However, 
such an approach seems contrary to the accepted belief that foreseeability and awareness are 
important in establishing criminal responsibility, particularly if the defendant is in a superior 
position.
120
 The higher expectations raised by the superior position were clarified when the Court 
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noted the need ‘to take into account that the defendant is a person with public authority, both on 
the national and international level’.121 This authority however, would depend on the 
commander’s position in the chain of command. A relationship of subordination between 
different levels of command would limit that authority to a certain extent, particularly on the 
‘geopolitical and strategic level’.122 If the complaint would, for instance, be related to exercising 
a specific task assigned to the battalion or applicable to the area in which that battalion is based, 
the battalion commander would have a great deal of responsibility for carrying out that task 
diligently. The battalion commander exercises command on the tactical level.
123
 Although 
Marchal was a sector commander, he was still a part of the tactical level of command as he was 
also placed under the Force Commander.
124
 The argument that a specific unit itself is responsible 
for the tasks assigned to them was confirmed by the judge. The Court held that the primary 
control is, in the first place, in hands of the given unit and that, only in the second place, would 
that control lie with the superior who gave orders to that unit.
125
 The Court concluded:  
 
Even, as far as this additional control is concerned, the sector commander is in no way to blame, 
since the information in the file shows that, on several occasions, the accused himself has 
supervised the execution of his orders by the subordinate units (cf for instance to such vital point 
as was the airport and the orders for appropriate ammunition, in particular to defend this 
target).
126
 
 
By giving orders and supervising the execution of those orders, Marchal had fulfilled his part of 
the task. After the orders have been given by the higher levels of command, it is up to the 
battalion level commander to decide how these orders should be exercised and it will be his or 
her task to instruct his underlings to do so. The judge also held that the only culpable conduct on 
part of Marchal was his failure to draw up an emergency plan; however, the judge found that the 
causal nexus between the absence of such a plan and the death of the paratroopers could not be 
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established.
127
 As such, Marchal was not to blame for their deaths. The Court found it would have 
required too much time to prepare any form of effective intervention.
128
 As a result, the Court 
acquitted Marchal. For our purposes, the main point of interest to be taken from this case is that 
the responsibility for certain tasks remains with the specific unit, which implies that 
accountability in these circumstances is more likely to be imposed on the level of battalion 
command than on the higher level of force command.  
 
In the second case, Mukeshimana, the survivors and relatives of victims of the mass killing that 
took place in the ETO filed a civil complaint against the Belgian state and the commanders, Luc 
Marchal, Joseph Dewez and Luc Lemaire. The plaintiffs argued there was a causal link between 
the decision to withdraw the Belgian battalion and the killings that took place after the Belgians 
left.
129
 The Brussels District Court’s interim decision indicated that the complaint might be 
justified, since both the state and the officials knew of the atrocities going on in the wider area 
outside the school before their withdrawal. It stated that  
 
[t]he commanders could not have been ignorant of the war crimes committed on a large scale in 
Rwanda before the evacuation of the ETO, and of the fact that such crimes would be perpetrated 
against the ETO refugees once the protection by the Belgian soldiers came to an end. The 
commanders could have had no illusion as to the fate that awaited the refugees after the departure 
of the Belgian blue helmets.
130
 
 
The District Court further confirmed the causal connection between leaving the people 
unprotected and the crimes that took place after the withdrawal.
131
 The defence counsel argued 
that the Belgian troops were only following orders, which should relieve them from guilt, and that 
the troops were under the command and control of the UN rather than the Belgian state.
132
 These 
defences were rejected.
133
 An argument made by the defence that alternative solutions were 
sought to protect the civilians before the troops were withdrawn was not found to lessen the 
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culpability associated with the withdrawal either.
134
 An important factor was that the passive 
presence of the battalions was considered sufficient to keep the militias from attacking the 
refugees. The withdrawal was particularly culpable considering that the refugees had the status of 
protected persons under the Geneva Conventions.
135
  
 
The Court also held that the military officials acted on behalf of the state, which meant that their 
conduct could result in state responsibility.
136
 The decision to withdraw was taken outside the UN 
chain of command, since the Belgian commanders consulted only their national military superiors 
and state representatives. Therefore, they were acting under de facto Belgian command and 
control.
137
 Two separate reproaches were addressed to the state on the one hand and the military 
officials on the other: the former was said to have failed to intervene to prevent the commission of 
genocide; the latter were said to have failed to act ‘in the face of war crimes taking place’.138  
 
Regarding the specific failure of the commanders to act while knowing that war crimes were 
about to be committed, the Court referred to command responsibility as included in article 
136septies (5) of the Belgian Penal Code (BPC).
139
 The outcome of the Court’s analysis is 
particularly relevant to this thesis. The Court rejected the defence counsel’s argument that 
command responsibility only referred to the relationship between the military official and his or 
her subordinates, leaving the option of command responsibility for conduct committed by third 
parties like the Interahamwe militias open. It held that this limitation is not included in article 
136septies (5) of the BPC.
140
 This demonstrates that the Belgian law has its own definition of the 
notion of superior or command responsibility. Applying such a domestic definition of the crime to 
conduct engaged in at the international level may lead to confusion, given that another definition 
exists in international law. While ‘superior responsibility’ was referred to on the domestic level, it 
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would not have been an option under international criminal law. The perpetrators are not 
subordinates of the commanders, and that relationship will not fulfil the subordination 
requirement in article 28 of the Rome Statute. It is thus important to compare the approaches 
taken in domestic and international criminal law: the outcome of a trial at the domestic level may 
differ from one at the international level depending on the definitions and interpretations used by 
the courts. With the conduct of the Belgian and Dutch commanders taking place in the context of 
international crimes being committed, but with exclusive criminal jurisdiction being assigned to 
the TCC, both domestic and international law may be relevant.  
 
By establishing that, on other occasions, protection from UN troops prevented civilians from 
being killed, the Court observed that there was no need to step outside the limitations imposed 
upon the battalion by the Rules of Engagement (ROE): the passive presence of the troops was a 
sufficient measure to protect the civilians.
141
 That, according to the Court, was sufficient to 
conclude that there was a causal connection between that protection being removed and the later 
death of the refugees.
142
 That refugees were also killed outside the compound did not break that 
chain of causality.
143
  
 
The most interesting aspects were, however, not discussed in this judgment: the blameworthiness 
of the commanders and the exact compensation to be paid to the victims. This will be addressed 
in the still pending follow-up judgment. The Court clarified that it deems the commanders 
culpable for their decision to withdraw. That the perpetrators were not the commanders’ 
subordinates, did not affect the Court’s finding of culpability. 
 
2.3.2 The Netherlands: Mothers of Srebrenica and Nuhanović/Mustafić  
 
The legal aftermath of the Srebrenica genocide is difficult to capture. Different courts have not 
only discussed different aspects of the cases, but the outcomes have also demonstrated that there 
has been a considerable development in how the facts are interpreted. The question of attribution 
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will be left aside as it concerns state responsibility; instead our focus will be on the conduct of the 
Dutch battalion and the role of the commanders in the events. This will allow us to look into 
whether the judgments leave scope to consider the role of the military commander as a 
responsible actor in later chapters. 
 
First, it is relevant to map the different cases and the complaints raised by the plaintiffs. There are 
two concurrent yet separate procedures that have petitioned for the attribution of state 
responsibility based on tort law. In both Nuhanović/Mustafić v the Netherlands144 and Mothers of 
Srebrenica v the Netherlands
145
 the plaintiffs asked for a form of civil responsibility to be 
ascribed to the state for its alleged role in the death of their relatives. There is however a 
difference in the scope of their complaints and in the way these judgments must be interpreted. 
The Nuhanović/Mustafić case looked at responsibility for the deaths of three specific men, while 
the plaintiffs in Mothers of Srebrenica hoped to establish liability for the death of a group of 300 
men who remained at the compound and who were forced to leave the compound after the 
enclave had fallen.  
 
The civil legal aftermath started with the Nuhanović/Mustafić families who sought legal redress, 
claiming the state and the military commanders had failed to prevent the deaths of their family 
members, despite being able to do so. In 2008, the District Court in The Hague ruled that the 
Dutch state could not be held accountable for Dutchbat’s conduct since it was related to the UN 
mandate and it was the UN’s responsibility that needed to be assessed.146 As such, the Court 
declined jurisdiction. In July 2014, The Hague District Court confirmed that actions outside of 
the powers given to Dutchbat by the mandate could be classified as ultra vires conduct, and were 
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attributable to the TCC. Wrongful conduct taking place within the limits of the mandate or 
contrary to the mandate, however, fell outside the scope of the TCC’s powers147 and fell within 
the remit of the UN.
148
 Given that the UN was immune from prosecution, legal redress for any 
wrongful conduct attributable to it was impossible. This is a further reason why assessing the 
means to sanction peacekeepers at an individual level is important. Without remedies to sanction 
individuals, peacekeeping conduct may fall within this grey area of law in which establishing 
liability on part of any of the actors involved is complicated due to the constraints posed by 
organizational or individual immunity. This limits the victims’ relatives in their right to claim 
compensation for injuries or to seek redress for injustice. 
 
The Nuhanović/Mustafić case reached an important point in 2013, when the Dutch Supreme 
Court confirmed that the state was responsible for not preventing the deaths of the three men. In 
doing so, the Court confirmed that it was ‘the duty of peacekeepers to protect individuals within 
their control when the peacekeepers are aware of the risk that crimes may be committed against 
those individuals’.149 This was based on the rationale that Dutchbat was informed about the 
commission of serious crimes near the compound, and nevertheless agreed to evacuate the men 
from the compound. Given the authority that Dutchbat had over the compound, they could keep 
those seeking refuge on the compound and could have continued to offer them protection.
150
 
 
As mentioned, the complaints in the Mothers of Srebrenica cases concerned a wider group of 
people than the indictment in the Nuhanović/Mustafić judgments. The foundation Mothers of 
Srebrenica represents the relatives of approximately 300 men who were killed after being 
expelled from the Dutch compound. 
 
After the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court in Mothers of Srebrenica v the Netherlands and 
United Nations that it could not rule on the responsibility of the UN due to that organisation’s 
immunity, the Mothers of Srebrenica started new proceedings against the Netherlands.
151
 This 
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resulted in the much debated judgment handed down on 16 July 2014.
152
 A decision by the 
appellate court of The Hague was given on 27 June 2017. I will consider both judgments in the 
discussion that follows. In the 2014 judgment, The Hague District Court ruled that the Dutch 
state is responsible for the deportation of 300 men who resided at the UN compound in 
Potočari.153 The Court remarkably broadened the liability of the Dutch state  compared to the 
previous judgments. The 2014 judgment implied that Dutchbat acted wrongfully, not only 
because the Dutch should have known that the men were in danger, but also because Dutchbat, 
and thus the state, had full control over the compound.
154
 The latter conclusion was confirmed by 
the appellate Court of The Hague in its 2017 judgment.
155
 Both the District Court and the 
Appelate Court appeared to have considered the decision of whether or not to protect the refugees 
on the compound to be in Dutch hands, although the Court of Appeal confirmed that the state did 
not influence this decision, since this fell under the responsibility of the Dutch commanders.
156
 
However, the Hague Court of Appeal remained undecided on the question of whether the Dutch 
should have known that the men were at risk of genocide.
157
  
 
The Hague District Court furthermore found a causal nexus between the wrongful conduct 
attributable to the state and the killings that took place. The Court reasoned that these 300 men 
would most likely not have been killed had Dutchbat allowed the men to stay on the 
compound.
158
 Therefore, the District Court found that the deportation facilitated the killings. On 
this count, the Hague Court of Appeal disagreed again with the position taken by the District 
Court. The Appelate Court argued that it cannot be determined with sufficient certainty what 
would have happened to the refugees if they had been allowed to stay on the compound on 13 
July.
159
  Instead, it estimated that the chances of survival, had the refugees been allowed to stay 
on the compound, was 30%, which is the proportion of damages the State is therefore required to 
pay to the victims’ relatives.160 The Appelate Court however did reinstate the District Court’s 
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observation that Dutchbat, by assisting the evacuation and the separation of men and women, 
facilitated the killings.
161
 Remarkably, the Appelate Court deemed the causal nexus between the 
facilitation and the killings unworthy of  reparations, but did want to make this statement by 
means of redress to the victims’ relatives.162  
  
In a similar vein, the District Court did not state that either Dutchbat or the Netherlands was 
responsible for the deaths of the 300 men, but it also found that helping the BSA soldiers deport 
these men amounted to culpable conduct.
163
 It deemed Dutchbat’s engagement in the deportation 
specifically wrongful.
164
 The Court considered Dutchbat’s involvement in the deportation against 
the background that Gobilliard instructed the forces ‘to take all reasonable measures to protect 
refugees and civilians in your care’. This led the District Court to conclude that Dutchbat would 
not have violated instructions of the Dutch government or the UN, ordering them to assist the 
evacuation, if they had kept the able-bodied men on the compound due to the risk that these men 
would be killed.
165
 Assisting the deportation of the Bosnian Muslims clearly breached the 
instruction given by Gobilliard which came from a higher level of command. It made the decision 
to expel the able-bodied men unreasonable.
166
 The cooperation with the BSA should have been 
ended in the afternoon of 13 July 1995, when there were clear signs that ‘the men were at serious 
risk of being killed as part of a genocide’.167 The Appelate Court followed the District Court on 
this matter, but referred to the risk that the men would be subjected to torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or would be executed if Dutchbat had ended the cooperation with the 
Bosnian Serb Army.
168
 
 
It is significant to note that the District Court confirmed the existence of an obligation on part of 
the Netherlands to protect human rights on the compound after the fall of the enclave in the 2014 
Mothers of Srebrenica judgment.
169
 The District Court acknowledged that the Dutch had the 
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geographical notion of effective control over the Dutch compound (also referred to in the 
judgment as the ‘mini safe area’).170 This was based on the Dutch state’s active involvement in 
the command and control structure after the BSA took over,
 171
 which meant that the Netherlands 
had jurisdiction over the compound within the meaning of the ECHR and the ICCPR.
172
 This is 
supported by the District Court’s reasoning that the compound was a fenced area over which 
Dutchbat had authority and more important, that this authority was respected by the BSA.
173
 The 
Appelate Court on the other hand did not go as far as recognising the existence of a positive 
human rights obligation on part of the Dutch state, and failed to discuss this in its judgment. The 
Court of Appeal however did confirm that Dutchbat facilitated actions that violated articles 2 and 
3 of the ECHR, which resulted in the conclusion that Dutchbat acted wrongfully.
174
 As such, the 
Court referred to the negative obligation to refrain from violating the convention. Although both 
the District Court and the Appelate Court thus found that Dutchbat acted wrongfully, the 
Appelate Court was unable to confirm the District Court’s conclusion that a causal connection 
exists between that conduct and the killings that followed. This conclusion may appear relevant 
in discussing the potential criminal liability of the peacekeeping commanders throughout the 
remainder of the thesis. Before I turn to the exploration of individual responsibility, I will first set 
out the command and control structure in PKOs.   
 
2.4 Command and Control within PKOs 
 
2.4.1 Chain of command 
 
The chain of command and control within a PKO consists of three different levels. These levels 
of command and control (also referred to as C2) from bottom to top are tactical, operational and 
strategic command and control. First, the tactical level of command and control is in the hands of 
the TCC. That state will appoint a national commander, the battalion commander, who is 
responsible for the movements of his or her contingent and will decide on the actions taken by 
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them.
175
 In doing so, he or she must ensure that the contingent members carry out the specific 
tasks assigned to them by the higher levels of command.
176
 Also part of the tactical level of 
command is the ‘joint handling of local crisis situations, including evacuations of UN civilians 
when necessitated by the security situation’.177 A tactical level commander will report to the 
operational commander, while the TCC may take steps if the tactical commander cannot fulfil his 
or her tasks properly. The main responsibility of the batallion commander is to ensure compliance 
with UN standards, local laws and regulations.
178
 
 
Second, the operational level is represented by the (civilian) Head of Mission and (military) 
Force Commander (FC). These actors have the power to issue directives that regulate the conduct 
of the peacekeeping troops.
179
 In addition, it is up to them to decide how and where units are 
employed and they have the authority to reassign forces if necessary.
180
 Operational control is 
considered part of operational command and refers to the authority possessed by the FC over the 
activities of subordinate commanders. Compared to combat operations, the authority of FCs in 
PKOs is limited since they will not have disciplinary tasks vis-à-vis  subordinate troops. The fact 
that different national battalions operate under the FC’s authority limits the FC’s authority, which 
makes assigning disciplinary powers to the FC legally difficult as discipline is then subject to 
national laws applicable to the national battalions.
181
 Another factor that complicates the 
application of international law to national contingents and their commanders is that there is no 
formal relationship in place between the UN and the TCC.
182
  
 
Third, the strategic level is the highest level of command within PKOs. The actors operating on 
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this level are the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat who carry 
overall oversight over the mission and provide the mission with instructions regarding the 
political objective and tasks of the mission.
183
  
 
In the cases under review, protecting civilians was a relevant task assigned to the battalions as it 
is in many contemporary PKOs. Civilian protection can be a tactical task or a strategic goal of the 
mission.
184
 The UN Security Council Resolution regarding the UNMISS operation in South 
Sudan for example contained civilian protection as a 'strategic goal'.
185
 The concept of civilian 
protection in PKOs was envisaged in a peaceful context where the host state had consented to 
peacekeepers being present in its territory. That consent is based on the assumption that PKOs 
only employ peaceful means to achieve their goals, but this may have changed due to the 
development of robust forms of peacekeeping.
186
 Sewall refers to the concept of civilian 
protection as something that is an ‘affirmative military task’ in a UN PKO.187 Civilian protection 
is therefore coordinated on the tactical level. That is distinct from interpreting the protection of 
civilians as a military objective which is aimed at ending atrocities committed against civilians.
188
 
In this sense, protecting civilians is different in peacekeeping than in conventional warfare. 
Protecting civilians in regular warfare would impose a negative obligation on combatants to not 
harm civilians, whereas in PKOs the protection of civilians is framed as a positive obligation: the 
peacekeepers are supposed to take measures to protect the civilians from harm by third parties.
189
 
This will be assessed in further detail in chapter 5, where the same distinction will be made 
between protection under IHL, IHRL and in PKOs.  
 
The notion of civilian protection as a task carried out on the tactical level of the PKO is in line 
                                                          
183
 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, Police Command in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (January 2016) 9.  
184
 Sarah Sewall, ‘Civilian Protection’ in Mary Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov (eds), The Handbook Of Global Security 
Policy (Wiley Blackwell 2014) 213, 219, 222. 
185
 Ralph Mamiya, ‘Legal Challenges for UN Peacekeepers Protecting Civilians in South Sudan’, ASIL Insights, vol 
18, no 26, 9 September 2014 <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/26/legal-challenges-un-peacekeepers-
protecting-civilians-south-sudan> accessed 11 April 2017. 
186
 Sewall (n 184). 
187
 Ibid 212. 
188
 Ibid. 
189
 Damian Lilly, ‘The Changing Nature of the Protection of Civilians in International Peace Operations’ (2012) 19 
International Peacekeeping 628, 630; Robert Weiner and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Beyond the Laws of War: 
Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal Framework’ (1996) 27 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 293. 
48 
 
with the idea that decision-making regarding responses to imminent threats can only be taken on 
the ground. Breaky and Dekker therefore refer to protection as a ‘decentralised activity’.190 
Calculating risks and evaluating the specific circumstances at a specific time cannot be done as 
well in an office in New York or the capital of the host state as in the local area where the threat 
occurs. Therefore, considerable weight is placed on the battalion commander in the decision-
making process. Both the Force Commander and the Head of Mission, acting on behalf of the 
Secretariat, have no power to regulate the conduct of battalion members directly.
191
 Therefore, 
the directives issued by the higher chains of command bind the battalion members if the battalion 
commander has translated the directives in orders. After all, the UN has no enforcement powers 
over battalion members, this is exclusively assigned to the battalion commander.
192
 If however, 
protecting civilians is an objective, this would fall within the responsibility of the operational 
level commander.
193
  
 
In sum, different levels of command fulfil the tasks and objectives of PKOs. It is unlikely that a 
failure to protect civilians is ascribed to one level of command only. Yet, the command and 
control arrangements within PKOs leave the question open to what extent these commanders can 
be held accountable for not fulfilling their tasks. The Memorandum of Understanding refers to 
accountability in a few respects, as discussed below. A difficulty in the overall assessment of the 
commanders' responsibilities and accountability however is that contingents, and thus battalion 
commanders, fulfil 'a dual legal position and act in a dual role: in an international capacity as part 
of the institutional structure of the international organisation conducting the operation, and in a 
national capacity as an organ of their sending State'.
194
  
 
2.4.2 Memorandum of Understanding 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is an agreement between the TCC and the UN in 
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which the TCC agrees to take on certain responsibilities in order to fulfil the mission-specific 
mandate.
195
 An example is the guarantee to familiarise the national contingent members with the 
rules of conduct and to provide proper pre-deployment training to the troops.
196
 The MOU binds 
its parties, which includes the members of the national contingents.
197
 The Memorandum also 
sets out the procedure for both the UN and the TCC on how misconduct should be dealt with by 
the contingent members.
198
 Misconduct in a PKO is defined as follows: 
any act or omission that is a violation of United Nations standards of conduct, mission-specific 
rules and regulations or the obligations towards national and local laws and regulations in 
accordance with the status-of-forces agreement where the impact is outside the national 
contingent.
199
 
 
Serious misconduct is defined in article 30 of the MOU as ‘misconduct including criminal acts, 
that results in, or is likely to result in, serious loss, damage or injury to an individual or to a 
mission’.  
Over the years, the TCCs have committed themselves to take on the responsibility to exercise 
their criminal jurisdiction over their contingent members if they are suspected of such serious 
misconduct. Yet, the MOU still lacks an obligation for TCCs to present those cases of alleged 
criminal behaviour to its authorities to make sure that these are subject to prosecution when the 
DPKO has confirmed that this would be appropriate.
200
  This also means that there is no 
mechanism in place that obligates the TCC to report to the UNSG why the domestic authorities 
decided to prosecute or why it deemed prosecution unnecessary.
201
  Such a mechanism could 
provide an effective measure against the strong reluctance to prosecute peacekeepers within the 
TCC’s domestic system. At the European level, such a measure exists in the form of the 
obligation to investigate serious instances of misconduct involving death under article 2 of the 
ECHR, as will be discussed in section 2.5.2.  
The operational aspects of the mission are dealt with in the Operational Planning (OPLAN) and 
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the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
202
 The Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) sets 
up these documents, and falls under the responsibility of the Under-Secretary General.
203
 These 
documents translate the mandate into specific instructions for the peacekeeping troops. How both 
the mandate and the ROE influence the obligations of peacekeeping commanders will be 
discussed in chapter 5. Now we have explored how the different levels of command operate in a 
PKO, the discussion in the remainder of this chapter will focus on whether there appears to be 
scope for assessing individual responsibility of peacekeeping commanders for a failure to act 
under international and domestic law. I will do this by first addressing the general view on 
individuals as fully-recognised actors in international law. In the second part, the focus lies on the 
Arnhem Court of Appeal's judgment in Mustafić & Nuhanović v Karremans, Franken & 
Oosterveen to illustrate the difficulties encountered in establishing criminal liability for the 
peacekeeping commanders’ alleged positive contribution to the serious crimes committed.  
 
2.5 Looking Beyond the State as Actor Bearing Responsibility for Human Rights 
Protection 
 
As set out in the chapter thus far, both the Belgian and Dutch state were held accountable for 
their disputed roles in the course of events in Kigali and Srebrenica. In the case of the 
Netherlands, the responsibility is based on wrongful conduct by the Dutch battalion, whereas the 
Belgian state responsibility is linked to a causal connection between the deaths of the Rwandan 
refugees and the Belgian withdrawal of passive protection. Having discussed the command and 
control relationships in the previous section, it is evident that many actors are involved in a 
PKO’s  decision-making procedure and that accountability could arise at different levels within 
the chain of command. As Willmot and others concluded regarding accountability for failing to 
protect civilians:  
 
Individuals, States, and international and regional organizations can all be held accountable for 
breaches of both positive and negative international obligations relating to the protection of 
civilians. This is as a matter of State or international organization responsibility or international 
criminal responsibility, as well as national legal and UN administrative responses (…) There are 
circumstances in which Force Commanders (and possibly Heads of Mission) can be held 
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responsible for failing to use force to protect civilians, and contingents for not following orders to 
use force.
204
  
 
Although command and control was in the hands of the state in both Kigali and Srebrenica,
205
 the 
contingent commanders were the main national military representatives present in the area and 
thus capable of taking immediate decisions regarding the protection of civilians. That the use of 
force was not considered necessary to offer protection to the civilians under their care supports 
the idea that the commanders could at least have continued to offer them protection. However, as 
the cases discussed in this chapter illustrate, the battalion commanders acted on behalf of their 
states.
206
 In Blaškić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified the matter of individual accountability 
for state agents being part of an international peacekeeping force:  
 
The situation differs for a State official (e.g., a general) who acts as a member of an international 
peace-keeping or peace-enforcement force such as UNPROFOR, IFOR or SFOR. Even if he 
witnesses the commission or the planning of a crime in a mon[i]toring capacity, while performing 
his official functions, he should be treated by the International Tribunal qua an individual. Such 
an officer is present in the former Yugoslavia as a member of an international armed force 
responsible for maintaining or enforcing peace and not qua a member of the military structure of 
his own country. His mandate stems from the same source as that of the International Tribunal, 
i.e., a resolution of the Security Council[.]
207 
 
To what extent this would change where the TCC has command and control over the situation 
and not the UN, is unclear. We can however conclude that the TCC’s command and control  
would not affect the position of the commander whose presence in the mission area would still 
rely on an authorisation by the UN Security Council. 
 
It is ground-breaking that the Dutch cases on Srebrenica were the first (considering that the 
Belgian case only led to an interim decision so far) cases in which responsibility for a failure to 
protect in peacekeeping was assigned to a TCC. Addressing legal responsibility to a state where a 
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third party was the main culprit is a serious matter. This has been a turning point in international 
law. A thorough legal assessment of the conduct of the individuals who made the decisions in 
those difficult circumstances is therefore necessary. After all, the state’s responsibility implies 
that ‘there must be individuals who are also liable’.208 Although the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in principle seems to believe that state responsibility and individual responsibility are 
independent from each other, its reliance on the jurisprudence of the ICTY in the Bosnia 
genocide case shows that state responsibility builds on a finding of individual responsibility.
209
 
We have seen in the discussion of the cases in chapter 2, and the language used by the courts, that 
the states’ responsibility was based on conduct performed by the national battalions and their 
commanders. The difficulty lies with the fact that a state will always be held responsible for its 
own failure to act and that the conduct of the actors giving rise to that responsibility might be left 
unaccounted for. In sum, state and individual responsibility are connected, but the responsibility 
that follows leaves space for an assessment of the individual actors’ conduct that lies at the basis 
of a state’s responsibility. 
 
Contemporary peacekeeping mandates contain a stronger focus on civilian protection which,  
coupled with the more integrated approach
210
 taken in recent PKOs, expands the powers held by 
the peacekeepers in the mission area. It then becomes likely that obligations of protection arise in 
these operations. It is thus necessary to determine who the addressees of these potential 
obligations to protect are and what their limitations are. The role of non-state actors, including 
individuals, in international law has changed over the last decades, which requires us to reassess 
our perception of their obligations under international law and IHRL in particular.
211
 Admittedly, 
most individuals continue to act under the auspices of a state and the responsibility for protecting 
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fundamental human rights continues to be predominantly a state matter.
212
  
 
However, scholars like Meron and Rawksi have argued that we must move away from the state-
based perspective on international law.
213
 Rawksi argues that in the internationalised sphere in 
which multinational organisations and non-state agents are predominantly represented, we should 
shift our focus towards an ‘individual rights’ discourse.214 In a similar vein, protecting the 
individual who acted in an official capacity from criminal responsibility has by now become 
obsolete and is no longer in line with the development that international law has undergone. We 
accept that not only states, but also individuals bear responsibility for mass atrocities; a 
development that gained traction in the aftermath of the Second World War. With the 
establishment of international criminal courts to enforce international law against individuals 
besides states, we must be more open to the option that where state responsibility has been 
established, also the individual actors involved may bear responsibility.  
 
The role of the individual in international law can be explored by challenging the classical view. 
Is it not the case that the perception of the responsibility for such human rights obligations falling 
to states alone is based on the capacity of an actor to guarantee these rights? That could explain 
why international law focuses on the state as the guarantor of such rights, presuming that states 
are the most capable actors to do so in all circumstances. There may however be non-state actors 
equally capable to intervene. This could be an international organisation or an NGO, but also the 
military officials acting under the auspices of the UN in a multinational operation. This would 
require the area in which the operation takes place to fall within the effective control of the 
commander’s state of nationality.215 
 
As pointed out above, the Belgian interim case pertained not only to the responsibility of the 
TCC, but also to the direct failure of the Belgian commanders to act in the face of atrocities being 
committed. Thus, establishing state responsibility does not exclude the option that also the 
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individuals acting on behalf of the state are held responsible.
216
 For that reason, the relatives of 
Mustafić and Nuhanović filed a criminal complaint against three Dutchbat officials in 2010 for 
their alleged active participation in the commission of war crimes and genocide.
217
 
 
2.5.1 Mustafić & Nuhanović v Karremans, Franken & Oosterveen 
 
The criminal complaint was based on article 2 of the Implementation Act of the Genocide 
Convention and article 9 of the Dutch War Crimes Act.
218
 The former criminalises those who 
intentionally allow the commission of genocidal acts (as defined in article 1 of the same act) by a 
subordinate. Article 9 of the Dutch War Crimes Act criminalises those who intentionally allow 
the commission of war crimes by a subordinate. The plaintiffs argued that the Dutchbat officials 
acted wrongfully in forcing Mustafić and Nuhanović’s father and younger brother to leave the 
compound while knowing this would have fatal consequences for them. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the Committee of experts that was asked to advise the Dutch Public Prosecutor on 
this matter was of the opinion that prosecution of the Dutchbat officials was appropriate.
219
 The 
Prosecutor appeared to dismiss this opinion and held such a case to be inadmissible.
220
 The 
plaintiffs appealed this decision, but this was dismissed by the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of 
Appeal.
221
  
 
The main conclusion of the Court of Appeal was that the officials could not rely on the immunity 
of the state, because the SOFA does not affect the criminal jurisdiction of the TCC.
222
 Regarding 
the extent to which a potential prosecution would be possible, the Court held that the Netherlands 
is obligated under public international law to prosecute the most serious crimes. Therefore, the 
Court could not apply a narrow interpretation to the requirement that prosecution should be in the 
‘interest of justice’ as mentioned in article 53 of the Rome Statute.223 The Court decided that it 
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should assess the content of the case to decide whether prosecution was possible, since there was 
no formal objection to prosecution. The Court continued by arguing that the available 
information did not show that the defendants knew of the crimes being committed elsewhere. It 
furthermore held that most executions took place after these specific men were expelled from the 
Dutch base.
224
 In its decision regarding complicity in genocide, the Court argued that it would 
apply the same standards the ICTY used. This means that the defendants would have to have 
known of the genocidal acts being committed, which they did not.
225
 The Court therefore rejected 
this part of the complaint. For complicity in the commission of war crimes and/or murder, the 
Dutch threshold of dolus eventualis would however suffice.
226
  
 
In assessing the knowledge of the defendants regarding the commission of war crimes and/or 
murder, the Court held that although the facts were sufficient for the civil courts to conclude that 
Dutchbat should not have expelled these men from their compound, they could not show 
‘criminal knowledge’.227 The defendants knew of the killings taking place and were aware of the 
able-bodied men being ‘evacuated’ separately from the elderly men, women and children.228 The 
Court appeared to follow the defendants in their argument that the actual death of the men was 
not foreseeable, because detention seemed more likely as that was not an unusual practice for the 
BSA.
229
 It furthermore held that the killings taking place in Potočari, near Srebrenica, were 
considered ‘opportunistic killings’ and not necessarily murder or killings on a large scale.230  
 
Regarding the question of whether Karremans intentionally allowed Franken to commit a crime 
(article 9 of the Dutch War Crimes Act) the Court clarified that ‘intentionally allowing’ also 
includes ‘failing to act where he/she had the ability to do so’.231 Karremans could have overruled 
Franken’s decision.232 It is not clear why the Court then held that, despite this conclusion, it was 
not likely that a judge would conclude that Franken would be found guilty. As such, there would 
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not be a subordinate that committed a crime, and Karremans would not be guilty under article 9 
of the Dutch War Crimes Act.
233
 This appears to be speculative to a great extent.  
 
Regarding the death of Nuhanović’s father, Ibro, the Court concluded that although The Hague 
District Court found that his death resulted from unlawful conduct of the Dutch state, this was not 
a sufficient ground for criminal responsibility on part of the commanders involved.
234
 The 
situation of Mustafić was different, since he was told to leave the compound, although he had the 
right to stay on the compound because he worked for Dutchbat. The Court confirmed that 
Oosterveen made a ‘stupid mistake’ with ‘horrenduous consequences’, which could at most result 
in a conviction for negligent manslaughter, if it was not for the fact that the conduct was already 
statute-barred at the time.
235
  
 
The criminal complaint regarding the alleged positive contribution of Karremans cum suis to 
genocide or war crimes was unsuccessful in the domestic legal order. As a follow-up to this 
judgment, the plaintiffs asked the European Court of Human Rights to assess whether the 
Netherlands has fulfilled its duty to carry out an effective and adequate investigation into the 
matter under article 2 of the ECHR. The following section will first discuss the duty to 
investigate in general, after which Mustafić-Mujić and others v the Netherlands and Jaloud v the 
Netherlands will be discussed. 
 
2.5.2 Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: the Duty to Investigate 
 
If there is any doubt regarding the willingness or ability of the domestic authorities to investigate 
a case in which death occurred, article 2 of the ECHR provides plaintiffs with the opportunity to 
request an objective assessment of the efforts made by the state. This is of particular importance 
in PKOs since domestic authorities may not always be willing or able to investigate conduct 
committed by their officials.  
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Article 2 of the ECHR refers to the right to life and the duty of the state to investigate death. 
Although this duty may also apply to the human rights included in article 3 and 5 of the 
Convention, this section will focus on the duty to investigate violations of the right to life. The 
duty to investigate has developed through case law; McCann v United Kingdom
236
 was an 
important starting point in that development. Here, three members of the Irish Republican Army 
were killed despite being unarmed. There was suspicion that these members were about to 
commit an attack in Gibraltar by means of a car bomb. The military was requested to arrest the 
suspects.
237
 While following the suspects to arrest them, a situation occurred in which the soldiers 
felt that the suspects would detonate the bomb by using a button.
238
 In response to this being an 
immediate threat, the soldiers killed the suspects.
239
 The complaints filed by the relatives of the 
deceased were referred to the ECtHR by the European Commission of Human Rights with the 
request ‘to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the 
respondent State of its obligations under Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention’.240 Although the 
Court concluded that the UK had carried out an effective investigation into the deaths of the three 
suspects,
241
 it established the general obligation to carry out such an investigation by concluding 
that  
 
a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State would be ineffective, in 
practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by 
State authorities. The obligation to protect the right to life under this provision (art 2) read in 
conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 (art.2+1) of the Convention to ‘secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the [the] Convention’, 
requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when 
individuals have been killed as result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.
242 
                              
For this obligation to arise, it is not relevant whether a substantial obligation under the 
convention was breached.
243
 That the circumstances suggest that a substantial obligation may 
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have been breached is sufficient.
244
 In addition, as concluded by the Court in Cyprus v. Turkey, 
'the above-mentioned procedural obligation also arises upon proof of an arguable claim that an 
individual, who was last seen in the custody of agents of the State, subsequently disappeared in a 
context which may be considered life-threatening’.245 A state must fulfil several requirements to 
fulfil its duty to investigate.
246
 These requirements are that the investigation is carried out 
independently
247
 and prompt;
248
 that the family of the deceased can participate effectively in the 
investigation;
249
 that there is sufficient ‘public scrutiny’;250 that the investigation must identify 
which officials were involved in the operations, and must clarify the circumstances in which the 
events evolved, and should provide insight into whether force was used and if so, whether this 
was justified.
251
 It is of outmost importance that the state involved takes disciplinary steps against 
the officials responsible, if appropriate, and that responsibility for any serious offences are 
punished adequately.
252
 The Court stated in McKerr v the United Kingdom that ‘a crucial aspect 
of the investigation into a killing by State agents is that it is capable of leading to the prosecution 
and punishment of those responsible’.253  
Yet, the duty to investigate is ‘not confined to cases where it has been established that the death 
was a result of the actions of an agent of the state’, as was confirmed in Ergi v Turkey.254 Here, 
the Court also stated that  
neither the prevalence of armed clashes and the high incidence of fatalities can displace the 
obligation under Article 2 to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into 
deaths arising out of clashes involving the security forces.
255
 
A broader interpretation of the scope of the duty was also found in Bazorkina v. Russia, among 
other judgments. The Court held that  
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the essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the 
domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, 
to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility.
256
  
Other judgments expressed that accountability should be secured.
257
 In cases of serious violations 
of human rights, the punishment for such violation should be sought in criminal law, although 
situations of negligence and omission may be exceptions to this rule.
258
 This is of particular 
interest to the peacekeeping cases under review, as our focus will turn to such negative forms of 
liability in the following chapters. 
The Court also introduced a new threshold for the duty to be triggered as it held that ‘the mere 
knowledge of the killing on the part of the authorities gave rise ipso facto to an obligation under 
Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances 
surrounding the death’.259 This also means that the investigation does not depend on a formal 
complaint filed by the relatives of the victims.
260
  
As mentioned at the outset of this section, the duty to investigate is of particular relevance in 
relation to peacekeeping. The Netherlands was involved in two ECtHR cases in which the 
Netherlands was accused of not having fulfilled its duty to investigate sufficiently in the context 
of peace support operations. In Jaloud v the Netherlands, the Netherlands was held accountable 
for inadequately investigating the death of an Iraqi civilian during the UN mandated 
peacekeeping operation Stabilisation Force in Iraq (SFIR).
261
 The Court recognised that the 
mission was carried out in difficult circumstances, but nevertheless concluded that important 
documents were not provided to the relevant judicial authorities (and to the applicants) and that 
insufficient precaution was taken to prevent that witnesses could align their statements prior to 
being questioned.
262
 Also, the autopsy carried out was considered inappropriate considering that 
an agent of the state may be held criminally responsible following the death of the victim. The 
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autopsy was carried out by an Iraqi physician and the report on his findings was written in Arabic 
and not translated.
263
 Also, there were no representatives of the Dutch military present during the 
autopsy.
264
 Another point of critique concerned the fact that substantial material evidence got 
lost, namely bullets fragments.
265
 Most relevant however was the ECtHR’s conclusion that there 
was no reason to conclude that ‘the Netherlands troops were placed “at the disposal” of any 
foreign power, whether it be Iraq or the United Kingdom or any other power, or that they were 
“under the exclusive direction or control” of any other State’.266 That the Netherlands handed 
over operational control to a British commander did not change the fact that Jaloud ‘was fired 
upon while passing through a checkpoint manned by personnel under the command and direct 
supervision of a Netherlands Royal Army officer’.267 
The second case, Mustafić-Mujić and others v the Netherlands, deals with the question of 
whether the Netherlands has adequately investigated the role of Karremans cum suis in relation to 
the death of Mustafić, Ibro and Muhamed Nuhanović.268 The Court restated in this case that the 
applicants did not want to imply that Karremans cum suis intentionally contributed to their death, 
but that their claim related to the idea ‘that the defendants were aware of the fate that awaited the 
three men outside the compound at Potočari but nonetheless made them leave’.269 In addition, the 
Court held that ‘[a]rticle 2 does not entail the right to have third parties prosecuted – or convicted 
– for a criminal offence; the Court’s task, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, is to 
review whether and to what extent the domestic authorities submitted the case to the careful 
scrutiny required by Article 2 of the Convention’.270 This judgment’s relevance therefore pertains 
to the critique that TCCs are often unwilling to prosecute their military officials. A judgment by 
an independent court like the ECtHR sheds light on whether the authorities have indeed made 
sufficient efforts in considering the option of prosecuting the Dutch military officers.  
In assessing the Netherlands’ efforts to investigate the matter, the Court referred first to the large 
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amount of information that had become available over the years regarding the course of events.
271
 
Due to the multiple investigations carried out concerning the treatment of Mustafić & 
Nuhanović’s father and brother and the involvement of Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen, it 
was impossible for the Court ‘to find that the investigations were ineffective or inadequate’.272 
Another reasoning put forward by the Court was that ‘the respondent State’s procedural 
obligation under Article 2 can be discharged through its contribution to the work of the ICTY, 
given that the ICTY has primacy over national courts and can take over national investigations 
and proceedings at any stage in the interest of international justice’.273 The most important 
consideration for the Court appeared to be the conclusion of the Court of Appeal regarding the 
actual scope for liability for Karremans cum suis in relation to the nature and scale of the crimes 
committed and the moment in which the crimes took place: 
 
Turning to the facts, the Court observes that the Court of Appeal found it established – referring to 
the judgment of the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Krstić case – that there were a limited 
number of “opportunistic killings” in Potočari, but that “murder on a large scale” took place 
elsewhere, and more importantly, commenced only after Mr Rizo Mustafić, Mr Ibro Nuhanović 
and Mr Muhamed Nuhanović had left the compound(.)274 
 
Ultimately, the Court found that ‘it cannot be said that the domestic authorities have failed to 
discharge the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to conduct an effective 
investigation ... which was capable of leading to the establishment of the facts, ... and of 
identifying and – if appropriate – punishing those responsible’.275  
 
With this conclusion by the ECtHR, all options to hold Karremans cum suis criminally 
responsible for their positive contribution to the crimes committed by the BSA have been 
exhausted. It appears plausible to conclude that criminal responsibility is not a viable option here, 
because criminal liability in this context suggests that the commanders intentionally contributed 
to the commission of serious crimes; despite the explicit statement made by the plaintiffs that this 
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was not the case in their opinion. That was different for the interim judgment on the individual 
responsibility of the Belgian commanders, because it concerned tort liability (based on criminal 
law though) and it explicitly addressed the failure to act. The outcome did not suggest that the 
commanders actively contributed to the crimes committed. Noteworthy is also that the strategy 
chosen in Mukeshimana
276
 has succeeded. It bears consideration whether a failure to protect or 
intervene could be framed as negative conduct under criminal law, either directly resulting in 
criminal liability or as a basis for tort liability. This appears relevant if one considers the criticism 
voiced regarding the passive stance taken by UN peacekeepers towards the serious abuse of 
civilians in South Sudan.
277
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The main objective in this chapter was to summarise the facts of the cases that are central to the 
thesis and to draw the reader’s attention to the idea that individuals, like peacekeeping 
commanders in different command positions, may bear responsibility for their troops’ conduct 
besides the state's responsibility. Where the domestic cases discussed in this chapter considered a 
positive contribution to criminal conduct where it concerned the Dutch commanders, the Belgian 
interim case dealt with tort liability for their failure to act against the crimes committed. The 
Brussels District Court based its conclusion on the Belgian Penal Code however. As the persons 
in charge, the commanders played a key role in the decisions taken regarding the Belgian 
withdrawal in Kigali and the decision to expel certain men from the Dutch compound in 
Srebrenica. Although the state is deemed responsible for these decisions, aspects like the 
foreseeability and awareness of the consequences of the commanders’ conduct are factors which 
can also be ascribed to the individual commanders in charge. These factors may indicate that 
responsibility could also be incurred by peacekeeping commanders as individual actors.  
In the cases concerning Srebrenica, clear reference was made to a certain duty of care, the limits 
and precise meaning of which are unclear. Also, the Hague District Court referred to human 
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rights obligations that the troops and their TCC were supposed to uphold. In Mukeshimana, 
reference was made to the status of the civilian population as protected persons, which also 
implies that the Court recognised a certain obligation to protect based on article 4 of GC IV. 
Another important conclusion drawn in the Mukeshimana was the causal connection established 
between the troops’ withdrawal and the deaths ofthe refugees. The recognition that passive 
presence could have protected the people placed under their care indicates that there may have 
been an expectation to act. In the most recent Mothers of Srebrenica judgment, the causal 
connection established earlier by the Hague District Court was partly offset based on the 
reasoning that the likelihood of the respective group of Bosniak men surviving, had the Dutch 
troops acted differently, was estimated at 30 per cent. The outcome of the criminal complaint 
procedure initiated by the relatives of Mustafić and Nuhanović showed that liability for a positive 
contribution to genocide and war crimes may be difficult to establish. Framing the contribution of 
the commanders as a negative contribution to the crimes committed however may be a realistic 
alternative. A similar approach was taken in the complaint filed in Mukeshimana, albeit it a tort 
claim, which was successful in the interim judgment handed down by the Brussels District Court. 
Chapter 3 will explore how criminal liability for a failure to act may arise when such a failure is 
defined as an omission. This could be relevant for both direct criminal liability and for tort 
liability based on criminal law. 
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Chapter 3: Omission Liability in Domestic Law 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Since the judgments in the Dutch and Belgian cases discussed in chapter 2, the notion of positive 
obligations in the context of peacekeeping has become a more prominent topic of research in 
international law. So far, this has mainly focused on obligations of the TCC and the responsibility 
that can be incurred by that state when it fails to meet such obligations. However, I have argued in 
chapter 2 that state responsibility implies action or inaction by an individual actor, which may 
justify the additional exploration of individual responsibility. This is based on the reasoning that 
state responsibility does not exclude individual liability. Since criminal liability for a positive 
contribution to the committed crimes failed in Mustafić & Nuhanović v Karremans, Franken & 
Oosterveen, and the ECtHR confirmed that the Netherlands effectively investigated the matter,
278
 
this chapter will assess whether responsibility for a criminal omission is more likely to succeed. 
This could result in a direct form of criminal liability or may serve as a basis for tort liability. 
The main question this chapter aims to answer is first, how the elements required for omission 
liability have been interpreted by the domestic legal systems, both in the criminal law and 
jurisprudence. Second, this chapter aims to establish the rationale underlying these forms of 
criminal responsibility to understand whether failing to act is considered culpable or the 
contribution to the principal crime committed. This helps to develop an understanding of how the 
commanders’ conduct would be perceived in the light of the legal systems under review. This 
sheds light on the liability that could be incurred by the commanders. Identifying potential gaps 
or similarities among the different domestic systems furthermore indicates whether there would 
be a difference in the liability established in one domestic system or the other.  
The conclusions drawn here allow us to assess whether it is likely that this type of liability would, 
hypothetically speaking, be incurred by the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders. In 
judging whether the use of omission liability would be appropriate, the general principles of 
criminal law, which form an important yardstick for both domestic and international criminal law 
to assess whether someone can be held criminally responsible, will be applied. 
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As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, this chapter will analyse the law on omissions by 
means of a comparative study between common and civil law. Throughout the chapter, the effect 
of the conclusions drawn in the cases of the Dutch and Belgian commanders will be considered as 
well as the implications for current or future PKOs in which this liability may be more likely to 
occur. To place the Dutch and Belgian cases in the context of this chapter, we will refer back to 
the judgments handed down by the domestic courts regarding the state responsibility of Belgium 
and the Netherlands in which the battalions’ conduct was also discussed. Important elements such 
as the actus reus and mens rea can be outlined using these conclusions. In section 3.6 some of the 
practical limitations of the domestic adjudication of peacekeeping conduct will be discussed. The 
issues encountered could justify an assessment of the peacekeeping commanders’ liability on the 
international level. 
 
3.2 Omission Liability: A Definition 
 
In theory, omissions are considered criminal because the defendant failed to do something that he 
was legally obligated to do: the defendant had a duty to act that he failed to fulfil. I introduce the 
basic aspects of omission liability in this section.  
 
Let us first consider the classification of different types of omissions. An omission can be pure, 
direct or indirect. A pure omission is the failure to fulfil a general duty to rescue a stranger in peril 
– though it is only found in certain domestic systems.279 It requires no relationship with the 
victim, but refers to a situation in which one would come to the aid of a stranger who is in great 
peril.
280
 More relevant for this research, however, are direct and indirect omissions. In the case of 
a direct omission the duty to act and its failure are defined in a legal provision as being criminal, 
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and therefore there is no doubt regarding its criminality.
281
 For example, a provision may impose 
a duty on care-takers to take sufficient care of someone placed under their care and will also state 
that not doing so may result in liability for the care-takers. If the failure to act is included in a 
legal provision, this is a conduct offence and thus a direct form of omission liability.
282
 The actus 
reus required to establish liability is the failure to act, no specific result is required to constitute 
the criminal offence. It is often held that the mental state of the defendant is not important in cases 
of direct omission, as long as the defendant failed to fulfil an obligation as stated in the 
provision.
283
 Other potential legal bases for a duty to act may be a contract,
284
 a duty that follows 
the voluntary assumption of care,
285
 statute-based duties,
286
 a duty based on relationship,
287
 a duty 
based on the fact that the defendant created a risk himself,
288
 a duty because the defendant had 
control over the source of danger,
289
 and so forth. Not all of these duties will be clearly defined in 
legal provisions. If they are not, we refer to the omissions as indirect omissions. An omission is 
then based on the interpretation of a provision that describes the active commission of a crime, 
which in cases of indirect omission may be fulfilled by passive behaviour.
290
 For example, the 
commission of murder is criminal and will usually result from an act, but not doing something 
might also result in death and can therefore be defined as murder. This is then a result offence, or 
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‘commission by omission’.291 It does not matter whether the result is brought about by passive or 
active conduct, the result constitutes criminal liability. Some conduct offences cannot be 
committed by omission, because they require specific conduct. To illustrate: death can be caused 
by both active and passive behaviour,
292
 whereas rape or assault cannot be ‘caused’ by inaction 
since it requires specific, active conduct.
293
 
 
3.3 General Perspectives in Common and Civil Law Compared 
 
The general treatment of omissions and liability for omissions is different in both common and 
civil law systems. For example, the common law approach to criminal liability is relatively strict. 
The common law rejects liability for omissions because it is not in line with the principles of 
autonomy and liberalism so highly valued by common law countries.
294
 Over time and through 
practice, common law countries have come to accept liability for omissions, but maintain a 
narrow approach compared to civil law countries.
295
 Common law does not recognise pure 
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 Hall (n 283) 199; Dubber and Hörnle (n 281) 213; Jesús-María Silva Sánchez, ‘Criminal Omissions: Some 
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Survey of French and American Law’ (1998) 8 Touro International Law Review 93, 96 ff; Fletcher, ‘Criminal 
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omissions, discussed above, except for a few American states.
296
 Common law only recognises 
direct and indirect omissions in which the defendant failed to fulfil his or her specific duty to 
act.
297
 Civil law countries in contrast, have mostly codified a general duty to rescue under which 
anyone may have the obligation to rescue someone in immediate peril, irrespective of his or her 
relationship with the victim.
298
 
 
In both systems criminal liability requires a physical component and a mental component. These 
are referred to as actus reus and mens rea respectively in common law; however, these specific 
terms are not used in most civil law systems. As we will see, these elements must be fulfilled to 
establish direct individual liability for the commission of a crime, whereas the elements of 
complicity or ‘aiding and abetting’ need to be fulfilled to establish responsibility for being an 
accomplice to the commission of a crime. Usually, co-perpetration is an additional option to 
complicity, which means that the co-defendants fulfilled the elements of the main crime 
together.
299
 
 
The next sections explore the elements necessary to constitute liability for an omission in both 
common law and civil law: the actus reus, the mens rea and the causation required. The sections 
discuss each element separately and will assess how the interpretation of these elements 
influences the degree of responsibility assigned to the defendant.  
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3.4 Elements Required for Omission Liability 
 
3.4.1 Actus Reus: Failure to Act despite a Duty to Act 
 
In both common and civil law, the actus reus required for a direct omission consists of a failure 
to act despite having a duty to act.
300
 As introduced above, this will be part of a legal provision 
and is therefore rather straightforward. With indirect omissions, the actus reus still requires the 
defendant to have had a duty to act that he or she failed to fulfil.
301
 Rather than focusing on the 
conduct described in the provision, the focus will be on whether the result is brought about by 
the defendant: this can be done by either active or inactive conduct. This is what civil law refers 
to as the formal legal duty doctrine.
302
 Unlike in the cases of direct omissions, that duty to act 
will not be referred to explicitly in a legal provision. Since these duties must be inferred from the 
circumstances, this section addresses the two bases for a duty to act that are most often 
recognised in the jurisprudence. First, an omission may create a situation in which the risk of 
violence or harm is substantial.
303
 The person creating this situation is expected to prevent the 
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likely result and liability arises where he or she fails to do so.
304
 Second, law, contract or the 
fulfilment of a certain profession may ascribe protective or oversight duties to someone which 
are subsequently violated.
305
 This requires the existence of a relationship. This can be a 
relationship with the victim (relationship of care) or with the main perpetrator (relationship of 
control).
306
 We refer to this relationship as having a Garantenstellung: a guarantor needs to 
guarantee that a certain result does not occur.
307
 Technically, the Garantenstellung consists of a 
duty of care and only combined with knowledge of possible harm would a duty to act 
(Garantenpflicht) arise.
308
 If then, the guarantor fails to act despite having that duty, the 
guarantor may be held responsible as a perpetrator.
309
 This approach, focused on prevention of 
the result, implies that not preventing the result connects the defendant to the crime committed 
by the main perpetrator and does not create liability for the separate failure to act. We will 
discuss whether the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders hypothetically had such a 
duty to act under domestic law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
had been consistently abused by his house mates, which escalated one night; the victim stayed in the bathroom for 
hours while crying for help and being unable to move due to his injuries. The defendant was at home, but turned up 
the volume of the radio and ignored the victim’s situation. When Honden Peter (the principal perpetrator) came 
home later that evening, he kicked the victim multiple times and left him to die.
 
The Court held that ‘the defendant 
omitted to do what can be expected from every ‘sane person’ in these circumstances, which is calling for help. 
Instead, the defendant left the victim in a deplorable state as an act of abhorrent indifference. As such, the defendant 
created the environment in which the victim was driven slowly into death. The conduct of the defendant 
demonstrates an attitude that lacks any form of respect for the person and the life of the victim’, see paragraph 3.3 of 
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Oneigenlijke Omissiedelict (Celsus juridische uitgeverij 2008) 82. 
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a Pure omission 
 
Only civil law would allow the commanders’ failure to act to incur liability even absent a 
responsibility, i.e. a pure omission. This is based on the thought that anyone is required to rescue 
someone in peril or has an obligation to prevent crime in general.
310
 There is no specific actus 
reus, because having the ability to act will trigger the duty to do something.
311
 One could argue 
that having the ability to act is then part of the actus reus. Since a failure to fulfil such a general 
duty would not criminalise the result that follows from the failure, but only renders failing to act 
itself blameworthy, this is therefore considered a conduct crime.
312
 This would, in arguendo, 
impose a lower degree of liability on the Dutch and Belgian commanders than the alternative 
option of defining their failure to act as participation in the commission of war crimes arguably 
would. However, pure omissions are mostly used where the victim is in peril due to circumstances 
often not the result of criminal conduct.  
 
b Creation of a dangerous situation 
 
The second category referred to here, where an obligation to act follows from the creation of a 
dangerous situation, renders the defendant culpable for inaction even if he or she is not involved 
in violence that harms the victim. One could argue that the commanders’ decisions to withdraw 
(Belgians) or allowing the BSA access to the civilians on the compound (Dutch) put the victims in 
a helpless and vulnerable position,
313
 which enabled the subsequent killing of these people. 
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Without the ability to defend themselves after forcibly handing over their weapons to Dutchbat 
(Srebrenica), the lives of the Muslim population depended heavily on a third party like Dutchbat 
for protection, just like they depended on the humanitarian aid provided by the peacekeeping 
troops. The situation in Kigali however is arguably a better example of a duty that could arise out 
of the risk of harm that was the immediate result of the Belgian decision to withdraw. The 
Brussels District Court confirmed that it was considerably less likely that the civilians in the 
school would have been killed, if the peacekeeping troops had not left the ETO.
314
 If the Belgian 
commanders were aware of the reasonable risk that the refugees in the ETO would be killed after 
they had left, their decision to leave created the danger to some extent, which may have created 
the obligation to stay. The factor of reasonableness, as discussed in more detail in section 3.4.2 
below, is important in establishing whether such an obligation existed. 
 
c The profession, law, or contract as legal basis for a duty to act 
 
In the third category, both direct and indirect omissions may rely on a relationship based on the 
profession, the law or contract. 
 
The first option within this category refers to the Dutch and Belgian commanders having failed to 
fulfil a duty assigned to them by means of their profession.
315
 A failure to fulfil that duty could 
then result in liability for an indirect omission. It is likely that a relationship of control or care that 
stems from his or her profession as military commander is then the legal basis for this duty of 
care.
316
 The first option, a relationship of control, implies that the commanders should have been 
able to control the perpetrators. The case law discussed in chapter 2 gives no reason to argue this 
was the case. After all, the peacekeeping commanders were not part of the same military chain of 
command as the main perpetrators of the crimes.  
 
The second option within this category lets us consider domestic law and the possibility that a 
contract may be the legal basis for an obligation to act. Both in the common and civil law systems 
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under review the law contains numerous provisions referring to relationships and concomitant 
duties. A few examples in common law are article 215 of the Canadian Criminal Code (CCC) that 
contains the duty to provide necessaries of life and article 217 of the same Code that refers to a 
failure to act despite a commitment made, particularly if that failure endangers life. Legal 
provisions may refer directly to a duty of care or duty to help people in a helpless position. 
References to relationships of vulnerability have been made in sections 151-154 of the New 
Zealand Criminal Act of 1961 (NZCA) and the 2011 Crimes Amendment Bill
317
 which is also 
part of New Zealand criminal law. In addition, section 221 of the German Criminal Code (GCC) 
contains a duty of care owed to people in a helpless position or people under the defendant’s care. 
Abandoning a person in a helpless situation although giving him shelter or being obligated to care 
for him are examples of situations that might incur direct omission liability by the defendant. If 
this results in a threat to health or life, this may serve as an aggravating circumstance. For 
example, section 242 of the Norwegian Penal Code (NPC) criminalises abandoning someone 
under your care and leaving him or her in a helpless position. In a similar vein, article 255 of the 
Dutch Criminal Code punishes those who leave someone in a helpless position who depends on 
their care. Whether or not the peacekeeping commanders could be convicted for breaching such a 
duty will depend on the interpretation of the relationship between the peacekeeping commanders 
and the civilian population. Chapter 5 will discuss the protective duties of the commander towards 
the civilian population in the mission area in more detail. 
 
Particularly relevant to military commanders is section 324 of the NPC, which refers to the 
misdemeanour of wilfully failing to perform or otherwise violating an official duty by public 
officials. Although one could argue that the peacekeeping commanders did not failed their duty 
wilfully, the simple violation of their official duty may be sufficient here. The Belgian case 
Mukeshimana referred to article 136(5) of the BPC which contains failing to use an ability to act 
because of knowledge they had of the commission of crimes they could have prevented or 
stopped.
318
 This article refers to serious international crimes in particular. Note that the 
knowledge requirement is lower than the usually required intent for criminal responsibility, which 
makes it more similar to civil liability. In addition, article 255ff of the Dutch Criminal Code 
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establishes criminal liability for someone with a ‘special responsibility’ who leaves someone 
behind needing urgent assistance.
319
 Although the Dutch commanders are initially blamed for 
actively contributing to the crimes committed, one could argue that they refused people access to 
the compound, knowing these people would be at risk of falling in the hands of the BSA. It could 
be argued that peacekeeping commanders have a ‘special responsibility’ towards the civilians in 
the mission area. Whether or not the Dutchbat commanders could be convicted based on article 
255ff of the DCC, however, would depend on a Court’s assessment of the case. Again, it would 
depend on how the relationship between the commanders and the civilians is defined. Section 
3.4.2 will also discuss how the relationship should be weighted against having the ability to act, a 
factor that is also relevant for individuals with a ‘special responsibility’ and thus capacity.  
 
A third option is that the relationship (of care) between the commanders and the civilians was 
based on a contract.
320
 By analogy, one can take the example of the relationship between a 
physician and his patient, as also referred to in the introduction to the thesis.
321
 The doctor does 
not need a contract with each individual victim to be required to intervene:
322
 the responsibilities 
towards the patient are part of his profession and may be part of a professional oath that each 
doctor takes. That contract creates a relationship of care between the professional and the patient 
that is arguably not very different from the relationship between a peacekeeping commander and 
the civilian population that his or her battalion is expected to protect. Whether such an obligation 
to act within PKOs exists based on law or contract depends not only on the domestic law, but also 
on the legal status of the mission-specific documents, eg the UNSC resolution (the mandate) and 
the ROE. These documents and the legal implications thereof for peacekeeping commanders will 
be discussed in chapter 5. 
 
3.4.2 The Interpretation of the Actus Reus: Reasonableness & Ability to Act 
 
The scope of the duty to act depends greatly on the defendant's ability to act and the 
reasonableness of the inaction. This section will therefore discuss these two circumstantial factors 
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that appeared to be most relevant in constituting liability for omissions in both civil and common 
law.
323
  
 
In common law countries there is a visible tendency to focus on an objective interpretation of 
whether someone failed in his or her duty to act.
324
 The standard used is often referred to as 
‘reasonableness’.325 In New Zealand the law was amended in 2011 to codify this tendency that has 
developed in the case law.
326
 The amendments also widened the scope of the relationship required 
by not specifying the content of the required relationship, but instead referring to a ‘failure to 
protect [a] child or vulnerable adult’.327 This would appear to imply that the specific relationship 
becomes less important: instead, the provision refers to ‘a child’ or ‘a vulnerable adult’ with 
whom the defendant ‘has frequent contact’.328 Then, it continues by requiring that the defendant 
‘failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the victim from that risk’.329 In addition, the defendant 
should be either a member of the same household or ‘a person who is a staff member of any 
hospital, institution, or residence where the victim resides’.330 This means that New Zealand 
criminal law has lessened its focus on the Garantenstellung, by making the required relationship 
between the defendant and the victim more flexible, but strengthened its focus on reasonableness 
and to some extent the ability to act. This allows for a broader interpretation of omission liability. 
A similar viewpoint was held in Honden Peter in which the Dutch Court argued that the defendant 
‘did not do what every ‘‘sane’’ person would have done in these circumstances’.331 A focus on 
both the duty and considerations of reasonableness and ability to act was demonstrated in 
Lederspray. The German Federal Court held in this case that those with a certain duty to act 
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should do that which is within their capabilities and can be considered reasonable.
332
  
 
The different interpretations may stretch a duty to act from only being imposed on individuals 
with a specific duty to act to those who may not have such an obligation, but were simply passing 
by and able to do something. It is important to keep these two separate concepts of omission 
liability in mind: on the one hand, there is a situation in which someone has a duty to act because 
of a certain relationship, the Garantenstellung.
333
 On the other hand, someone’s duty to act may 
depend on the factors of reasonableness and capacity to act to some extent.
334
 Pure omissions are 
a good example thereof. In practice however, these two concepts may easily be confused. 
 
The weight that should be assigned to the duty on the one hand and reasonableness and capacity 
to act on the other complicates the definition and demarcation of liability for omissions. Logically 
speaking, not having the ability to act would take away the obligation to do so.
335
 When someone 
has a specific duty to protect and/or a specific capacity to do so, the relevance of reasonableness 
in assessing the criminality of that failure to act must be determined in a different way. To 
illustrate, if a random passer-by can save a drowning child, but only by putting his own life at 
risk, not acting seems reasonable. However, if it concerns an armed police officer who does not 
intervene when a burglar shoots an innocent man, this changes the evaluation of reasonableness. 
In the latter context, not acting somehow will appear unreasonable to many. This depends not just 
on the capacity to act, being armed for instance, but also on the specific quality of the police 
officer. Even if he or she risks being shot in an attempt to stop the burglar, this could be inherent 
to his job. The same rationale may apply to the military commanders in Kigali and Srebrenica. 
Note that the Belgian military court considered reasonableness as a factor in its Marchal 
                                                          
332
 Lederspray (n 303) paras 1c, 1e, 1bb; BGH 6.11.2002- 5 StR 281/01, para 8 of the guiding principles preceding 
the judgment and paras 1d, 7 and D of the judgment itself. The judgment confirmed that the uselessness of acting 
(and thus unreasonableness) takes away the duty to act. See also BGH 16.07.1993 - 2 StR 294/93 where this is 
described as weighing the risk to harm for the defendant against the likelihood of preventing the result when 
intervening, as mentioned in the principles and paragraph 9b, see furthermore paragraph 6 of this judgment. 
333
 Text to n 307. 
334
 Roxin (n 302) 464; Kindhäuser (n 306) 329; Carl Bottek, Unterlassungen Und Ihre Folgen: Handlungs- Und 
Kausalitätstheoretische Überlegungen (Mohr Siebeck 2014) 146. In a slightly different context the ability to act was 
also discussed in JBJ Van der Leij and HK Elzinga, Plegen En Deelnemen (Kluwer 2007) 23. 
335
 Maik Barthel, Die ( Un- ) Zumutbarkeit Des Erfolgsabwendenden Tuns (Tenea 2004) 238. 
77 
  
judgment, as mentioned in chapter 2.
336
  
 
Some have argued that acting would have been unreasonable due to the risk this would have 
posed to the peacekeeping commanders themselves. While this may be a legitimate objection for 
civilians when not acting in cases of pure omissions, this does not appear persuasive where the 
defendant has a special quality. In both the Srebrenica and Rwanda cases, this argument of 
defence was raised. Some of the Dutch troops had been taken hostage and were at risk of losing 
their lives.
337
 The Belgian battalion had lost ten of its members.
338
 It was therefore understandable 
that both sides refrained from acting against the aggressors. In certain situations, however, these 
risks may be part of the job and therefore reasonable. Each profession has its own norms which 
determine the extent to which the defendant can be expected to face individual danger. The risks 
that the commanders would have faced if they had opposed the aggressors more strongly in both 
Kigali and Srebrenica would arguably have been acceptable considering the norms that apply to 
the military commander’s profession. As section 26 of the Norwegian Military Penal Code also 
states: ‘fear of personal danger cannot be pleaded to justify the omission of an official duty’.  
 
Another difficulty in relation to these risk assessments is that it is impossible to attach a certain 
value to the lives of one group of people to justify the death of others. Human life cannot be 
graded in numbers.
339
 This applies to the thought of saving the lives of the Dutch and Belgian 
troops, but also to the reasoning brought forward by Deputy Commander Franken in the 
Srebrenica hearings, that Dutchbat sacrificed the able-bodied men to save women and children.
340
 
Although this may seem morally just, it is not an acceptable legal basis to argue that the 
commander’s (in)action was reasonable. Reasonableness and capacity should be read in the 
context of the relationship or duty that is key to the case.  
 
The exact circumstances in which a duty to act arises are after all difficult to define. The Ontario 
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Court of Appeal defined the standard for establishing a duty to act in Browne:
341
  
 
The threshold definition must be sufficiently high to justify such serious penal consequences. The 
mere expression of words indicating a willingness to do an act cannot trigger the legal duty. There 
must be something in the nature of a commitment, generally, though not necessarily, upon which 
reliance can reasonably be said to have been placed.
342
  
 
Tolmie however argued that reasonableness should be the main threshold and that it is of greater 
importance than the exact nature of the relationship.
343
 She refers here to the difference between a 
security guard’s duties and that of a parent towards his or her child and observes:  
 
Certainly it is true that the nature of the relationship that parents and security guards have with the 
person they are protecting will be very different - the parent/ child relationship has emotional and 
moral dimensions that will not be present in a paid security relationship, and parents obviously 
have holistic responsibilities towards their children that go far beyond simply protection from 
other people's violence. But the difference in the nature of the relationships should not colour a 
consideration of the actual function which is in issue when discussing a duty to protect. The duty, 
quite simply, is to do what you can reasonably do to protect your charge from foreseeable physical 
assaults from other people, and that will also be part of the services provided by paid security, 
even though the nature of the relationship giving rise to the obligation and the source of the threat 
(family members as opposed to strangers) is likely to be different.
344 
 
Tolmie rightly argues that using the reasonable ability to act is arguably more important than the 
specific relationship between the defendant and the victim. This is however an uncontroversial 
point of view as a legal obligation is often assigned based on a specific quality of the defendant, 
for example having the authority to act, special training that raises an expectation of protection, 
etc. On the other hand, it may affect the interpretation of the provisions discussed in the previous 
section that often referred to a relationship of care. If the peacekeeping commanders had the 
ability to act, in combination with their specific quality as a military commander, one could 
question the need to establish such a relationship. To fulfil the actus reus requirement of a 
potential duty to act, it should be established that the commanders did not reasonably do 
everything they could have done in the circumstances to protect the civilians ‘under their care’.345 
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There may have been an ability to act, by passive presence at the very least, which would have 
fulfilled the actus reus requirement, because they were reasonably capable of doing something. 
They withdrew and surrendered instead. The latest judgment in Mothers of Srebrenica also 
stressed that the Dutch commanders could have continued to provide protection, which implies 
that the District Court found the decisions taken by the commanders unreasonable.
346
 In contrast, 
the Court of Appeal reasoned that it cannot be determined with sufficient certainty whether the 
refugees would have survived, had they been allowed to stay on the compound, and even assessed 
the possibility of them surviving at no more than 30 per cent.
347
   Whether or not failing to act 
could result in criminal liability depends on whether the commanders had a duty to act, which will 
be discussed separately in chapter 5. It also depends on the mental element required for omission 
liability under domestic law, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.4.3 Mens rea 
 
As Roxin argued in his much cited Taeterschaft und Tatherrschaft, where differentiation between 
objective behaviour in different cases of omission is difficult, the mental element is crucial to 
determine criminal liability.
348
 The mental element required for omission liability is similar if one 
compares the civil law countries under review. Within the common law system however, one can 
find substantial differences. Principal liability for the commission of a crime usually requires 
intent.
349
 Participation in the commission of crimes requires double intent in both systems.
350
 This 
applies to both complicity and co-perpetration. This means that the participant should have 
intended the participation itself and should have intended the commission of the crime. Each 
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system under review will have its own adaptions to this requirement, but this is the general 
viewpoint on the required mental element for participation. In most interpretations of ‘intent’ 
however, knowledge will suffice. A different threshold may apply for omissions though.  
 
The provisions and jurisprudence show that both recklessness and negligence are often used to 
establish omission liability. Although the two are often considered similar, it is important to keep 
in mind that recklessness refers to subjective foresight,
351
 meaning that the defendant actually was 
aware of the risk but consciously disregarded it, whereas negligence refers to objective 
foreseeability.
352
 This means it is unnecessary for the defendant to have foreseen the risk; it is 
sufficient that he could or even should have foreseen the risk that the result might occur. 
Negligence is an objective standard because it considers what another person in the same position 
and circumstances would have done. Negligence is often used for individuals who fulfil a certain 
role or are part of a certain profession where an objective comparison with individuals in the same 
position is possible. The rationale is that the position or profession raises the expectation of the 
defendant to foresee the result of his or her inaction,
353
 which lowers the threshold for the 
required mens rea. This results in using an objective standard rather than a subjective one. 
 
3.4.3.1 Recklessness  
 
In the criminal laws and jurisprudence of several civil and common law countries recklessness 
serves as a minimum threshold for the mental element required for omission liability. The 
Canadian Criminal Code for example accepts recklessness as the mental standard for omission 
liability
354
 for both domestic and serious international crimes.
355
 The New Zealand law also 
requires knowledge ‘that the victim is at risk of death, grievous bodily harm, or sexual assault 
(…)’356 in one of the most relevant provisions codifying the failure to protect a child or vulnerable 
adult.  
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The case law in New Zealand prior to this amendment from 2011 was not uniform regarding the 
mens rea for omissions, but was nevertheless an important reason to change the law. In Kuka the 
Court used a recklessness standard by arguing that the defendant knew of the threat her daughter 
was facing,
357
 which was similar to the standard used in Witika in which it was held that 
knowledge of the risk that violence may occur would fulfil the mens rea requirement.
358
 However, 
in Lunt the Court declared that a duty to act is triggered if the defendant ‘ought to know’ what 
was ongoing or foreseeable to happen.
359
 Where the latter judgment accepted a negligence 
standard, the first two cases used a recklessness standard. The English Manual on Service Law 
deviates from the standard set in the general criminal law by accepting foreseeability of the 
consequences as sufficient to fulfil the required ‘intent’: 
 
The meaning of ‘intention’ is not restricted to consequences which are wanted or desired, but 
includes consequences which an accused might not want to follow but which he knows are 
virtually certain to occur. (…) Where the accused may not have desired the consequence but may 
have foreseen it as a by-product of his action, whether intent is proved will require consideration 
both of the probability, however high, of the consequence occurring as a result of the accused’s 
action, and in some cases this may be a very significant factor together with all the other evidence, 
in order to determine whether the accused intended to bring about the consequence.
360
  
 
The standard of dolus eventualis used in most civil law countries is similar to recklessness.
361
 It 
allows the use of a relatively objective standard to fulfil the intent requirement. In Honden Peter, 
for example, the Dutch Supreme Court applied dolus eventualis which led the Court to argue that 
the defendant ‘willingly and knowingly took the risk that the victim would die as a result of his 
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inaction’.362 Not acting against the crimes being committed equalled intentionally allowing it to 
happen, argued the Court.
363
 The defendant was held responsible for aiding the crime of 
manslaughter by omission. It should be noted that the double intent requirement is often not 
referred to in these cases, but is more or less embedded in the notions of recklessness and dolus 
eventualis. It contains both the awareness of the risk and acceptance of the risk that the criminal 
result may occur. This may explain why double intent as such is rarely discussed in cases dealing 
with omissions. 
 
Although the Dutch case of RB Zutphen 6 April 2004
364
 is not a perfect example of an omission, 
since the mother was more actively involved in the mistreatment of her son than in the other 
examples referred to, the mental element used was also dolus eventualis. The Court held that the 
nature and frequency of the violent acts committed by her partner towards her son should have 
made her ‘reflect on the situation’.365 It must have been clear to her that death would be a possible 
consequence of her partner’s acts. Therefore, she ‘willingly and knowingly’ took the considerable 
risk that her child might die because of her partner’s violent behaviour.366 She was convicted for 
co-perpetrating attempted assault and attempted manslaughter. 
 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, the Dutch and Belgian courts were of the opinion that the battalions 
(and presumably their commanders) could not have been ignorant of the fact that systemic killings 
were taking place near the compound and school respectively.
367
 In both situations, the courts 
established some level of subjective knowledge, which could fulfil a recklessness or dolus 
eventualis standard. In the Mustafić & Nuhanović v Karremans, Franken & Oosterveen complaint 
procedure, the Arnhem Court of Appeal touched upon the notion of different concepts of 
knowledge in civil and criminal law. The Court concluded that the defendants did not have the 
required knowledge under criminal law, despite having it under civil law.
368
 As Ryngaert and 
Thompson later argued in a case commentary, this is peculiar since the commanders cannot have 
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knowledge under civil law, but have no knowledge under criminal law.
369
 It is true however that 
civil law applies a lower threshold for the required intent, not necessarily requiring a subjective 
form of knowledge. This could explain why the Court argued as such. Perhaps civil law focuses 
more on causation to establish who is responsible for the damage caused, whereas criminal law 
requires evidence of individual guilt. This means that if criminal intent would be difficult to 
demonstrate, tort liability would be a good alternative if causation between the defendants' 
inaction and the result has been demonstrated.
370
 Within criminal law, negligence is another form 
of mens rea used to establish omission liability. This type of intent is more objective and is as 
such also used in establishing tort liability. 
 
3.4.3.2 Negligence  
 
Where tort negligence can be defined as 'creating an unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
another, a risk that the actor could and should have prevented by taking a precaution',
371
 criminal 
negligence differs from this concept in that it refers to 'the actor's unreasonable inadvertence or 
unreasonable mistake'.
372
 Or as Simons specifies this, '[a]n actor might be unreasonably ignorant 
or inadvertent in failing to form any belief about a relevant matter, when he should have formed a 
belief [,o]r the actor might form a definite belief, but that belief might be unreasonably 
mistaken.
373
 Where tort law considers the reasonableness of the actor's conduct, given the risks 
created by that conduct prior to the harm actually occurring, criminal law looks at the 
reasonableness of the actor's belief considering the information available to him or her when 
taking the decision.
374
  
 
Using negligence to establish omission liability is likely in the cases of the peacekeeping 
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commanders where they have a duty of care regarding the civilian population.
375
 Some criminal 
provisions will specifically include negligence as the standard for the mental element.
376
 This is 
officially required for negligence to be applied.
377
 How criminal negligence should be defined is 
often subject to debate. In Canadian criminal law it is defined as ‘who in doing anything or 
omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do so, shows wanton or reckless disregard for the 
lives or safety of other persons’.378 The British Armed Forces Act explains that negligence will 
most often occur in cases of non-criminal offences because they are related to the military’s 
‘professional responsibilities, where certain basic (or reasonable) standards of performance can be 
expected’.379 A reasonable person in this context means someone with the ‘same skills, 
professional training, knowledge and experience. A person is negligent if he fails to exercise such 
care, skill or foresight as a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation’.380 The 
rationale behind the use of negligence for specific roles and professions is that, in those roles or 
professions, someone had the training or education to deal with such situations. Examples are a 
lighthouse officer, railway officer, a pharmacist, medical doctors, police men
381
 and military 
officials. The exercise of these professions is often ‘monopolised’; in other words, only a limited 
number of people can do the job. Working in these professions may therefore create an obligation 
to go beyond what other people outside that job should do, simply because other people cannot 
respond to the need in question.  
 
Although no one is required to do the impossible, sometimes, the defendant could or should have 
known that not acting would put someone at risk of harm. This corresponds with the discussion in 
section 3.4.2 on reasonableness and the ability to act. Applying negligence is complex, partly 
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because of its use as both a subjective and objective element to the commission of crimes.
382
 
Where the defendant had a specific duty of care, negligence may be part of the objective element 
rather than being part of the mens rea.
383
 Surely, it is difficult to argue that the defendant had an 
actual mental state if one was not aware of criminal conduct being committed.
384
 This type of 
negligence is expected to result in a lower degree of liability, arguably for the failure to fulfil a 
duty as a separate offence, but not linked to the criminal result. 
 
However, some provisions indicate that the expectation of action that is inherent to using a 
negligence standard, links the defendant to the resulting crime. This was explicitly stated in the 
German Soldiers Act,
385
 for example, which determines that soldiers who commit an offence by 
omission based on negligence, are to be held liable for the result of their omission. A likely 
explanation for this would be that negligence is equated with intent, based on the reasoning that a 
soldier was expected to know what was about to happen and should therefore have intervened.
386
 
Willingly taking the risk that the result may occur (while the defendant at least should have been 
aware of this) is then seen as culpable conduct that makes the defendant liable for the result and 
not just for failing to fulfil a certain duty.  
 
Several criminal law provisions also offer scope to convict the commanders based on their 
potential negligence regarding the death that resulted from the withdrawal of protection to the 
civilians under their care.
387
 Section 239 of the Norwegian Penal Code (NPC) is one provision 
which criminalises 'any person who negligently causes the death of another person’. The 
maximum punishment referred to in this section is three years, and six years if aggravating 
circumstances occur. This implies a lower sentence than one may expect for causing death. 
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Another provision in the NPC states that if the defendant ‘could have foreseen the possibility of 
such a consequence or failed to prevent the foreseeable consequence to the best of its ability’,388 
an increased sentence may be imposed. Thus, in certain circumstances there might be a duty to 
foresee; failing to do so and the subsequent failure to act are considered worthy of higher 
sanctions.  
 
When comparing the use of negligence and recklessness in practice, it is clear that in the majority 
of the jurisprudence reviewed a negligence standard has been applied as the mental element for an 
omission. The expectation of a lower degree of liability or a lower punishment is however not 
visible. Kuka
389
 is a good example of a case in which the Court held that the duty to protect is 
triggered as soon as the parent ‘ought to have known’ that violence would occur.390 Lunt 
confirmed that simple negligence may establish criminal liability for a failure to act.
391
 In the 
Canadian case Popen the Court confirmed that aiding by omission based on relationships of care 
requires purpose, but could not establish the defendant’s purpose to aid murder. Instead, the Court 
argued that ‘the defendant may be independently guilty of manslaughter if he knew, recklessly 
disregarded, or was negligent to the fact that his wife was abusing their child’.392 Thus, in cases 
where only knowledge, recklessness or negligence can be demonstrated as opposed to the 
required purpose, the Canadian Court may establish principal liability for a lesser offence. In the 
Dutch Savanna case, there was no proof that the mental element was fulfilled according to an 
objective standard: the guardian could not have foreseen the maltreatment by the girl’s mother 
and partner and the consequences thereof.
393
 
In these cases, using a relatively objective standard like negligence or a low subjective standard as 
recklessness may facilitate a conviction. It lowers the threshold for liability, also in cases where it 
does not concern the criminalisation of a separate failure to act, but where omission leads to a 
criminal result.  
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Applying these observations to the Dutch and Belgian case studies results in the following 
conclusion:  because the Dutch and Belgian courts confirmed the foreseeability of the crimes that 
were about to take place,
394
 the Dutch and Belgian commanders would fulfil the required mens 
rea. In the case of the Belgians one could even speak of a situation in which the commanders 
turned a blind eye to the danger faced by the refugees.
395
 The conclusions drawn so far in this 
chapter shed a different light on the decision in Mustafić & Nuhanović v Karremans, Franken & 
Oosterveen,
396
 especially if one takes the state responsibility cases into account. The Hague Court 
of Appeal was of the opinion that the knowledge or awareness of the Dutchbat officials regarding 
the possible consequences of sending the men away was limited.
397
 The Court concluded that the 
commanders did not possess the required knowledge when they sent the men from the 
compound.
398
 As touched upon in section 2.5.1 (Ch. 2) this conclusion is not in line with previous 
judgments in the Mothers of Srebrenica and Nuhanović/Mustafić cases. The witness statements 
and observations made demonstrated that there was a certain level of awareness among the 
Dutchbat officials of what was ongoing outside the compound and of the likelihood that the men 
who were sent away would face the same fate.
399
 The fact that Franken explained to Ibro 
Nuhanović that they had to sacrifice the men to save women and children demonstrates this,400 as 
well as his remark in the NIOD investigation that he sent these men off the compound into an 
almost certain death.
401
 The Hague District Court’s conclusion in this regard was clear: 
 
at the end of the afternoon of July 13th 1995 Dutchbat given what they knew then and had 
observed as reproduced above must have been aware of a serious risk of genocide of the men 
separated and carried off from Potočari by the Bosnian Serbs as referred to in the deliberation cited 
in paragraph 4.178 of the [ICJ]: the Bosnian Serbs systematically selected men who were then 
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badly treated and stripped of their identity papers – so that they could no longer be identified – and 
then carried off separately to an unknown destination.
402
  
 
This was different in the days preceding the 13th of July and may therefore not have applied to 
the situation of Mustafić and Nuhanović, since they were sent of the basis on the 12th of July. 
However, the Hague District Court's conclusion here indicates that the Dutch were negligent 
regarding the potential consequences of sending people of the base from the end of the afternoon 
on the 13th of July onwards, which was confirmed in the Appeal Judgment.
403
 The District Court 
further held that ‘[i]n all reasonableness, Dutchbat could have been required to reassess the 
situation and all interests concerned prior to the evacuation of the refugees from the compound 
and that it should have decided to let the male refugees stay at the compound’.404 The 
commanders’ awareness of the imminent risk of the killings could have fulfilled the criminal law 
interpretation of negligence, and if applicable, a duty to act. This is in line with domestic practice 
as discussed above. 
 
3.4.4 Causation 
 
So far it appeared that the thresholds used for the mental element are relatively low and that there 
are different ways to establish a duty to act that would fulfil the actus reus of omission liability. 
The causation requirement is important to determine whether the peacekeeping commander’s 
potential liability would be linked to the failure to act or to the criminal result. Judging from the 
limited jurisprudence discussed above, it appears that causation is interpreted in a similar manner 
whether a court is dealing with cases of commission or omission, based on the rationale that the 
result, eg death or serious injury, is the same.
405
 In Kuka, the mother was held responsible as a 
principal offender for manslaughter,
406
 based on the argument that her failure to protect caused 
the result.
407
 Causation for homicide and manslaughter is tested in the same way: the judges will 
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assess whether the act or omission ‘is a "substantial and operative" contribution to the 
acceleration of death which took place’.408 This was also the view taken by the New Zealand Law 
Commission regarding omissions in cases of domestic violence when it argued that ‘in 
comparison with illegal violence, an omission would be equally culpable (…) in the sense that the 
risk to the child is the same’.409  
 
The search for causation is plausible when it concerns commission by omission, focusing on the 
result, but is more questionable when it concerns failing to act. Only in establishing tort liability, 
causation between the omitted act and the result could be established without implying that the 
defendant is also responsible for the result. In the Dutch Savanna case, the culpable failure to act 
on its own could not establish liability.
410
 Since the Court applied a negligence standard, one 
would expect the case to focus on the failure to act as a separate issue rather than coupling it to 
the criminal result. It therefore applied negligence as a subjective element rather than as an 
extension of the actus reus. In cases of direct omissions, in which someone is under a duty to act 
but fails to do so and fulfils the required mental element, it is not necessary to establish a 
connection with the result. The Court’s conclusion that the defendant should be acquitted because 
a causal link between the guardian’s failure to protect and the death of the 3-year-old Savanna 
could not be established was therefore an incorrect conclusion.
411
 The causal connection to the 
result is only required if it concerns commission by omission and thus an indirect form of 
omission. Since the guardian had a duty of care regarding Savanna this was a direct omission.  
 
The Savanna case is an example of how direct and indirect omissions are sometimes combined 
leading to an incorrect judgment.
412
 The confusion mainly results from widening the scope of the 
subjective element as well as focusing on whether the omitted act could have prevented the result, 
despite claiming in theory that such a causal effect is not required for a failure to act or a direct 
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omission.
413
 In other words, a counter-factual form of causation is applied. Where this may lead to 
a conviction for the result, it might also relieve the defendant from guilt. In the German 
Radfahrerfall
414
 case a lorry driver did not keep sufficient distance from a drunken cyclist, who 
was hit by the lorry and died. The Court held that even had the lorry driver kept enough distance, 
the drunken cyclist could have gotten under the truck. Therefore, a causal connection between the 
driver’s violation of law and the death of the cyclist was not existent.415  
 
Whether the defendant’s omission actually contributed to the result is subjected to a strict test in 
New Zealand and America: the omitted act should have prevented the result with certainty.
416
 It is 
not sufficient to conclude that intervening could have made a difference.
417
 This is a high standard 
and yet, omissions fulfil this requirement more easily than might be assumed - especially if we 
recognise that multiple causes could lead to one result.
418
 The inaction of the defendant need not 
be the main cause for the result to occur. For example, the BSA in Srebrenica and the 
Interahamwe in Kigali committed the actual crimes and were the main cause that led to the 
killings, but that does not rule out the passive attitude of the Dutch and Belgian commanders as an 
additional cause that may incur liability. However, Canada has accepted a lower standard by 
requiring that the omission should have been a significant contributing cause to the result.
419
 
Therefore, one might be inclined to conclude that Canada is less focused on the causal 
contribution of the defendant’s act or omission to the result than we have seen above in the New 
Zealand and American approach.
420
 However, the causal contribution is relevant in establishing 
criminal conduct and it appears that the distinction between direct and indirect omissions is not 
always made, although this is a highly relevant question for the actual meaning of a judgment on 
omissions. If the inaction is linked to the result, it implies that the defendant is held responsible 
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for the criminal result and not for his or her failure to act. The degree of liability between the two 
options may differ greatly, depending on which specific crime it concerns. 
 
3.5 Degree of Liability 
 
In common law, the starting point for the attribution of guilt differs from civil law. Since the 
defendant will be held responsible for the result, the causal connection is arguably more important 
to establish. The result will be key to the criminal liability of the defendant, regardless of whether 
he or she is a principal or a participant. This means that differentiation only takes place by means 
of the sentence and the crime. A court may convict a defendant as a principal for a lesser offence, 
because participation in the commission of a more severe crime could not be established, eg 
principal liability for manslaughter where a conviction for aiding the crime of murder fails, as will 
be explained in more detail below. This approach to criminal liability can be explained by the 
common law tendency to focus on the causal connection with the criminal result.  
 
In the light of this approach, a failure to act can lead to liability as a principal based on the 
reasoning that a failure to act causes the result just as much as active conduct, if the intervention 
could have prevented the result.
421
 This leads to a scenario as seen in both the Kuka and the Peters 
cases: convictions for either manslaughter or murder, which, arguably, impose an unfair label on 
the parent who failed to act.
422
 Although the mother in Kuka was held responsible for failing to 
protect and a failure to provide medical care, the conviction and punishment (9 years 
imprisonment) themselves stigmatised the parent as an active wrongdoer, or even a serious 
criminal, despite her being described as an otherwise loving and caring mother. If these parents or 
caretakers would have been held responsible for not fulfilling their duty of care, as a direct 
omission, the degree of responsibility would have been lower. However, the courts’ reasoning 
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implies that they are being held responsible for the main crimes committed and not for the more 
suitable failure to fulfil a duty of care. After all, it seems unreasonable to frame the person who 
failed to act as a principal perpetrator.
423
 This would not be in line with the principle of fair 
labelling, as introduced in the introductory remarks to this part of the thesis. It would also mean 
that the defendant is held liable for conduct he or she did not commit him- or herself, which is in 
contrast to the principle of culpability as discussed in the introduction.  
 
Because of this practice, the final judgment often contains a mixture of the elements necessary for 
a criminal omission as a separate offence (legal duty and failure to act + negligence) and the mode 
of liability, eg participation (substantial effect on/contribution to the commission of the crime and 
knowledge or awareness with dolus eventualis as minimum threshold and double intent). This will 
negatively affect the outcome, since a failure to act is then linked to the criminal result.  
 
The problems encountered could be avoided if a separate approach to liability for a failure to fulfil 
duties is used. In German law for example, the Pflichtsinhalttheorie as an objective approach is 
sometimes used to establish liability based on failure to fulfil duties.
424
 A simple rule 
differentiates between perpetration and participation: someone who fails a duty to protect is 
considered a perpetrator of the crime, whereas a failure to exercise security control may only 
result in participation.
425
 The underlying rationale is that the latter refers to cases in which the 
defendant will have been a third party to the offence.
426
 It is therefore more a secondary form of 
liability than a primary one. This also reflects more accurately the role that the defendant played 
in the commission of the crime, which is in line with the principle of culpability and fair labelling. 
However, in the case law reviewed here, although not restricted to Germany, this secondary role 
often results in liability for co-perpetration. If, however, the control theory is used, there is little 
scope for differentiation, as in the German case BGH 4 StR 488/08.
427
 The judiciary therefore find 
a middle way between the control theory and the Pflichtsinhalttheorie. Both the mindset (innere 
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Haltung) and the control over the commission of the crime are then considered.
428
  
 
The confusion that some domestic courts have demonstrated regarding the qualification of 
inactive conduct and the elements required to establish liability for omissions leads to a difficult 
conclusion regarding the elements and the degree of liability that is assigned to the defendants. In 
the cases under review, the actus reus of participation was often not considered. Instead, the focus 
was placed on the failure to act and the knowledge (foreseeability or awareness) required, where it 
was also held that negligence suffices. One can see that omission and commission are often 
treated equally and that both direct and indirect omissions may result in criminal liability for the 
result, even though direct omissions are normally not connected to the result. This means there is 
little scope in the assessment of a failure to act to consider it a separate offence.  
 
If we apply the law hypothetically to the cases of the Dutch and Belgian commanders, it would be 
problematic to argue that they would be responsible if we aim to respect the general principles of 
criminal law. However, we have not considered whether the Dutch and Belgian commanders had 
an obligation to act yet. If one of the national law provisions would be applicable to the Dutch and 
Belgian commanders, or if chapter 5 would point out that an obligation to act exists under 
international law (which may be enforceable under domestic law if based on customary 
international law), the liability that follows would impose an unfair stigma on the commanders 
and would hold them responsible for conduct they did not commit. If the rationale behind 
criminalisation is that the defendant is held accountable for his or her own conduct, the judgments 
should reflect this. Also, where the jurisprudence has diverged from written law, it may not be 
foreseeable for the commanders that not acting could be considered a crime in certain situations.  
 
This chapter illustrates how context is important in ensuring that failing to fulfil an obligation 
does not result in an unfair judgment on the Dutch and Belgian commanders’ criminal liability. 
The elements used to assess omission liability are after all relatively objective and provided that a 
duty to act exists, a factual, non-contextual assessment of their liability (disregarding the 
principles of criminal law) could result in the conclusion that they are responsible for crimes 
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committed by a third party. Context is also provided by factors such as reasonableness and ability 
to act, just like the general principles of criminal law provide an additional check to assess 
whether the outcome of a legal judgment would be fair considering the facts under review.  
 
3.6 Practical Limitations to Domestic Adjudication of Peacekeeping Conduct 
 
Besides the difficulties in establishing a fair degree of liability, the domestic criminal prosecution 
of peacekeeping conduct is constrained by several practical issues in the domestic sphere. These 
practical limitations complicate the fair and effective adjudication of crimes committed during 
PKOs. As many incidents of sexual abuse in PKOs have demonstrated so far, TCCs are often 
unwilling to investigate conduct performed by their own peacekeepers and will therefore not 
initiate investigations easily.
429
 This may contribute to selective prosecutions when it concerns 
politically sensitive cases.
430
 In addition, TCCs may not have jurisdiction over crimes or other 
conduct committed outside their national territory.
431
 Or, if the TCC uses military courts to 
adjudicate military conduct, their jurisdiction may be limited to conduct committed during an 
armed conflict and therefore exclude conduct committed in times of peace.
432
 An additional 
problem encountered in practice is that the investigations often take place somewhere far removed 
from the place where the crimes occurred. It is then difficult to find the proof and evidence in due 
time.
433
 A benefit of domestic adjudication for the TCC is that it keeps the willingness of states to 
contribute to future missions high, as states keep the power to adjudicate their agents in their own 
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hands.
434
 This is important in keeping the morale of TCCs up, since PKOs depend on the 
voluntary contributions of UN member states.
435
  
 
A complicated aspect is that different national laws apply in multinational PKOs, which results in 
the fulfilment of the nearly impossible task of FCs, battalion commanders and legal advisors to 
keep a close eye on how certain conduct in PKOs may affect a peacekeeper according to his or 
her national laws. This is particularly difficult if it concerns crimes that may be qualified as 
international crimes. If one considers that the greatest contributors to PKOs nowadays are 
countries that have not necessarily ratified the Rome Statute (RS), for example Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and India,
436
 it is clear that finding a uniform approach may be difficult. Four out of ten 
countries currently contributing to peacekeeping missions have not ratified the RS at all.
437
 
Therefore, their domestic law may not be in line with the internationally applicable standards, to 
which the RS is an important guideline. Also, many of these countries are still in the process of 
developing an effective judicial system, which does not warrant legal remedies after misconduct 
in PKOs.
438
 This problem is more pressing if these states have domesticated international crimes, 
eg frame a war crime as murder in a domestic court.
439
 The criminal complaint filed against the 
Dutch commanders showed a combined use of international and domestic crimes, eg complicity 
to the commission of war crimes and complicity to the commission of murder.
440
  
 
Besides the differences in defining specific crimes, TCCs will also apply their own general part 
of criminal law. This means they will apply their own standards regarding the modes of liability, 
rather than the general part of international criminal law statutes.
441
 This may be beneficial if 
certain countries may have standards that go further than international law in criminalising 
contributions to the commission of international crimes. With the majority of TCCs lagging 
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behind in adopting the international norms regarding individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes, this may however be a negative aspect.  
 
Another difficulty in applying domestic law to try conduct that may be considered an 
international crime is that the ‘nature of the conduct’ is in those cases more likely to be 
international than domestic, as Kleffner points out.
442
 Considering international legal practice on 
the matter would then do justice to the serious and international nature of that conduct.
443
 Not 
acting while knowing what was about to happen, the commanders may have neglected the 
fundamental principles of humanity that international criminal law aims to respect. That makes 
international law relevant in this context,
444
 albeit it for consultation.  
 
In addition, if a failure to act arises in a PKO, it might not just harm criminal law principles or 
norms, but it may also affect the UN’s main objectives and principles.445 It might even affect 
mission specific objectives as mentioned in the mandate. This is derived from Oswald’s 
argumentation that a model criminal law framework for peace operations is necessary, because 
the effects that peacekeeping conduct may have are inherently different from conduct normally 
under scrutiny of a domestic criminal court.
446
 While recognising the exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction assigned to the TCC, I consider the interpretation and practice of criminal law at the 
international level highly relevant. Despite the limitations that domestic law poses, we must focus 
on domestic criminal law as the primary area of law that applies, while recognising that 
international law may provide us with a universally accepted approach to liability and the 
definition of crimes.
447
  
 
International law may be important to help us find uniformity in the approach to the adjudication 
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of serious criminal conduct committed in an international context. If domestic courts have 
implemented international law in their domestic codes, this is the direct way to apply the 
international standard. But where domestic courts cannot apply international law directly, 
international courts may exercise jurisdiction. Where IHL applied and where crimes were 
committed within the geographical and temporal scope of jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, 
these tribunals may even exercise their primary right of jurisdiction.
448
 Generally, it has been 
argued that if domestic adjudication is problematic, the adjudication of such conduct by 
international courts or tribunals should at least be considered.
449
 
3.7 Comparative Perspective and Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter aimed to discuss both common and civil law approaches to omission liability and 
wanted to highlight the main differences and similarities between the two systems. The outcome 
however is straightforward: the approaches in both systems are similar to a great extent. Although 
common law is generally stricter and prefers a narrow interpretation of omission liability, which 
excludes pure omissions, the comparison demonstrated that direct and indirect omissions in both 
common and civil law are treated in a similar fashion. Both systems recognise the same legal 
bases for duties of care: creation of danger or risk, the law, contract and the possibility to derive 
this from the fulfilment of a certain profession. Equally, both systems use factors such as 
reasonableness and the ability to act to assess whether a duty to act was triggered. The supporting 
evidence was however primarily found in the jurisprudence and literature discussing the common 
law system.  
 
Regarding the required mens rea, a negligence standard is mostly used in both systems, even 
though several common law cases applied recklessness as a threshold and civil law systems 
occasionally applied the dolus eventualis threshold for the required knowledge. Although often 
claimed that omission liability requires no causal relationship between failing to act and the result, 
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the jurisprudence shows that such a causal connection was sought in most cases discussed. There 
was no substantial difference between civil and common law countries. A problematic aspect 
regarding this type of liability and its potential application to the cases of the Dutch and Belgian 
commanders is the high degree of liability incurred by the defendants. This is partly based on the 
unitary approach to liability applied in the common law system, but is also the immediate result of 
the fact that causation is established and that lower standards have been used in establishing this 
type of liability, while often linking the liability to the crime committed by the principal 
perpetrator.  
 
Considering the general principles of criminal law, the liability incurred by the commanders 
would be disproportionate to the crime committed, because they would not be held responsible for 
their own personal conduct. In addition, it would stigmatise the commanders as contributors to the 
commission of serious crimes. Whereas a certain level of responsibility for a failure to act with 
such dramatic consequences seems appropriate, omission liability will be difficult to establish 
under domestic law. We furthermore discussed that this is not the only limitation to domestic 
prosecution of the conduct under review, since there are several practical obstacles to effective 
criminal prosecution of peacekeeping conduct by the TCC. It is thus relevant to consider omission 
liability under international criminal law to see how the RS has been interpreted in international 
law in this context and how the jurisprudence of the ad hoc courts may have contributed to the 
development of liability for omissions in the international legal sphere. 
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Chapter 4: Scope for Omission Liability under International Law? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter takes us from liability for omissions in the domestic legal realm to omission liability 
at the international level. In view of the jurisdictional provisions in a PKO’s SOFA, the 
application of a TCC’s criminal law is most suitable in considering what type of liability should 
be incurred by peacekeeping commanders if they fail to fulfil such an obligation. We considered 
domestic criminal law in chapter 3. Since the domestic prosecution of peacekeepers in their TCCs 
comes with practical difficulties and omission liability is difficult to establish for the Dutch and 
Belgian commanders, this chapter will look into omission liability under international criminal 
law. International law has a complementary role in domestic courts because of the example set by 
the RS. The international context in which peacekeeping takes place and the relevance of 
international provisions of IHL and IHRL for the fulfilment of PKOs furthermore supports the 
idea that international criminal law should be considered in the cases under review.  
 
Although criminal omissions as such are contested in international criminal law, the ICTR and 
ICTY have produced a limited amount of case law on omissions. Yet, the RS and the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes lack an explicit provision that criminalises such a failure to act. The statutes only 
recognise the concept of command responsibility, which is an important example of liability for 
omissions in international criminal law as it establishes individual criminal responsibility for a 
state agent. After assessing whether the international courts have jurisdiction over the conduct 
under review and whether that conduct should be classified as a domestic or international crime, 
the third section discusses command responsibility. Thereafter, I will give an overview of the 
general position on omission liability in international law. Then, an analysis of the elements 
required for omission liability shall take place. 
 
4.2 Jurisdiction of the International Courts and/or Tribunals 
 
The current jurisdictional arrangements for criminal conduct in PKOs do not exclude the 
possibility that conduct is also subject to the jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal or 
100 
 
the ICC where IHL applied directly to peacekeeping commanders. It is however questionable 
whether conduct committed by peacekeepers or peacekeeping commanders can fulfil the 
requirements that make these mechanisms suitable for the most serious international crimes. To 
reach that threshold, several requirements must be fulfilled. 
 
Let us first consider the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR, in relation to 
the conduct of the Belgian and Dutch commanders. The ad hoc tribunals have primacy over 
national courts (art 9 (2) of the ICTY Statute) concerning violations of international humanitarian 
law. It is possible to consider responsibility for both a domestic and international court however, if 
the crime for which the person is tried by a national court was characterised as an ordinary crime 
(art 10 (2) (a) of ICTY Statute) or if the 'national court proceedings were not impartial or 
independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the 
case was not diligently prosecuted' (art 10 (2) (b) of the ICTY Statute). 
 
The jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals is based on three grounds: jurisdiction ratione loci, 
jurisdiction ratione temporis and jurisdiction ratione materiae.
450
 Put differently, the jurisdiction 
is triggered when the alleged crimes were committed in Rwanda or Yugoslavia respectively, after 
a certain date (for Yugoslavia this is 1 January 1991,
451
 whereas the ICTR’s jurisdiction is limited 
to the year 1994)
452
 and if the subject matter triggers the Court’s jurisdiction. This is the case if it 
concerns grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva conventions,
453
 violations of the laws and customs of 
war,
454
 genocide
455
 and/or crimes against humanity.
456
 One can observe that the alleged failures to 
protect were ‘committed’ within the required territory and within the time frame to which the 
tribunals’ jurisdiction extends, but it is unclear whether that failure to protect could fall within a 
category of crimes over which the ad hoc tribunals have jurisdiction. We will look into that aspect 
below. We will first turn to the main requirements that trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
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The jurisdiction of the ICC depends on two main foundations: 1) the time of the commission of 
the crimes, which should be after the entry into force of the Rome Statute (1 July 2002) as 
determined in article 11 of the RS and 2) the state of which the defendant is a national or the state 
on whose territory the conduct occurred should be a party to the RS.
457
 It is clear from the first 
requirement that jurisdiction for the failures to protect by the Belgian and Dutch commanders, 
which took place in 1994 and 1995, would not trigger the jurisdiction ratione tempori of the ICC. 
Conduct that took place in PKOs of more recent date could however be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC if the national courts appear unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction.
458
 
The second requirement, that the TCC to which the defendant belongs or the state on whose 
territory the conduct was committed should be a member of the ICC, has automatically not been 
met in the cases of Kigali and Srebrenica. The ICC and its statute were not in force until 1 July 
2002, therefore both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda as the host states and Belgium and the 
Netherlands as the TCCs could not have been a party to the RS. As addressed above, this does not 
exclude the possibility that the ICC may have jurisdiction over matters that arise in contemporary 
or future PKOs, if these requirements have been met. 
 
For contemporary or future PKOs this would mean that two additional criteria must be fulfilled. 
These additional criteria are first, the threshold of gravity
459
 and second, the principle of 
complementarity that requires asking whether the domestic court is unwilling or unable to try the 
defendant.
460
 If so, the ICC may obtain jurisdiction if a country refers a case to the ICC itself,
461
 or 
if the UN Security Council does so.
462
 Alternatively, the prosecutor has the discretionary power to 
pick cases himself.
463
 The complementarity principle underlines that the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction if the national courts with this right are unwilling or unable to do so,
464
 something that 
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is not an unlikely scenario in the context of peacekeeping. Since the conduct of the Dutch and 
Belgian commanders did not meet the requirements for jurisdiction to be assigned to the ICC, we 
will not discuss the jurisdiction of the ICC in further detail. 
 
4.2.1 Qualification of Conduct: A Domestic or International Crime? 
 
With criminal jurisdiction being exclusively assigned to the TCC, and the ad hoc tribunals having 
primary jurisdiction over international crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, the exercise of jurisdiction will greatly depend on the classification of the 
commanders’ conduct. We thus need to assess whether the conduct of the Dutch and Belgian 
commanders can be classified as an international crime or whether it is more suitably framed as a 
domestic crime. 
 
Bantekas confirmed that the ‘principle difference between domestic crime and international crime 
is context’.465 This means that where the local authorities have control over crime committed in a 
domestic society, international crimes occur in ‘situations of lawlessness and breakdown of 
authority’.466 The ICTY Appeals Chamber held in its Kunarac judgment regarding the difference 
between war crimes and domestic crimes that 
 
[w]hat ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war crime is 
shaped by or dependent upon the environment – the armed conflict – in which it is committed. It 
need not have been planned or supported by some form of policy. The armed conflict need not 
have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a 
minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to 
commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed.
467
 
 
This reasoning can be applied to peacekeepers as well: it has been argued that the context of 
armed conflict in which they have been deployed creates the connection required to commit an 
international crime.
468
 It is possible to argue that the general context in which the Dutch and 
Belgian commanders’ conduct took place was a context of armed conflict. But is that sufficient to 
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qualify their conduct as an international crime? For the three core crimes recognised in 
international criminal law, and thus in the statutes of the international courts, certain contextual 
requirements indicate whether a crime could be defined as such. Each requirement will be 
discussed in this section for the crimes of genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes. 
 
4.2.2 Genocide 
 
When we consider genocide briefly, it is mainly relevant to discuss whether the Dutch and 
Belgian commanders could have fulfilled the requirements set for genocide. Genocide as defined 
in article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
469
 requires a 
specific mental element, namely the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such’. In addition, article II requires a physical element, which 
consists of several options.
470
 In assessing these options, while taking the conduct of the Dutch 
and Belgian commanders in consideration, some of these possibilities can be excluded. For 
example, the commanders did not ‘kill members of the group’471 or ‘deliberately inflicted on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’.472 
Neither did the commanders ‘impose measures intended to prevent births within the group’473 nor 
‘forcibly transfer children of the group to another group’.474 More debatable is the act of genocide 
described as ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’,475 because it 
allows for a broader interpretation than the other acts listed. The language used does not restrict 
the interpretation of this option to active conduct, since ‘causing’ may also imply a more passive 
way of bringing about harm. In particular, when we consider the listed forms in which genocide 
can be committed, this does not necessarily limit its options to direct responsibility for genocide. 
Article III of the Convention for example also refers to conspiracy, incitement, attempt and 
complicity as additional ways of committing the crime of genocide.   
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The question is then to what extent these options would require the commanders to have fulfilled 
the specific intent requirement referred to above. It has for example been argued that the specific 
intent requirement may not apply to complicity to genocide, since article III (e) of the Convention 
contains no reference to the specific mens rea requirement.
476
 In particular, the difference between 
‘complicity in genocide’ as included in article 4(3)(e) of the ICTY Statute, and thus in the special 
part of the statute, and aiding and abetting genocide in article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, which is 
the general part of the statute, is cause for confusion. This refers to the difference between 
complicity as part of the crime of genocide and complicity as part of aiding and abetting and thus 
as a modality of criminal liability. Some interpret the notion of complicity in genocide as a 
separate crime, which sets it apart from aiding and abetting the crime of genocide as a mode of 
liability.
477
 Those who follow that line of reasoning accept that complicity to commit genocide as 
a crime requires knowledge (and thus awareness), whereas aiding and abetting as a mode of 
liability would require specific intent.
478
 This is arguably because the accomplice would be the 
mastermind behind the genocide and not the actual perpetrator.
479
 A substantial body of case law 
confirmed that the meaning of aiding and abetting under article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute should 
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be read into article 4(3)(e) of the Statute, so knowledge of the (specific) intent of the perpetrator 
will constitute aiding and abetting the crime of genocide.
480
 Although the Dutch and Belgian 
commanders seemed aware of the reasonable likelihood that the civilians in the area under their 
protection could be the subject of serious crimes, it seems unrealistic to argue that they were 
aware or knew of the specific genocidal intent of the BSA and Interahamwe rebels respectively. 
As such, it appears unlikely that the Dutch and Belgian commanders aided and abetted genocide. 
 
4.2.3 Crime(s) against Humanity 
 
Crimes against humanity are subject to two relatively stringent requirements particularly difficult 
to fulfil for peacekeepers.
481
 The chances that inaction will amount to a crime against humanity 
are limited, because it requires the conduct to be part of a widespread or systemic attack.
482
 It is 
not realistic that peacekeeping commanders, or peacekeepers generally, would willingly join the 
perpetrating forces to set up such an attack together. Another requirement for crimes against 
humanity is knowledge of the conduct being part of the attack.
483
 Even if there is awareness that 
people may be killed, the Dutch and Belgian commanders should have been aware that this was 
part of an attack of such scale. The only aspect that may form a risk for peacekeeping 
commanders is the way the fulfilment of these requirements is demonstrated. Whether or not these 
requirements are met is usually based on contextual circumstances such as presence at the scene 
of the crime, the position in the chain of command, etc. For the commanders of the Dutch and 
Belgian troops to have been part of such an attack, this would require them to be part of the chain 
of command that conspired the attack. If awareness however is sufficient, one may argue that a 
peacekeeping commander could be aware of an imminent attack because of the intelligence he or 
she received or the contact he had with the party that orchestrated the attack. The latter 
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consideration is much debated in the context of Srebrenica, since it appeared in hindsight that 
certain countries were aware of the imminence of the attack on the enclave.
484
 However, this 
would still not enable us to argue that the commanders in Srebrenica or Kigali were part of the 
attack itself and helped in planning and setting up the attack. 
 
4.2.4 War Crimes 
 
For crimes to be defined as war crimes in contrast to domestic crimes, they must have taken place 
in the context of an armed conflict. This is more commonly referred to as the required ‘nexus with 
armed conflict’.485 The status of the situations in both Srebrenica and Rwanda has been discussed 
extensively in the case law of the ICTY and ICTR. The ICTY Trial Chamber concluded in 
Prosecutor v Krstić that ‘it is not disputed that a state of armed conflict existed between BiH and 
its armed forces, on the one hand, and the Republika Srpska and its armed forces, on the other. 
There is no doubt that the criminal acts set out in the indictment occurred not only within the 
frame of, but in close relation to, that conflict’.486 Regarding the situation in Rwanda, the ICTR 
Trial Chamber observed in Akayesu that  
 
the FAR was and the RPF were "two armies" engaged in hostilities, that the RPF had soldiers 
systematically deployed under a command structure headed by Paul Kagame, and that FAR and 
RPF forces occupied different sides of a clearly demarcated demilitarised zone. Based on the 
evidence presented, the Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that armed conflict existed in 
Rwanda during the events alleged in the indictment, and that the RPF was an organised armed 
group, under responsible command, which exercised control over territory in Rwanda and was able 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.
487
 
 
In Ntagerura and others , the ICTR Trial Chamber confirmed that ‘[b]etween 1st January 1994 
and 17th July 1994, in Rwanda, there was an armed conflict not of an international character’.488 
 
It follows that the PKOs in both Srebrenica and Kigali were deployed in the context of an armed 
conflict. To what extent does that allow us to argue that the Dutch and Belgian commanders’ 
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conduct had a nexus with armed conflict? Several international decisions have indicated that a 
lenient approach has been taken towards this requirement. In the ICTY’s Tadić case the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber held that it is ‘sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the 
hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict’.489 In 
its Kunarac and others judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber clarified that  
 
the criterion of a nexus with the armed conflict under Article 3 of the Statute does not require that 
the offences be directly committed whilst fighting is actually taking place, or at the scene of 
combat. Humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole of the territory under the control of one 
of the parties, whether or not actual combat continues at the place where the events in question 
took place. It is therefore sufficient that the crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring 
in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict. The requirement that the act 
be closely related to the armed conflict is satisfied if, as in the present case, the crimes are 
committed in the aftermath of the fighting, and until the cessation of combat activities in a certain 
region, and are committed in furtherance or take advantage of the situation created by the 
fighting.
490
 
 
If the conduct took place in an area controlled by a party to the armed conflict, it could be 
qualified as establishing a nexus with the armed conflict. In both Srebrenica and Kigali, the 
peacekeeping troops were in control up to a certain point, but they were not considered a party to 
the armed conflict. This does however not necessarily mean that the peacekeeping troops were not 
sufficiently connected to the conflict.  
 
In relation to peacekeeping, some have argued that the nexus with the armed conflict is 
constituted in a different way. The context may be an indicator that the nexus is there. For 
example, one may assume that the deployment of peacekeepers is an immediate result of the 
existence of an armed conflict.
491
 The SCSL Trial Chamber ‘observe[d] that peacekeepers are by 
definition deployed in areas of actual or recent armed conflict, often in precarious situations 
before the warring factions have disarmed and while tensions remain high’.492 You can therefore 
impossibly ignore the connection between the context of an armed conflict and the peacekeepers 
operating in that environment. Wills even stated that ‘peacekeepers could be held accountable 
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under IHL for conduct amounting to a war crime regardless of whether the peacekeeping force is 
party to the conflict in the formal sense’.493 She based this on the following reasoning: 
 
[T]he peacekeepers’ relationship with the local population, and their power over individuals within 
it, is not the result of an incidental consequence of the chaos of war but of purposeful deployment 
by the Security Council in response to the conflict. (…) The existence of the armed conflict would 
“have played a substantial part” in the peacekeeper’s ability to commit the crime, his decision to 
commit it and the manner in which it was committed, in a way that is different in nature to that of a 
civilian merely exploiting the break-down of order.
494
  
 
The status of peacekeeping commanders under IHL is thus not important per se to decide whether 
conduct can be classified as a war crime.
495
 The context will determine whether the conduct can 
be classified as a war crime. Since we have established above that an armed conflict was ongoing 
in both Srebrenica and Kigali at the time of the conduct committed, this would be sufficient to 
state that the conduct fulfilled the requirement of having a nexus with the armed conflict. 
 
A second requirement for conduct to be classified as a war crime is knowledge or awareness of 
the existence of an armed conflict. This requirement does not need extensive discussion as it 
seems plausible that both in Kigali and Srebrenica, the commanders were aware of the armed 
conflict taking place in the area where they were deployed.  
 
So far it seems plausible to argue that there is at least no convincing reason to assume that the 
commanders’ conduct cannot be defined as a war crime, at least if the context of armed conflict in 
which PKOs operate would allow it. The main objection against defining it as a war crime could 
be the scope of application of the domestic provisions regarding international crimes under Dutch 
and Belgian law. The Dutch have, at least for war crimes as mentioned in article 5 of the Dutch 
International Crimes Act, incorporated the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict.
496 
The 
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Belgians have also included this requirement in article 136quater of the Belgian Penal Code. It 
should be noted however that the Dutch have universal jurisdiction over international crimes.
497
 
This may leave room for the argument that the Netherlands need not be involved in the conflict 
itself to have jurisdiction over such crimes. In contrast, Belgium has withdrawn its universal 
jurisdiction in 2003 and limited it to jurisdiction according to the principles of passive and active 
nationality.
498
 As such, the domestic interpretation of war crimes may be limited compared to the 
international interpretation discussed above.  
 
It follows from the above that the remainder of this thesis primarily needs to focus on the idea that 
the Dutch and Belgian commanders may have contributed to war crimes. Alternatively, their 
conduct may be classified as a separate failure to act. The qualification of their conduct as 
domestic or international criminal conduct depends greatly on the context in which it took place. 
The context of an armed conflict allows us to argue that it can be framed as an international crime. 
Yet, the involvement of Dutch and Belgian authorities and the command and control exercised by 
the Dutch and Belgian state at the time of the alleged crimes also does not rule out the possibility 
that it can be framed as a domestic crime, like murder or manslaughter for example. At least, it 
seems appropriate to continue our assessment of the possibility of liability for the commanders 
keeping in mind that the ad hoc tribunals would have primary jurisdiction over crimes committed 
in the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, but that TCCs have exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction over their peacekeepers. It is difficult to determine which rule takes precedence since 
the context of peacekeeping may change the primacy of the ICTY. Both options should be kept in 
mind. Jurisdiction also depends on whether the conduct is classified as a violation of IHL or 
IHRL, which requires us to assess whether the overarching concept of protection in PKOs is based 
on IHL or IHRL-based norms of protection, or both. In cases where IHRL is the dominant 
framework establishing that obligation, adjudication by an international criminal court may not 
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appear suitable. While IHL may be relevant for the contextual interpretation of a potential human 
rights violation, it would arguably stretch too far to ignore the TCC’s right to sanction violations 
of IHRL committed by its own nationals. As we have discussed in chapter 3 however, the hurdles 
that prevent effective adjudication of peacekeepers in the domestic system, allow us to consider 
the possibility of jurisdiction for the ad hoc tribunals. In addition, international criminal law may 
provide valuable insights into the adjudication of military commanders in general. The command 
responsibility doctrine is an example of a recognised mechanism to prosecute a state agent for a 
failure to act under criminal law.  
 
4.3 Command Responsibility 
 
Command responsibility is a doctrine in international criminal law developed to create a separate 
responsibility for a superior who is at the same time an agent of the state. In this thesis we will 
mainly consider the responsibility for military commanders under this doctrine as opposed to 
superiors in general, which is then referred to as command responsibility. While the doctrine 
particularly focuses on a failure to fulfil a commander’s duty to prevent or punish conduct 
performed by his or her subordinates, it was also used in relation to protective duties. Originally, 
the command responsibility doctrine was derived from the ‘purpose of the laws of war, namely to 
protect civilians’ as Robinson wrote.499 The Yamashita judgment, one of the first judgments in 
which command responsibility was elaborated, referred to this purpose and the commander’s role 
in serving that purpose explicitly:  
 
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose excesses are unrestrained by 
the orders or efforts of their commander would almost certainly result in violations which it is the 
purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of 
war from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with 
impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection.
500
 
 
The doctrine has developed since then and its distinctive elements, as set out in article 28 of the 
RS and article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute,
 
clearly set it apart from the modes of liability in article 25 
of the RS and article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. Yet, the characterisation of the doctrine is still 
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much debated. Some scholars strongly argue that command responsibility is a separate offence,
501
 
while others define it as a mode of liability.
502
 An elaboration on this debate can be found in 
chapter 8. 
 
Command responsibility is the only codified form of omission liability in international criminal 
law, but can in some ways be considered a middle way between an omission and bystander 
liability. The latter is an alternative to omission liability and will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
To give a general idea of the difference between omission and bystander liability: where omission 
liability requires a duty to act, bystander liability is more focused on elements of authority and 
control and on the effect the bystander had on the principal perpetrator's mental state. Although 
command responsibility contains a clear failure to fulfil a certain duty, it also relies on the 
authority or the control of the commander vis-à-vis the perpetrators. Having said that, command 
responsibility is based on the profession of the military commander and therefore contains 
elements of both forms of liability. This is furthermore supported by the fact that article 28 of the 
RS, in contrast to article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, seems to connect the commander’s failure to 
fulfil his/her duty to the criminal result.  
 
Despite the different nuances, international courts often use command responsibility in 
conjunction with either omission liability or bystander responsibility. Liability for aiding and 
abetting by omission or encouragement (the latter of which I refer to here as bystander liability) 
both fall under article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute and article 25(3) of the RS. The courts have 
however created a clear separation between command responsibility and aiding and abetting as a 
mode of liability, requiring the use of only the more appropriate of the two provisions and treating 
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the less suitable as an aggravating circumstance.
503
  
 
This passage from Kayishema and Ruzindana further demonstrates how both command 
responsibility and bystander liability have gained recognition in international criminal law, while 
liability for omissions may still be somewhat unestablished within the confines of the courts’ 
jurisprudence: 
 
This jurisprudence extends naturally to give rise to responsibility when the accused failed to act in 
breach of a clear duty to act. The question of responsibility arising from a duty to act, and any 
corresponding failure to execute such a duty is a question that is inextricably linked with the issue 
of command responsibility. This is because under Article 6(3) a clear duty is imposed upon those 
in authority, with the requisite means at their disposal, to prevent or punish the commission of a 
crime. However, individual responsibility pursuant to Article 6(1) is based, in this instance, not on 
the duty to act, but from the encouragement and support that might be afforded to the principals of 
the crime from such an omission.
504
 
 
While command responsibility is codified in the provisions referred to above and bystander 
liability is included in article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute as a contribution to the crime,
505
 omissions 
neither belong to command responsibility nor to the articles dealing with individual criminal 
responsibility.
506
 Command responsibility and bystander responsibility share the element of 
authority as a common denominator; omission liability and command responsibility share the duty 
requirement. Yet, omission liability has not been codified and cannot fulfil the requirements of 
these two codified forms to a satisfactory extent.
507
 To gain a better understanding of liability for 
omissions in international criminal law, we will first turn to the discussion of omission liability. 
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4.4 Omissions: Point of Departure in International Criminal Law 
 
Liability for omissions is far less established on the international level than on the domestic level, 
partly because of the far-reaching repercussions that such a recognition may have in the light of 
the character of international crimes. There are few countries willing to commit to an indirect 
assumption of positive duties, particularly not in the Rome Statute which applies to all member 
states. Just like in domestic law, direct omissions and indirect omissions may nevertheless occur 
on the international level. Command responsibility is the only example in the statutes, and will 
here be defined as a form of direct omission.
508
  
 
That international crimes may be committed by omission (indirect omission) under international 
law is the general opinion held in the literature on this topic. Mantovani argued that the intention 
to punish duty-related omissions was already confirmed by the Nuremberg tribunal and the Draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
509
 Berster posits that commission by 
omission could be legitimate in international criminal law as a general rule of international law.
510
 
Gerhard Werle shares this opinion and argues that ‘liability for omission can be qualified as a 
general principle of law, as comparative analysis shows that with the exception of French law, 
almost all legal cultures establish such liability’ and that ‘article 25 should [thus] be interpreted in 
such a way that it covers omissions, not only where they are explicitly criminalized in the Statute, 
but also where the omission equates to the active causation of the criminal result’.511 Van 
Sliedregt agrees and holds that ‘commission or participation by omission can be regarded as part 
of customary international law and the general principles derived from national laws’.512 To 
support her argument, Van Sliedregt refers to article 21(1)(b) and (c) of the RS which respectively 
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define the applicable sources of law as ‘where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles 
and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of 
armed conflict’ and  
 
general principles of law derived by the court from national laws of legal systems of the world 
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
 
We have concluded in chapter 3 that omissions, both direct and indirect, have been recognised in 
the domestic laws under review. As such, domestic jurisprudence arguably laid the foundation for 
omission liability as a general principle of international law. The RS and the jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc tribunals provide domestic courts with important guidelines regarding the interpretation of 
such forms of liability and the definition of the core crimes. 
 
In assessing, hypothetically, what type of liability could be incurred by the Dutch and Belgian 
commanders under the international statutes, aiding and abetting by omission seems the most 
suitable form of omission liability to be applied. Aiding and abetting is included as a mode of 
liability in article 25(3) of the RS, article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute and article 6(1) of the ICTR 
Statute. Article 25(3)(c) of the RS does not contain an actus reus requirement for aiding and 
abetting, and only refers to assistance ‘with the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a 
crime (…) including providing the means for its commission’. The case law indicates however 
that the requirement for the actus reus of aiding and abetting under the RS is a substantial 
contribution. In Mbarushimana for example, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC confirmed this and 
based its conclusion on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals.
513
  
 
Article 7 (1) of the ICTY Statute contains no actus reus of aiding and abetting but states that ‘a 
person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, 
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shall be individually responsible for the crime’. The definition of the actus reus can be found in 
the jurisprudence of the tribunals. The ICTY Trial Chamber held in its Tadić judgment that it is 
required for aiding and abetting that ‘the conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of 
the illegal act’.514 The ICTY Appeals Chamber developed a definition in Tadić, Aleksovski and 
Vasiljević that has at least one consistent basis: aiding and abetting requires proof of ‘acts which 
consisted of practical assistance, encouragement or moral support which had a substantial effect 
upon the commission by the principal of the crime for which the aider and abettor is sought to be 
made responsible’.515 The ICTY Appeals Chamber however added an additional requirement in 
Tadić and Vasiljević by requiring that the assistance is given with specific direction.516 Specific 
direction is still a debatable aspect of aiding and abetting and because of its importance for 
peacekeeping operations, this aspect will be discussed separately in section 4.5.3.  
 
The mens rea requirement for aiding and abetting under the RS can be found in article 30 of the 
Statute which reads: 
 
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent 
and knowledge.  
 
Intent is defined as meaning ‘to cause that consequence’ or ‘awareness that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events’. Article 30 then states that ‘[k]nowledge means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events’. This definition 
of the mens rea implies that dolus directus of the first and second degree suffices, but that dolus 
eventualis is not sufficient under article 30 of the RS to constitute liability.
517
  
 
The ICTY Statute contains no definition of the mens rea for aiding and abetting, neither do the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
518
 The case law of the ad hoc tribunals however indicates there 
are requirements that need to be fulfilled to establish the mental element of aiding and abetting a 
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crime. In Blaškić, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that ‘in addition to knowledge that his acts assist 
the commission of the crime, the aider and abettor needs to have intended to provide assistance, or 
as a minimum, accepted that such assistance would be a possible and foreseeable consequence of 
his conduct’.519 The ICTY Appeals Chamber disagreed with this viewpoint in Vasiljević in which 
it held that ‘knowledge on the part of the aider and abettor that his acts assist in the commission of 
the principal perpetrator’s crime suffices for the mens rea requirement of this mode of 
participation’.520 In Tadić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber concluded that ‘in the case of aiding and 
abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and 
abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the principal’.521 The position taken by the 
ICTY Trial Chamber in Orić caused further confusion as it referred to a double intent 
requirement, similar to the one used in domestic law.
522
 
 
In conclusion, we accept that the actus reus of aiding and abetting requires the defendant to have 
contributed substantially to the commission of the crime and that he or she acted ‘with the 
knowledge that such act would lend practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to the 
commission of a crime or underlying offence’.523 For the mens rea it is now accepted that the 
defendant was aware of the essential elements of the crime or underlying offence for which he or 
she is charged with responsibility, including the mental state of the physical perpetrator or 
intermediary perpetrator.
524
 Differing requirements may be imposed on aiding and abetting 
offences that require a specific intent. In Simić for example, the ICTY Appeals chamber referred 
to aiding and abetting the crime of persecution.
525
 In those cases, it was held, the defendant ‘must 
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thus be aware not only of the crime whose perpetration he is facilitating but also of the 
discriminatory intent of the perpetrators of that crime’.526  
 
Article 25 (3) of the RS and article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute refer to aiding and abetting a crime 
generally and do not exclude aiding and abetting by omission.
527 
There is, however, no specific 
reference to omission liability in article 25 of the RS
528
 or article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. An 
important indicator of whether omission liability may be recognised indirectly by the ICC or the 
ad hoc tribunals is the interpretation of the modes of liability in their jurisprudence and the 
limitations applied to the specific offences. As Berster, Werle and Van Sliedregt also argued,
529
 
the general principles of international law may give an impression of whether omission liability 
could apply.
530
  
 
As I have mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, the ICC lacks jurisprudence explicitly 
dealing with liability for omissions. Most conclusions about the scope of the Rome Statute and the 
jurisdiction of the Court in this regard are therefore based on a textual interpretation of the Rome 
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Statute. Berster has written extensively about liability for omissions under the RS. He is of the 
opinion that, for the ICC to have jurisdiction over crimes committed by omission, the duty to act 
should be included in the description of the specific offences in article 6-8 of the RS.
531
 This 
follows from the legality principle in article 22(2) of the RS that prescribes that the ‘definition of a 
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy’.532 Article 22(1) of the RS 
further confirms this as it states that ‘[a] person shall not be criminally responsible under this 
Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court’. This complicates the criminalisation of omissions under the RS, as long 
as they are not explicitly included in the text. There have been commentators who have disputed 
such a strict textual interpretation of the Statute. Broomhall for example argued that the term 
‘conduct’ used in article 22(1) of the RS may refer to both acts and omissions.533 This is however 
only the case if the conduct meets the requirements set for the specific crime or the mode of 
liability. Since the RS contains no separate crime of omission, it is not likely that an omission will 
be tried under the RS. If indirect omissions occur, the specific crimes must be result crimes and 
the result must then be brought about by the required failure to act while having a duty to act.  
 
Although we focus on the modes of liability mostly in relation to omission liability, the special 
part of the Statutes (article 6-8 of the RS and articles 2-5 in the ICTY Statute) provide an 
important implication of whether crimes can be committed by omission. The ad hoc tribunals 
however have so far mainly focused on the general part of the Statute to assess whether liability 
for omissions could arise. They remarkably refrained from analysing the special part of the Statute 
to see whether there was scope for omission liability in the definition of the crimes.
534
  
 
Yet, the interpretation of the specific part of the statutes of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals is 
crucial to determine whether crimes can be committed by omission. I already observed in section 
4.2 that it is not likely that the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders committed or 
contributed to the commission of genocide or crimes against humanity because the high threshold 
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imposed for these crimes is not likely to be reached by the conduct of the commanders. We will 
therefore not consider whether these crimes can be committed by omission. It suffices to refer to 
the ICTR’s trial judgment in the Kambanda case535 which confirmed that all the acts of genocide 
can be committed by omission. The judgment referred to ‘acts or omissions’ resulting in genocide, 
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and also 
complicity to genocide.
536
 In relation to crimes against humanity, article 5 of the ICTY Statute 
does not necessarily exclude the option that crimes against humanity may be committed by 
omission. In contrast to the ICTY Statute however, the Rome Statute limits crimes against 
humanity to ‘any of the following acts’. This could be interpreted as excluding anything other 
than acts, therefore omissions.  
 
This is different where it concerns the category of war crimes. Article 2(c) of the ICTY Statute 
regarding the ‘grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions’ defines this category of crime as 
‘wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health’. This requires no positive 
action and could be fulfilled by inaction. Surely, ‘to cause’ does not restrict the result to follow 
from acts, but leaves scope for great suffering or injury to be established by omission. In contrast, 
language such as ‘killing’, ‘treatment’, etc. refer more clearly to active conduct.537 Article 8 of the 
RS regarding war crimes leaves less scope for liability by omissions. Like crimes against 
humanity, the RS limits the scope of the provision to ‘acts’. Article 3 of the ICTY Statute also 
contains a list referring to active ways of violating the laws or customs of war, such as 
‘employment of poisonous weapons’, ‘wanton destruction’, ‘attacks or bombardments’, etc. An 
immediate conclusion could be that despite small differences between the two statutes, the RS has 
adopted a narrower approach to how the core crimes can be committed, which may leave less 
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scope for these crimes to be committed by omission. 
 
 
4.5 The Elements of Omission Liability in International Law 
 
Although the interpretation of the Statutes has been discussed in the scholarship on international 
law and there may be space to argue that omissions can be read in the statutes, it is still too vague 
to draw conclusions. We will therefore move towards an assessment of the jurisprudence of the 
international courts, which in practice means that we will consider the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals. The ICTY’s Prosecutor v Mrkšić case is the most noteworthy in this respect, but other 
cases like Prosecutor v Ntagerura and others and Prosecutor v Rutaganira also shed light on the 
scope of omission liability and the duty requirement in specific.
538
 In discussing these cases I will 
assess how omission liability is established under international law: which elements are required 
and how would this potentially affect the individual responsibility of the Dutch and Belgian 
peacekeeping commanders? 
 
4.5.1 Actus Reus: Duty to Act  
 
The actus reus for omission liability in international law deviates little from the one for domestic 
law. A duty to act and a subsequent failure to act are required.
539
 For participation by omission to 
be established, the additional requirements are that the defendant should have had the ability to 
act, that he or she failed to act intending to bring about the consequences, or was aware of or 
consented to those consequences occurring and that his or her failure to act resulted in the 
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commission of the crime.
540
 An additional, yet debatable requirement is the specific direction 
requirement I referenced to above. In Orić it was held that ‘his omission must be directed to 
assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a crime’.541 Whether or not this 
requirement is part of aiding and abetting by omission will be discussed in section 4.5.3. Another 
requirement not set in stone is that the duty to act held by the defendant should have been 
’mandated by a rule of criminal law’.542 This would implicate that duties based on IHL and IHRL 
cannot support a legal obligation to act under international criminal law. Dutwiller observed that 
‘domestic and international law interact’ and that  
 
in (…) the international law of armed conflict, the obligations of individuals have always been 
defined on two levels: On the domestic level, certain functions are attributed (e.g. who is to be a 
member of the armed forces), which are filled with duties on the international level (defining what 
the obligations of combatants are).
543
  
 
In Berster’s opinion however,  
 
deriving criminal responsibility for omissions through reliance on duties extraneous to criminal 
law seems inconsistent insofar as the commission of an offence through action presupposes a duty 
of international criminal law, while committing the same crime by omission could be based on 
duties far remote from the sphere of international criminal law.
544
  
 
The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals demonstrates that the duty to act can be founded on 
sources outside international criminal law. In Galić545 the ICTY Appeals Chamber referred to the 
requirement that the duty must be a ‘legal duty’, thus not necessarily based on criminal law. A 
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similar wide scope was referred to in Orić: ‘[s]uch a duty can, in particular, arise out of 
responsibility for the safety of the person concerned, derived from humanitarian law or based on a 
position of authority, or can result from antecedent conduct by which the person concerned has 
been exposed to a danger’.546 In Ntagerura and others, the Prefect of the local council and 
defendant, Bagambiki, was assumed to have the duty to ‘ensure the protection and safety of the 
civilian population within his prefecture’.547 Allegedly, ‘[he failed or refused] on several 
occasions (…) to assist those whose lives were in danger and who requested his help’.548 The duty 
to which reference was made had its foundation in Rwandan administrative law
549
 that obligates a 
Prefect to ‘ensure the tranquillity, public order, and security of people and property’.550 Based on 
that duty, Bagambiki was expected to act because of his position as a political superior. It even 
allowed him to request the intervention of armed forces.
551
 Where the Trial Chamber concluded 
that criminal responsibility under article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute would not apply, because it was 
not a duty mandated by criminal law,
552
 the Appeals Chamber was not sure whether a general or a 
criminal law provision established the duty to act.
553
 That question was left unanswered as the 
Appeals Chamber reasoned that even if criminal responsibility under article 6 (1) of the ICTR 
Statute had applied, the Prosecution failed to show which possibilities were open to Bagambiki to 
fulfil his duties under Rwandan law.
554
  
 
In his separate and dissenting opinion to the Ntagerura and others trial judgment, Judge Pavel 
Dolenc held that a specific indication of the legal basis for a duty to act must be defined to 
constitute commission by omission.
555
 Judge Dolenc further stated that the principle of precision 
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should be applied in a strict sense, considering the serious nature of the crimes.
556
 This is in line 
with the ICTY Trial Chamber’s remark in Delalić and others that ‘great care must be taken lest an 
injustice be committed in holding individuals responsible for the acts of others in situations where 
the link of control is absent or too remote’.557 In Mrkšić,558 the Chamber recognised a duty of care 
similar to the one in the German tradition on omissions. The ICTY assessed the responsibility of 
Šljivančanin who, as head of the security guards and major in the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), 
was responsible for the well-being of prisoners held captive in Vukovar. When Šljivančanin 
handed them over to the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), this resulted in the prisoners being 
killed. He failed to take measures to prevent the commission of crimes against the POWs under 
his protection, which amounted to a breach of the legal duty that comes with his profession as 
head of security. This may incur criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute.
559
 
However, the ICTY Trial Chamber argued that Šljivančanin could only be responsible for the 
crimes he witnessed and the crimes that continued that same day.
560
 Regarding the origin of the 
duty, the Appeals Chamber referred to the Blaškić judgment when it stated that the duty to act can 
be based on the laws and customs of war and that its failure may give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility.
561
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
so that it may be identified without any ambiguity; (ii) particulars of the subordinate perpetrator(s); (iii) the legal or 
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The ICTR clarified the scope of the duty in Prosecutor v Rutaganira,
562
 by looking at 
Rutaganira’s authority as a conseiller communal and drawing a remarkably heavy duty from this 
authority. The main conclusion was that Rutaganira had the authority to gather people and discuss 
the ongoing atrocities, which he failed to do.
563
 As a ‘prominent member of the local community’, 
he could be said to have the moral power to influence the population’s actions.564 The ICTR Trial 
Chamber furthermore held that  
 
international law also places upon a person vested with public authority a duty to act in order to 
protect human life. Indeed, the State to which it falls to carry out international obligations, can only 
act through all its representatives, be they in the upper reaches or at lower levels of Government. 
The State itself can fulfil its international obligations and not incur any responsibility not only 
because of its representatives’ respect for human rights but also by reason of actions taken, in the 
performance of their duties, to prevent any violation of the said rights.
565 
 
The Chamber furthermore stated that ‘as any person, all public authorities have a duty not only to 
comply with the basic rights of the human person, but also to ensure that these are complied with, 
which implies a duty to act in order to prevent any violation of such rights’.566 The Chamber 
seemed to be of the opinion that people with public authority have a duty to prevent violations of 
basic human rights.
567
 This was strengthened by its statement that 
 
[i]ndeed, violence to physical well-being suffered by thousands of people during the said events 
affects the very fundamental interests of Humanity as a whole, and the protection of such interests 
cannot be counterbalanced by the mere personal risk that may have been faced by any person in a 
position of authority who failed to act in order to assist people whose lives were in danger.
568 
 
Rutaganira’s authority placed him in a unique position, which resulted in a duty to assist people in 
danger. The Chamber also implied that he had a duty to report the crimes committed in his local 
area to the authorities. It also stated that Rutaganira had a duty to prevent people in his community 
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from participating in the attacks, and a duty to assist victims of these attacks.
569
 There is no other 
judgment in the international criminal courts that would stretch the duty of a superior to protect 
the civilian population this far. Although it may concern a duty towards his ‘own People’, this is 
not specified as such by the Chamber. It refers to a general duty of ‘a person in a position of 
authority’ to ‘assist people whose lives were in danger’. Given the public authority held by the 
Dutch and Belgian commanders as public officials and state agents, a similar obligation could be 
imposed on them if their TCC has the required jurisdiction over the territory under IHRL. This 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
This judgment indicates that duties under international criminal law may have their foundation 
outside international criminal law, and could be based on human rights law, without specifying 
the specific norm on which the duty would be based. Consequently, it will be of interest to assess 
in chapter 5 whether the same applies for peacekeeping commanders, considering that in both 
Srebrenica and Kigali, IHRL provided the peacekeepers with the minimum norms they were 
ought to respect. 
 
If we compare the discussion in international law with the assessment of duties under domestic 
law, the discussion focuses more on the source of the legal duty. Other than in the domestic 
sphere, the international courts have thus far not analysed the interpretation and demarcation of 
the duty to act to the extent as this occurred in the domestic laws under review. To assess whether 
liability based on an omission creates liability for failing to act or for the contribution to the result, 
the additional requirements for aiding and abetting need to be addressed in the context of 
omissions. 
 
4.5.2 Actus Reus of Aiding and Abetting: the Contribution Required  
 
To assess how aiding and abetting by omission is limited and interpreted, we must look into the 
requirements for aiding and abetting and how these have been applied to omissions. Where the 
causal connection between failing to act and the criminal result is an important aspect for liability 
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for omissions under domestic law, international criminal law focuses on the effect of certain 
conduct on the commission of the crime.  
 
The ICTR Trial Chamber broke the required connection between failing to act and the 
commission of the crime down in two criteria in its Rutaganira judgment: 1) there must be a 
temporary or geographical connection and; 2) the aiding and abetting of the crime should have 
had a substantial and decisive effect on the principal perpetrator of the crime.
570
 This is also 
referred to as a ‘substantial contribution’ or ‘substantial assistance’ to the commission of the 
crime.
571
 In Popović and others, the ICTY Trial Chamber looked into this aspect of aiding and 
abetting in relation to omissions and concluded that  
 
whether an omission constitutes “substantial assistance” to the perpetration of a crime requires a 
fact based enquiry. The fact that the accused provided a more limited assistance to the commission 
of a crime than others does not preclude the accused’s assistance from having had a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of the crime. With regard to the standard of proof, the Prosecution must 
show (i) that the omission had a substantial effect on the crime in the sense that the crime would 
have been substantially less likely had the accused acted; and (ii) that the accused knew that the 
commission of the crime was probable and that his inaction assisted it.
572
  
 
This was an attempt to define the notion of substantial assistance and indicate how it should be 
demonstrated. However, the exact threshold for the impact of the assistance or contribution has 
not been crystallised sufficiently. In Tadić, the ICTY Trial Chamber only referred to ‘participation 
in that the conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of the illegal act’,573 which did 
not contain a reference to the scope of the contribution. The now more accepted threshold of 
substantial contribution is still difficult to define.
574
 In the opinion of the ICTR, Rutaganira’s 
contribution was both substantial and decisive, and there was a temporal and geographical 
connection between Rutaganira and the crimes committed.
575
 His conduct thus established the 
actus reus for aiding and abetting extermination by omission, since the duty to act was already 
established, as discussed in the previous section. The required connection between failing to act 
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and the result indicates, as also highlighted in the discussion of the domestic case law, that the 
aider and abettor is held directly responsible for the result. This is an important factor in trying to 
understand what the defendants in cases of omission liability are held accountable for. 
 
It is not undisputed that an omission can form ‘substantial assistance’ to the commission of a 
crime.
576
 Berster for example held that aiding and abetting by omission cannot be realised, 
because substantial assistance requires a ‘physically effective momentum, an operative influence 
upon the course of events which would be missing in the case of a failure to act, which in fact is a 
nonentity in physical terms’.577 One can see that Berster focuses on the element of control, which 
allows him to argue that if the defendant had the required control, the defendant would be a co-
perpetrator rather than an accomplice.
578
 Focusing on control as an element for liability may be 
suitable to establish liability as a principal, but lacks the refinement to differentiate between 
different types of secondary liability. As a result, an analysis based on the premise that a certain 
level of control is required to speak of aiding and abetting may neglect conduct that may assist in 
the commission of a crime, but that does not necessary qualify as ‘a physically effective 
momentum’. Inaction may as well contribute to the commission of crimes,579 as the ICTY Trial 
Chamber in Popović and others indicated.  
 
The Mrkšić and Popović and others cases underline that the substantial contribution is also part of 
aiding and abetting by omission. Even though Šljivančanin claimed that he could not have 
fulfilled this requirement because he was not even present at the crime scene and other JNA 
officers who were present had more influence on the commission of the crime than he had, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber disagreed. In its response, the Appeals Chamber held that ‘the fact that 
the accused provided more limited assistance to the commission of a crime than others does not 
preclude the accused’s assistance from having had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime’.580 If the Dutch and Belgian commanders would be tried, they would be judged according 
to their own respective roles in the events and they would not be able to seek the defence of 
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superiors or people outside the chain of command being more involved. In Marchal,
581
 the Court 
also looked at the unit’s own responsibility, but focused on the level of control –primary or 
secondary- held regarding the conduct under review.  
 
 
Having the ability to act but not doing so is relevant in fulfilling the substantial contribution 
requirement, just like the ability to act was relevant for the actus reus on the domestic level. Larry 
May also stated that having the ability to act is more important in establishing aiding and abetting 
by omission than the actual relationship is.
582
 This is a similar argument to the one Tolmie made, 
as I have discussed earlier in chapter 3.
583
 May links the ability to act to knowledge about the risk 
that failing to act contributes substantially to the commission of a crime. The knowledge of that 
risk would make neglecting the ability to act culpable if the defendant had a duty to act. That 
creates a connection between the failure to act and the criminal consequence.  
 
In an objective assessment of the contribution made, one can assess whether the result would have 
occurred ‘but for’ the omission. This need not be an absolute causal connection. For example, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber argued in Mrkšić that the killings would have been ‘substantially less 
likely’ if Šljivančanin had secured the return of the military police to the hangar in Ovčara where 
the prisoners were held.
584
 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber found that ‘Šljivančanin’s failure to 
act pursuant to his duty under the laws and customs of war substantially contributed to the murder 
of the prisoners of war’.585 It was clear from the circumstances that Šljivančanin had the ability to 
act.
586
 Further, the Appeals Chamber disagreed with the Trial Chamber that Šljivančanin’s duty to 
protect the prisoners ended as soon as Mrkšić ordered the withdrawal of the military police. His 
failure to act pursuant to that duty contributed substantially to the killings.
587
  
 
Šljivančanin’s conviction for his failure to prevent crimes was remarkable not only because the 
                                                          
581
 Text to n 125 (Ch. 2). 
582
 Larry May, Genocide : A Normative Account (CUP 2010) 166. 
583
 Text to n 344 (Ch. 3). 
584
 Mrkšić (Appeal Judgment) (n 540) para 100. 
585
 Ibid para 100. 
586
 Ibid para 154. 
587
 Ibid para 102. 
129 
  
Court convicted him for his failure to protect people placed under his protection, but also because 
it demonstrated that this failure contributed substantially to the killings. As such, the Court 
applied the same questionable reasoning as seen in several domestic cases; it established a failure 
to act on the one hand, but connected it to the criminal result. It is then a combination of a direct 
and an indirect omission. This case is also distinct from the Ntagerura and Rutaganira cases, 
because these cases both contained aspects that resembled superior responsibility. Yet, 
Šljivančanin’s authority was also an important factor in the Mrkšić judgment. The Appeals 
Chamber blamed Šljivančanin for failing to do what was expected of him in his position.588 The 
consequent responsibility for aiding and abetting the crimes of torture and cruel treatment by 
omission may be an explicit failure of duty, but that does not relieve him from being a party to the 
main offence. The substantial contribution requirement links the aider and abettor to the criminal 
result. Šljivančanin would probably not have been convicted however had the Appeals Chamber 
recognised the specific direction requirement as being essential for the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting. In contrast to what the Appeals Chamber held in Tadić589 and Orić,590 this additional 
requirement was rejected in the Mrkšić appeal judgment.591 
 
4.5.3 Specific direction 
 
This specific direction requirement triggered an extensive debate in the courts and academia 
pursuant to the controversial judgments in Prosecutor v Perišić.592 This requirement would apply 
if the defendant is allegedly part of a criminal organisation that carries out so-called ‘mixed 
activities’. These activities are considered ‘mixed’ because they can be both lawful and unlawful. 
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This begs the question of whether someone’s ‘neutral assistance’ which is then used or seen as a 
contribution to unlawful activities, may constitute criminal liability for aiding and abetting those 
crimes. General Momčilo Perišić was a high ranked commander in the Yugoslav army (VJ) who 
transferred operational control over his troops partly to General Mladić593 and was, among others, 
closely involved in the genocide that took place in Srebrenica. Perišić allegedly assisted other 
armies, namely the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) and the Army of the Serbian Krajina 
(VSK).
594
 Whereas the ICTY Trial Chamber followed the Mrkšić appeal judgment in disregarding 
the specific direction requirement and sentenced Perišić to 27 years of imprisonment, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber followed the approach adopted in Tadić and required specific direction.595 
Perišić was acquitted as the assistance was considered too remote from the crimes committed and 
Perišić was not present during the commission of the crimes.596 
 
The cases dealing with specific direction are in some respects similar to the situation of the Dutch 
commanders in Srebrenica. First, the distance between the main perpetrators and the defendant, eg 
Perišić, was considerable. This includes the geographical distance between the defendant and the 
crimes,
597
 but there was also no official relationship between the two armies in terms of a 
command structure. These similar circumstances must be considered if one wants to argue that the 
Dutch commanders facilitated the commission of war crimes. In the view of the Dutch 
commanders, the BSA was evacuating their compound to bring people to safety. The 
consideration to be made by the Dutch commanders is then whether their assistance was likely to 
contribute to the commission of crimes. Mr Harmon argued in Perišić that Perišić ‘knew that the 
assistance was going to assist the VRS and that it was likely that that assistance would be used in 
the commission of crimes’.598 For understandable reasons, it is debatable whether such 
conclusions should be drawn without requiring that the assistance had the purpose of assisting the 
crimes. This was illustrated by Judge Moloto who used an analogy to show that this appeared 
undesirable to him: 
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A war began in Afghanistan in 2001 and it is generally known that there are allegations of crime[s] 
having been committed at least since 2002 to date. Does that make the commanders of the various 
NATO armies that are jointly participating in that war guilty of the crimes that are alleged to have 
been committed, and are still being committed, like detentions in Guantanamo, in Bagram, in 
Kabul and all these places?
599 
 
This is a valid point as it demonstrates that objective factors alone are arguably not sufficient to 
come to a conviction for contributing to the commission of a crime. Although specific direction is 
considered part of the actus reus, it seems more indicative of the defendant’s mental state 
regarding the assistance provided and can thus be considered a subjective factor.
600
  
 
However, specific direction is a high threshold for aiding and abetting that would equate aiding 
and abetting with perpetration, which means that the alleviated degree of criminality that is 
inherent to aiding and abetting is disregarded.
601
 Requiring a clear intent or purpose, which 
specific direction arguably represents, means after all that the defendant was consciously involved 
in the commission of a crime. The instances of aiding and abetting where awareness or other 
cognitive forms of the mental element are now deemed sufficient will then result in an acquittal if 
the defendant did not direct his or her assistance to the commission of the crime. Using such a 
high threshold for the actus reus of aiding and abetting is also in contrast to the low threshold 
used for the mens rea. In Bemba, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC confirmed that ‘awareness’ 
regarding the ‘almost inevitable outcome’ of the assistance is sufficient for aiding and abetting.602 
Adding specific direction to the requirements for aiding and abetting means that such awareness 
probably does not suffice and sheds a different light on the mental element required for aiding and 
abetting.  
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When placing the discussion regarding the specific direction requirement in the context of liability 
for omissions, there appears to be a broad scope for holding an aider and abettor responsible for 
the result if a specific direction requirement is not used. This results in using a strict form of 
liability that will qualify a defendant as a party to the offence (also referred to as the unitary 
perpetrator model),
603
 which leads to a high degree of criminal responsibility. As the Mrkšić 
judgments and the Perišić trial judgment indicate, the bar for holding someone responsible for 
someone else’s conduct is then relatively low. This could result in a problematic conviction if one 
considers the culpability principle, that aims to ensure that individuals are held accountable for 
their own conduct. Applying the specific direction requirement increases the threshold for aiding 
and abetting significantly, which means that also more culpable assistance could lead to impunity. 
If this is a threshold used in situations where the ‘main perpetrators’ are involved in both lawful 
and unlawful activities, the standard applied should reflect that factor of uncertainty. After all, the 
assistance may have contributed to lawful acts. Specific direction would relieve the Dutch and 
Belgian commanders from guilt, as they did not fail to protect the civilians with the intention that 
this would lead to their death. Also for contemporary and future PKOs it appears unlikely that 
peacekeeping commanders would have such a specific will or intent to aid and abet the 
commission of a crime. 
 
4.5.4 Mens Rea 
 
The mens rea required for aiding and abetting by omission is similar to that in domestic law and 
that of aiding and abetting by positive conduct in international law. In Prosecutor v Mrkšić, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber confirmed that the mens rea consists of two elements. First, it is required 
that ‘the aider and abettor [knows] that his omission assists in the commission of the crime of the 
principal perpetrator’ and second, the defendant ‘must be aware of the essential elements of the 
crime which was ultimately committed by the principal’.604 In Prosecutor v Simić however, the 
defendant did not have to be aware of the specific crime about to be committed, but he or she had 
to be ‘aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes 
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is in fact committed’ to conclude that ‘[the defendant] has intended to facilitate the commission of 
that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abetter’.605 In Rutaganira, the ICTR Trial Chamber 
limited the mental requirement to awareness of his duties and his moral authority towards the 
civilians.
606
 That awareness of his position vis-à-vis the population and the fact that he knew of 
his failure to act led the Court to conclude that he was aware that his failure to act would further 
the commission of the crime.
607
 This is in line with the requirements set out in Ntagerura and 
others.
608
 This conclusion follows from the authoritative position held and the realisation that the 
defendant failed to do something that was expected of him in that position. 
 
As mentioned above, in Mrkšić the ICTY Appeals Chamber found the mens rea for aiding and 
abetting in ‘awareness of the circumstances’ and the realisation that a failure to act would ’assist 
in the murder of the prisoners’.609 Šljivančanin argued in his defense that the mens rea requires a 
conscious decision not to act that reaches a threshold similar to consent. The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber however rejected the requirement that an aider and abettor should have had ‘the 
intention to provide assistance, or as a minimum, accepted that such assistance would be a 
possible and foreseeable consequence of his conduct’ in its Vasiljević judgment.610 Judge Vaz 
held in her dissenting opinion that Šljivančanin did not have the required mens rea to be convicted 
for aiding and abetting murder by omission, since it should have been established without 
reasonable doubt
611
 that ‘Šljivančanin knew that (i) killings of the prisoners of war were likely to 
take place at Ovčara and that (ii) his failure to take action in this regard would assist the 
commission of the murders’.612 Strictly speaking, this is not awareness she referred to, but 
foreseeability of the commission of crimes. In her opinion, it was not evident that Šljivančanin 
was aware of the likeliness that the killings would occur.
613
 She based this opinion on the fact that 
it was difficult to ‘foresee that the killings would occur as long as the prisoners of war remained 
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under the authority of the JNA’.614 
 
The few judgments discussed indicate that the standard for the mens rea for aiding and abetting by 
omission is at least lower than intent or knowledge, and may be similar to recklessness, combined 
with the awareness of failing to fulfil a duty to act, arguably even realising that such a failure 
would contribute to the commission of a crime. The level of probability that the failure would 
contribute to the result is not specified, and differs between the judgments discussed. Since it is 
not an absolute form of awareness, it may be considered recklessness, which was also the standard 
used on the domestic level. It was however not as frequently used as negligence.  
 
On the international level, using recklessness (or a similar standard) as a subjective form of mens 
rea may be more appropriate than negligence given the fact that international criminal law deals 
with the commission of serious international crimes by omission. Considering this standard in the 
light of the Dutch and Belgian commanders, one can conclude –as argued with regard to 
recklessness in the domestic sphere- that they were arguably aware of the likelihood that serious 
crimes would take place, which could make them worthy of blame had a legal obligation applied 
to the Dutch and Belgian commanders. On the domestic level, even awareness would suffice to 
demonstrate aiding and abetting the commission of a crime.  
 
More difficult to establish is whether the commanders were aware that they failed to fulfil a duty, 
if they had one, and that their failure to act would contribute to the commission of crimes. In both 
Kigali and Srebrenica, the commanders were aware that something terrible was about to happen. 
In Srebrenica, the fact that Franken admitted that they sacrificed the men to save the women could 
indicate that they were aware that their decision to allow the BSA to evacuate the compound 
would result in a massacre. They did not want the killings to take place, but they were aware that 
they would happen in the ordinary course of events. It is difficult to argue that the commanders 
consciously disregarded the serious consequences their passive conduct or withdrawal had. It can 
be argued that they did not see the opportunity to act differently in the chaotic and difficult 
circumstances. However, the more complex and integrated the responsibilities in contemporary 
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PKOs become, the more difficult it will be to argue that military personnel were not properly 
prepared to protect basic human rights if necessary. 
 
4.6 Degree of Liability 
 
The degree of liability will be derived from the type of involvement in the commission of the 
crime, eg as a principal or participant, and is based on the conclusions regarding the connection 
between the peacekeeping commander’s failure to act and the criminal result. Although judiciary 
at the ICTY have argued that the terminology regarding principal or participant is ‘non-normative’ 
and would therefore not indicate the level of responsibility assigned,
615
 the sentence imposed does 
not always determine the degree of liability alone. It seems commonly accepted that aiding and 
abetting represents a lesser degree of liability than, for example, Joint Criminal Enterprise, as Van 
Sliedregt also points out.
616
 The degree of participation may not be the only relevant factor, as it is 
part of a number of rules,
617
 but it is an important factor.  
The conclusion that aiders and abettors are punished for the main crime and therefore as principals 
is particularly problematic in relation to omissions, because the legal duty combined with a low 
threshold for the mens rea could easily establish this type of liability. Solutions have been sought 
in domestic systems, like lower sentences for complicity in the Dutch and German system,
618
 but 
in relation to serious international crimes differentiation on the sentencing level has not been 
established yet. Van Sliedregt refers to the ‘principal–accomplice distinction in Nuremberg case 
law’ that was ‘nuanced’, which made clear that regardless of the level of involvement, defendants 
received similar sentences. Van Sliedregt refers to Katanga as an example of how these norms are 
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Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 341; Jens David Ohlin, ‘Co-
Perpetration: German Dogmatik or German Invasion?’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 519. 
136 
 
still being used.
619
  
With regard to the responsibility for omissions, we can conclude that in the cases under review, 
the substantial contribution requirement connects the commander to the criminal result. Whereas 
the specific direction requirement could prevent that, it is sensible to consider the requirement 
undesirable because it would equate aiding and abetting with co-perpetration, as it would 
increase the defendant’s involvement in the commission of the crimes. Discussing the specific 
direction requirement as if it is part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting should not distract 
judiciary from the fact that aiding and abetting with specific direction should be interpreted as 
sharing the intent of the principal. Using either low or high thresholds is undesirable in the light 
of the general principles of criminal law. The low thresholds used for omission liability in 
international law indicate that the Dutch and Belgian commanders could, in theory, be held 
responsible, had the general principles of criminal law not made such a conclusion unjustified. 
Holding them criminally responsible for the result would be in contrast with the culpability 
principle. Also, the ability to impose equal sentences on both perpetrators and assistants to the 
commission of the crime makes that the principle of fair labelling would be compromised. Only 
if the liability that follows would establish liability for failing to act as a separate offence, the 
conclusion would be different. In chapter 8 command responsibility will be discussed as an 
important example of establishing a separate type of liability for a military commander. The 
option of establishing a similar type of responsibility for peacekeeping commanders will be 
considered there. However, to create liability for a failure to act, whether as part of command 
responsibility or omission liability, a duty to act is required. Whether the Dutch and Belgian 
peacekeeping commanders had such a duty under international law, will be discussed in chapter 
5. 
 
4.7 Comparative Perspective and Concluding Remarks  
 
If one compares the conclusions on the domestic level with those on the international level, it is 
visible that international courts are still at the outset of defining their approach to this type of 
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liability. This was clear in relation to the duty to act and the lack of analysis applied on the 
international level. Rather than defining the exact triggers for a duty to act, the courts were more 
occupied with the sources from which these duties could be drawn. Negligence was not 
considered in the cases discussed in international criminal law, while this is the standard most 
commonly used on the domestic level. This underlines the difference between omission liability 
and command responsibility since the latter applies negligence as the mens rea standard.  
 
However, the overall liability assigned to a defendant for a failure to act has the same 
shortcomings as at the national level. Although recklessness is more subjective than negligence, 
and is therefore more suitable in the context of criminal responsibility for serious international 
crimes, it is still a low threshold compared to intent or knowledge. Furthermore, the application 
of a counter-factual approach to causation on the domestic level demonstrates that the omitted 
act should have made a difference to the result, which links the omission once more to the actual 
crime. At the international level, we saw a similar tendency but then in the form of a substantial 
contribution requirement to the criminal result. Using such low standards may facilitate the 
conviction of peacekeeping commanders. Just like in domestic criminal law however, the general 
principles of criminal law would complicate such a conviction to a great extent. Attaching the 
peacekeeping commanders’ responsibility to the criminal result would make them responsible 
for conduct committed by others. It would also attach an unfair stigma to the commander as an 
actor involved in the commission of war crimes.  
 
A special mention should be made of the specific direction requirement that will be of particular 
importance in defining the standards for aiding and abetting by omission. The discussion on this 
supposed element of aiding and abetting is still ongoing. The recent appeal judgment in Stanisić 
and Simatimović, which rejected the use of specific direction,620 further complicates our 
interpretation of aiding and abetting by omission. Where applying specific direction for aiding and 
abetting may result in impunity in a number of aiding and abetting cases, particularly if these 
cases concern liability for an omission, the current interpretation imposes a high degree of liability 
for aiding and abetting by omission. This is also undesirable. In both scenarios, imposing liability 
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for aiding and abetting by omission requires a critical assessment of whether the general 
principles of criminal law allow the liability to be incurred by the defendant. Where the 
criminality of inaction is not sufficiently foreseeable or where the defendant is held liable for 
conduct he or she did not commit, the responsibility should not be imposed. However, this is a 
factor inherent to omission liability. There is a thin line between being held responsible for one’s 
personal conduct and that of someone else if a failure to intervene or act is at the core of this type 
of liability. Whether one can speak of a separate failure to act will depend on whether such an 
obligation to act applied to the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders.  
 
Another cause for concern is the label attached to the defendant. If a conviction would label a 
peacekeeping commander as a contributor to the commission of war crimes, such liability should 
not be imposed, because it would not be a ‘fair label’ considering that someone failed to fulfil an 
obligation of protection. The next chapter will look into whether such a legal obligation to act or 
protect exists under international law, which could influence our conclusion on what form of 
accountability for peacekeeping commanders seems fit in both domestic and international law.  
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Chapter 5: A Legal Obligation to Act for the Peacekeeping Commander? 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
We have discussed how command responsibility is a means to assign responsibility to a state 
agent like the peacekeeping commander for a failure to fulfil a certain duty. Similarly, liability 
for omissions as discussed in chapters 3 and 4 requires a duty to act. This chapter therefore 
analyses the extent to which peacekeeping commanders are obligated to act under the legal 
paradigms applicable to PKOs.  
 
This assessment is difficult to make because it is debatable whether positive obligations can be 
placed upon individuals under legal paradigms like IHL and IHRL. It is equally unclear whether 
the mandate directly binds the peacekeeping commanders. Also, it is difficult to establish which 
paradigms apply in the often complex circumstances in which PKOs take place; more often than 
not the peacekeepers are deployed in a context of armed conflict, while not being a party to the 
conflict themselves. Another issue in defining which obligations are imposed on whom is that 
national contingents deployed in PKOs 'occupy a dual legal position’.621 On the one hand they are 
part of a multinational force under UN control, and on the other hand they continue to be agents 
of their state. This means they must comply with both the rules and laws applicable to the UN as 
the organisation of which the PKO is a subsidiary organ, yet they are also bound by their national 
laws and the treaties to which their TCC is a signatory.
622
 
 
The first section discusses the mandate and the ROE applicable to PKOs and the extent to which 
these instructions create an obligation to act for peacekeeping commanders. The second section 
looks into the relationship between IHL and IHRL, which is relevant for PKOs that often take 
place on the borderline between peace and armed conflict. Third, we will assess whether IHRL 
offers a potential legal basis for an obligation to act for peacekeeping commanders, and the fourth 
section will make this assessment for IHL. In discussing IHL and IHRL, I will address the 
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difference between protection as a concept in IHL, IHRL and PKOs. The need to distinguish 
between different notions of protection is an important reason to argue against the contextual 
interpretation of the law. It arguably paves the way for developing a separate paradigm for  
peacekeeping, which will be addressed in chapter 8.  
  
5.2 Peacekeeping Mandates and Rules of Engagement  
 
5.2.1 The Mandate and ROE as Legal Basis for Individual Obligations?  
 
Whether the UNSC resolution, also referred to as the mandate, and the ROE impose any 
obligations on peacekeeping commanders is difficult to answer. The mandate serves as an 
authorisation for the presence of peacekeeping troops in the territory of the host state while also 
stating the aims and objectives of the mission. Evans refers to both the mandate and ROE as 'the 
legally binding instructions for particular missions, describing at different levels of generality not 
only what their basic tasks are but when, where, and to what extent their members may use 
force'.
623
 However, this is limited to 'general' instructions of which the legal status is unclear. 
There has been discussion on the binding force of resolutions issued under chapters VI and VII of 
the UN charter;
624
 in particular the binding nature of Chapter VI resolutions has been widely 
discussed.
625
 Some have argued that the language used in the mandate indicates whether or not 
the resolution is intended to bind its addressees.
626
 The International Court of Justice argued in 
the Namibia case
627
 (1971) that all UNSC resolutions are binding and that 'the language of a 
resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made 
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as to its binding effect'.
628
 Since the language used is often ambiguous, a conclusion to its binding 
effect is not straightforward. Interestingly, a UNSC research report concluded that the 'actual 
tasks in the mandate and the political circumstances surrounding the resolution’s implementation 
(which will be reflected in the concept of operations) are likely to have a larger impact than 
whether Chapter VII is mentioned in the relevant resolution'.
629
 
 
In considering a potential obligation to act under the mandate, a distinction should be made 
between an obligation to use force and an obligation to do what is within the capabilities of the 
peacekeepers. Generally, peacekeeping troops are authorised to use force where others 'commit 
or threaten to commit physical violence against civilians or against other persons under the 
protection of the peacekeeping operation or if there is reasonable belief, as demonstrated by 
intent and capacity, that they are preparing to commit such physical violence against civilians'.
630
 
Khalil interprets the authorisation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as an obligation ‘to use 
force, up to and including deadly force, where and when necessary and appropriate to pre-empt, 
prevent, deter, and/or respond to targeted or systematic attacks on civilians within the limits of 
their capabilities and areas of deployment’.631 
  
However, for peacekeeping commanders it is often unclear to what extent they are supposed to 
use the authority to use force to protect civilians if the host state appears unwilling or unable to 
do so.
632
 Khalil's argument that peacekeepers are obliged to use force under a chapter VII 
mandate does not find support in the 2014 and 2017 Mothers of Srebrenica v the Netherlands 
judgments and the Al-Jedda case, which concluded that the mandate authorises the use of force, 
but does not create an obligation to do so.
633
 Wills argues that if the protection of civilians is 
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included in the mandate as if it were an obligation, this is a positive legal obligation since this 
'cannot be achieved simply by refraining from action'.
634
 She furthermore argues that '[w]ith 
positive legal obligations come procedural obligations, and with procedural obligations come the 
obligation to carry out the procedures unless there is a good reason why this is not possible'.
635
 
The obligation should then be read as a minimum duty to monitor the security situation and 
ensure that risks of likely attacks are assessed and that the senior levels of command are notified 
of these risks.
636
 However, this does not require the use of force per se, but may also consist of 
duties to report and investigate threats to the civilian population.
637
 In this context, a distinction 
should be made between the duty to report and the duty to report 'immediately', as Wills points 
out.
638
 The latter words were used in the mandate of UNMISS,
639
 and seem more than a request 
to do so. It implies an obligation to act upon it. Not interpreting a duty to report as an obligation 
would, as Wills puts it, ‘reduce the mission’s protective actions to the level of ad hoc (essentially 
dependent on the best efforts of the individual commander and her/his advisors at the time)’.640 
She then concludes that ‘ad hoc responses are not sufficient to meet a positive obligation to 
protect in situations where civilians are known to be at risk’.641 In her view, the protection 
strategy in the UN DPKO Civilian Affairs Handbook
642
 read in conjunction with the civilian 
protection mandate creates an implied obligation to actually carry out the protection plan. Risks 
of serious harm that were not foreseeable at the time of drafting the plan could limit that 
obligation however.
643
  
 
Where Wills focused on the language used in the mandate and other mission-specific 
documents, Khalil looked at the historical development of the civilian protection mandate and 
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the overall UN legal framework.
644
 The main difference between the two views is that Wills 
ultimately admits that legal obligations are more likely to be based on IHL, IHRL and the law 
of international organisations, and less so on the mandate considering the view that the 
mandate is not necessarily a binding source of law.
645
 In particular, the way in which 
individual peacekeepers would be bound by the mandate is unclear.
646
 Wills additionally 
recognises that policy documents, eg the Brahimi report, may support a general obligation to 
act in PKOs.
647
 Although it indicates that the UN and the international community at large 
have shown a stronger commitment to protecting civilians and the will to incorporate this in 
PKOs, it lacks the legal impact required to create such an obligation. Khalil’s focus on civilian 
protection as a historically developed objective of peacekeeping is understandable. Without 
clarity regarding the mandate’s binding force and without mandates explicitly setting out the 
role of individual peacekeepers in the mission however, it remains questionable whether 
mandates are of particular relevance in analysing the peacekeeping commander’s obligation to 
act. For now, it appears that a careful analysis of the language used indicates what the 
mandate’s intended effect is.  
 
5.2.2 Mission-specific mandates and ROEs: UNAMIR and UNPROFOR 
 
In the previous section, we have considered that analysing the language used in the mandate is 
the most straightforward way to assess the mandate’s meaning for the peacekeeping troops and 
their commanders. This part of the chapter will look into the language and objective(s) of the 
UNAMIR and UNPROFOR mandates and the ROE to see how they affected the mission in 
practice, answering the question of whether there was an implication that the peacekeeping 
commanders were under an obligation to act. 
 
It is evident from the language used in UNAMIR's mandate that it did not create an explicit 
obligation to protect a certain area or a particular part of the population. In addition to being 
responsible for the security in the city of Kigali, the resolution states that ‘UNAMIR shall have 
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the following mandate’, expecting the troops to ‘monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement’, 
‘to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced 
persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner’ and ‘to assist in the 
coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations’.648 
Nothing in the language used indicates that UNMIR has to fulfil these tasks, it simply states that 
the troops are mandated to do so. 
 
Although UNSC resolution 743, issued at 21 February 1992, defined UNPROFOR as an 
operation based on consent, there was 'increasing pressure for the force to operate in a non-
consensual environment in particular for humanitarian convoys and protection of civilians'.
649
 
Ultimately, the UNSC adopted Resolution 836 on 4 June 1993, which extended UNPROFOR’s 
mandate ‘to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire [and], to promote the 
withdrawal of the military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground[.]’650 In that light, the UN authorised 
UNPROFOR 
 
to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the 
safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate 
obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected 
humanitarian convoys.
651
 
 
Dutchbat was mandated to protect the people within the safe area, or at least received the 
authorisation to use force to protect the safe areas. Allowing them to do so seems superfluous if it 
comes without the expectation that the troops use such an authorisation if necessary. In 
comparison, UNAMIR’s mandate was less specific and contained no specific reference to the 
protection of civilians. The instruction given to UNPROFOR to protect the safe areas can be read 
as an implicit authorisation to use force to protect those within that safe area. Yet, an 
authorisation is not forceful enough to constitute a legal obligation. 
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The ROE are part of the operationalisation of the mandate and directly address the 
peacekeeping commanders. These rules indicate to what extent and in what circumstances the 
peacekeepers may use force. They do not create obligations to use force; rather they indicate 
what the troops are allowed to do in this respect and when.
652
 The ROE also specify when 
'force may not be used by armed UN military personnel'.
653
 As such, ROE are legally 
binding
654
 and their legal purpose can be defined as '[providing] restraints on a commander’s 
actions, consistent with both domestic and international laws, and may, under certain 
circumstances, impose greater restrictions than those required by the law'.
655
 It is the duty of 
military commanders to ensure that their subordinates are well familiar with the ROE.
656
  
 
In contrast to UNAMIR’s mandate, the ROE developed by Dallaire for UNAMIR657 implied 
that they had far-going options to protect the population from violence. Based on these ROE, 
UNAMIR was allowed to ‘use all available means to halt’ the commission of mass atrocities: 
 
Ethnically motivated criminal acts may also be perpetrated during this mandate and will morally 
and legally require that UNAMIR use all means available to terminate the same. Examples: 
execution, attacks against displaced people or refugees, ethnic riots, attacks against demobilised 
soldiers, etc. When this happens, UNAMIR military personnel shall follow this directive’s ROE's, 
in support of UNCIVPOL and the local authorities, or in their absence, UNAMIR shall take the 
necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.
658
  
 
However, the UN refused several requests by Dallaire to act upon these ROE, which implied that 
the UN considered the 'standard ROE' applicable to the mission and not the ROE drafted by 
Daillaire. This even though UN headquarters did not object to a renewed proposal to include 
action against crimes against humanity in these ROE.
659
 Since the Belgian inquiry refers to 
                                                          
652Peace Operations Training Institute, Core PreDeployment Training Materials, ‘Establishment and 
Operationalization of Security Council Mandates in Peacekeeping Operation part 1 (2014) 91-92. 
653
 Ibid. 
654
 Ibid. 
655
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instr. 3121.01b, Standing Rules of Engagement 
 (SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use Of Force (SRUF) for US Forces (13 June 2005) 81. 
656
 Ibid. 
657
 These ROE were not officially approved by the UN Headquarters, see UN independent inquiry (n 51) 9. The 
Belgian inquiry however refers to them as being the ROE in place for UNAMIR at the time. 
658
 Para 17 of the UNAMIR ROE, as cited in Belgian Inquiry (n 53) section 4.13; UN Independent Inquiry (n 51) 9. 
The Belgian Inquiry confirmed that this was to be interpreted as an instruction to act in the face of certain atrocities, 
eg crimes against humanity, see para 3.8.4.1. 
659
 Security Council Report (n 626) 29.  
146 
 
Dallaire's ROE as the ones applicable, it is difficult to indicate which ROE actually applied.  
 
The ROE for UNPROFOR allowed Dutchbat to ‘defend themselves, other U.N. personnel, or 
persons and areas under their protection against direct attack, acting always under the order of the 
senior officer/soldier at the scene’,660 ‘to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force 
from discharging its duties’661 and ‘to resist deliberate military or paramilitary incursions into the 
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) or Safe Areas’.662 These ROE do not indicate what 
means Dutchbat was allowed to use, but the language used implies there is an expectation that 
Dutchbat would act against an attempt to take over the enclave and against any harm done to the 
people living within that area. So, where Dallaire's ROE for UNAMIR designated that it could 
use all ‘available means’, this was not stated in UNAMIR's mandate. For UNPROFOR however, 
the mandate contained such language, but the ability to act was not reflected in the ROE 
applicable to UNPROFOR. This could indicate that using all available means does not 
necessarily imply the use of force, but may also refer to other non-forceful measures that could be 
taken to limit the harm done to the civilians within the area under their control.  
 
There is the obvious risk of reading obligations of protection into the mandate or the ROE based 
on the idea that the mandate prioritises civilian protection. Where this was not the case yet for 
UNPROFOR and UNAMIR, this could be likely in analysing contemporary peacekeeping 
mandates which often focus on civilian protection. One should be wary of imposing obligations 
on the commanders based on the mandate if there is no unitary opinion on whether or not these 
resolutions are legally binding. Also, if the mandate binds it addressees, it is unclear whether this 
includes the peacekeeping commanders. If the mandate includes a reference to civilian protection 
as a task however, the contingent commander may be responsible for carrying out that task 
diligently, as was also discussed in chapter 2.
663
 Diligence refers to the expectation that someone 
is ‘careful and using a lot of effort’ in doing something.664 Where the Force Commander is 
responsible for the mission’s objectives, the battalion commander holds such responsibility for 
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the tasks that need to be carried out in the field.
665
 Another observation is that the discussion 
regarding peacekeeping obligations should not focus on the use of force as the only means of 
protection, but should include other options that are more feasible to fulfil. This is in line with the 
conclusions drawn by the Dutch and Belgian courts that offering the refugees passive protection 
would have been sufficient to protect them.
666
  
 
5.3 PKOs and the Relationship Between IHL and IHRL 
 
In the previous section we have concluded that the mandate only creates an obligation to act upon 
the instructions given in the mandate if the language implicates this. This means that 
peacekeeping commanders may be expected to monitor the overall security situation and to take 
measures within their spheres of competence to protect the civilian population, depending on how 
the instructions are phrased. Considering the uncertainty surrounding the legal status of the 
mandate, it is worth looking into the applicable law to see whether it establishes a legal 
obligation to act for peacekeeping commanders. 
 
With peacekeeping troops being impartial and PKOs being characterised by a limited use of 
force, the question is whether international law could form a legal basis for an obligation to act 
for peacekeeping commanders. In the example of the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping 
commanders, IHL will apply in the general context, namely that of an armed conflict, but the 
peacekeepers are only subject to IHRL because they will usually not be a party to the conflict. 
However, the (now defunct) UN Commission on Human Rights stated that if IHRL is the 
prevailing regime, and if human rights may be violated, the parties to the conflict are called on to 
‘apply fully the principles and rules of IHL’.667 This suggests that both regimes apply to some 
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extent. In practice, this may lead to difficult scenarios. Engdahl referred to the example of a 
robust PKO that usually exceeds the use of force commonly used in law enforcement 
situations.
668
 With IHRL being the paradigm applicable in law enforcement situations and both 
IHRL and IHL in an armed conflict, it becomes difficult to draw the line between these two areas 
of law.  
 
A situation may even develop in which the interpretation of a rule or norm from one paradigm 
must be interpreted in the context of the other. The ICTY Trial Chamber interpreted norms of 
IHRL in the context of IHL in its Boškoski and Tarčulovski judgment. It held that: 
 
[t]he European Court of Human Rights has held in a number of cases that to use lethal force 
against a person whom it is possible to arrest would be ‘more than absolutely necessary’. 
However, when a situation reaches the level of armed conflict, the question what constitutes an 
arbitrary deprivation of life is interpreted according to the standards of international humanitarian 
law, where a different proportionality test applies.
669
 
 
The interpretation of IHRL norms may thus depend on the context in which they apply. If there is 
an armed conflict ongoing, regardless of the involvement therein of the peacekeepers, these 
norms must be interpreted in the light of IHL. The ECtHR also applied this rationale in Hassan v 
UK
670
  in which it considered: 
 
As regards the interplay between the two regimes, there could be no single applicable rule. Any 
given situation was likely to require elements of both bodies of law [IHRL and IHL] working 
together, but the balance and interplay would vary. Accordingly, there might be situations, such as 
the detention of prisoners of war, in which the combination of criteria lead to the conclusion that 
international humanitarian law would carry more weight, and determination of human rights 
violations regarding issues such as grounds and review of detention would be based on the 
relevant rules of international humanitarian law. Even in such contexts, however, human rights 
law would not be under absolute subjection to international humanitarian law. For example, if 
there were allegations of ill treatment, human rights law would still assist in determining issues 
such as the specificities of the acts which constituted a violation. From the perspective of the 
human rights body, it would be advantageous to use human rights law as the first step to identify 
the issues that needed to be addressed, for example, periodicity of review of lawfulness of 
detention, access to information about reasons of detention, legal assistance before the review 
mechanism. The second step would be to undertake a contextual analysis using both international 
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humanitarian law and human rights law, in the light of the circumstances of the case at hand. On 
condition that the human rights body presented its analysis with sufficient coherence and clarity, 
the decisions generated would provide guidance to both States and armed forces ahead of future 
action. It went without saying that the approaches and the result had to be capable of being 
applied in practice in situations of armed conflict.
671
  
 
 
Note that the ECtHR refers in specific to the guidance this also gives to armed forces. A 
contextual analysis and the considerations of the circumstances of the case are thus considered 
guiding in what law applies. The ICJ already used a similar approach in several cases, among 
which the Advisory Opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which 
the ICJ argued: 
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant for the Protection of Civil 
and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the 
Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. 
Respect for the right to life, however, is not such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily 
to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation 
of life, however, falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable 
in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a 
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an 
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant 
itself.
672
 
What the ICJ does not indicate here is how norms of IHRL can be interpreted in the context of 
IHL. The reference to the lex specialis rule in the context of armed conflict implies that IHL 
becomes the determinant framework in such situations. The ICJ concluded in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory that there are three possible solutions in dealing with the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL:  
some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be 
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of 
international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into 
consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex 
specialis, international humanitarian law.
673
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In addition, the Human Rights Committee considered IHL and IHRL as two complementary 
bodies of law rather than exclusive to each other:  
 
the Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international 
humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules 
of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation 
of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.
674
 
 
Although the two paradigms are complementary because of their mutual focus on protecting 
people in armed conflict (IHL and IHRL) and peace (IHRL), the reliance on context and 
circumstances to determine which norm prevails could result in the conflation of the two areas of 
law. Less attention is then paid to the purpose or nature of the law, and more to the context which 
then influences the interpretation of norms from these legal paradigms. An immediate result 
thereof may be that the relevant norms are developed outside their original paradigm, possibly 
affecting the future application of the norm, even in its original context.  
 
The argument that both paradigms have taken a convergent direction has been made in particular 
with regard to the protection of civilians.
675
 Wills argued that the Case Concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo of the ICJ may be exemplary of this convergence, 
because it concluded that Uganda had an obligation to protect based on human rights law, but 
also under the law of occupation in the form of article 43 of The Hague Regulations.
676
 By 
arguing that the situation of occupation triggered Uganda’s human rights obligations, it 
considered IHRL and IHL as intertwined. The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
implied that IHL and IHRL protect the same values and that the difference is their application, 
since IHRL applies at all times and IHL only applies in times of war.
677
 Meron shared this point 
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of view and even argued against the separation of IHL and IHRL. He stated that ‘although these 
systems of protection continue to have different institutional ‘umbrellas’ (...), a strict separation 
between the two is artificial and hinders efforts to maximise the effective protection of human 
rights’.678 Walter Kaelin, (former) UN special rapporteur on human rights, also spoke of norms 
that ‘reinforce each other’ and referred to them as a ‘unified complex of human rights norms 
under different institutional umbrella’s’.679 IHRL is considered normative which means that in 
interpreting the law, we take into account the object and purpose of the relevant treaty, instead of 
using a limited interpretation.
680
 IHL on the other hand is subject to a condition for it to apply, 
namely the existence of an armed conflict. It is furthermore not as unlimited in scope as IHRL is, 
but contains ‘purpose-built rules to protect life’ within certain limits in armed conflict.681 Despite 
the similar focus on protection of life, the content of the law and the limits of its application are 
different. For example, protecting the right to life under IHRL and under IHL have different 
meanings. If one ought to use the principles of IHL, eg proportionality, to assess whether certain 
actions are proportionate, this would lead to different conclusions in each paradigm. The 
description of the relationship between IHL and IHRL by the International Law Commission as 
‘two sets of rules related to each other as today’s reality and tomorrow’s promise’ captures that 
difference quite nicely.
682
    
 
Where IHRL contains a normative, positive norm of protection of the right to life, IHL refers to 
protection as an effort to do as little harm as possible to those not actively engaged in the conflict.  
The main argument in favour of keeping this distinction in mind is the complicated assessment of 
how these norms should be enforced if we no longer distinguish between IHRL and IHL. A 
situation of peace is after all distinct from armed conflict. For that reason, international criminal 
law deals with violations of IHL by individuals whereas violations of IHRL are often sanctioned 
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in human rights courts. If it concerns violations of IHRL by individuals, this can be brought 
before a domestic criminal court or a court of general jurisdiction. For that purpose, the 
distinction between IHL and IHRL norms of protection is relevant, even though peacekeeping, as 
a (partly) military activity that shows overlap with both paradigms, complicates that distinction. 
The next sections look into protective norms under IHRL and IHL respectively and will discuss 
how protection in PKOs relates to these notions of protection. Attention also goes out to the 
different impact these norms have on peacekeeping commanders on the one hand and military 
commanders in combat operations on the other hand. 
 
5.4 International Human Rights Law 
 
This section discusses the human rights obligations of both the UN and the TCC, and assesses to 
what extent these obligations must be upheld by peacekeeping commanders. The extent to which 
a TCC has human rights obligations in an extra-territorial context depends on the level of 
effective control held by the TCC.
683
 As Cerone highlighted, ‘the degree of positive obligations 
will be dependent upon the type and degree of control (or power or authority) exercised by the 
state’.684 It has been accepted that peacekeeping troops must comply with the IHRL treaty 
obligations of their TCCs within the area of their military bases or compounds,
685
 as the Hague 
District Court confirmed. In its Mothers of Srebrenica judgment the Court held  
 
that through Dutchbat after the fall of Srebrenica the State had effective control as understood in 
the Al-Skeini judgment over the compound. The compound was a fenced-off area in which 
Dutchbat had the say and over which the UN after the fall of Srebrenica exercised almost no 
actual say any more. In addition we have established the fact that other than the mini safe area the 
Bosnian Serbs respected this area and left it untroubled after the fall of Srebrenica.
686
 
 
This type of effective control creates a connection between the troops, present as agents of their 
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TCCs, and the civilians that sought refuge on these compounds. In Mukeshimana, the Brussels 
District Court only referred to the effective control standard in the sense of article 6 of DARIO
687
 
and did not mention Belgium’s human rights treaty obligations.  
 
The Hague District Court even held that articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR and articles 6 and 7 of the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 'imply that the military force 
whose task it was to protect the refugees in the safe area was there to protect the right to life and 
the integrity of the human person inasmuch as that may reasonably [be] asked of it'.
688
 These two 
non-derogable human rights norms are part of international customary law and are principles of 
international law
689
 which bind the state,
690
 state agents,
691
 like Dutchbat, and other actors subject 
to international law.
692
  
 
It is difficult to determine, however, to what extent the UN as an organisation is bound by human 
rights law, since it is not bound by the same human rights treaties that bind the TCCs. In addition, 
the conclusions of the Dutch and Belgian courts that the compound (“mini safe area”)693 and 
ETO respectively were under the effective control of the Dutch and Belgian state,
694
 indicate that 
the UN no longer had command and control over the troops when the killings took place. It is 
therefore unlikely that the UN as an organisation was responsible for the protection of civilians. 
To see whether contemporary missions are bound by human rights obligations through the UN, 
we will first assess to what extent the UN has committed itself to positive obligations under 
international human rights law. 
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5.4.1 The UN and IHRL 
 
Articles 41 and 42 of DARIO, that also bind the UN as an organisation, assert that where the 
TCC has extraterritorial control over territory or persons, the TCC's positive obligations under the 
human rights treaties to which they are a party must be upheld.
695
 Article 42 of the DARIO 
prescribes that '[s]tates and international organizations shall cooperate to bring to an end through 
lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of article 41'.
696
 Article 41 of DARIO refers 
to 'the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by an international 
organization of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law'.
697
 
These obligations may apply to PKOs if the host state commits human rights violations or is 
incapable of providing human rights guarantees to its population.
698
 However, taking over human 
rights functions from the host state may increase the risk of the host state withdrawing its consent 
for the operation. This means that the UN and a TCC must consider carefully whether to take 
over this responsibility from the host state.
699
  
 
Article 14 of the DARIO reflects that the UN has an obligation not to violate peremptory norms. 
This article precludes the UN from assisting a state which violates peremptory norms, which 
makes it unlikely that the organisation itself could violate these norms directly.
700
 For the 
organisation to be held responsible it must have provided assistance 'with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act'.
701
 Wills is of the opinion that the protective 
legal obligations under IHRL and IHL and articles 14, 41 and 42 of the DARIO create something 
that is similar to an obligation.
702
 This is based on the customary status of the DARIO, which is 
however not uncontested.
703
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The UN refers to positive obligations to protect civilians from serious violations of IHRL and 
IHL in its Human Rights Up Front Action Plan and its Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on 
UN Support to Non-UN Security Forces (HRDDP).
704
 The HRDPP states that if UN entities give 
support to non-UN forces, it must be in line with the UN's purposes and principles under the 
Charter and with ‘its obligations under international law to respect, promote and encourage 
respect for international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law'.
705
 If the host state 
would commit grave human rights violations, the ‘UN entity providing this support must 
intercede with the relevant authorities'.
706
 This includes the ‘commission of “war crimes” or of 
“crimes against humanity” (…) or “gross violations” of human rights, including summary 
executions and extrajudicial killings, acts of torture, enforced disappearances, enslavement, rape 
and sexual violence’.707 Both the HR Up Front action plan and the HRDDP reflect that the UN is 
committed to actively contribute to the promotion of IHRL; the HRDPP even obligates the UN 
entity to  interfere in the commission of serious international crimes by calling the responsible 
host state to account.  
 
5.4.2 The TCC, Peacekeeping Troops and IHRL 
 
The Hague District Court seemed to confirm that IHRL applied in the context of Srebrenica and 
that the Dutch battalion needed to act in accordance with the non-derogable norms of IHRL based 
on the TCC's treaty obligations.
708
 In Osman, the ECtHR held that 'in certain well-defined 
circumstances a positive obligation [rests] on the authorities to take preventive operational 
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measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another 
individual'.
709
 This positive obligation only extends to safeguarding the right to life and the 
prohibition of inhumane treatment. Although this is an obligation imposed on states, its 
immediate effect is that military troops (in particular in PKOs) will be placed in situations in 
which the expectation of action against criminal acts of others has been created. If the mission is 
established under a civilian protection mandate, this expectation rests on both the mandate and 
IHRL. Protection in the context of PKOs is defined as protection of ‘“physical violence” and the 
threat thereof’.710 Although peacekeeping commanders may not be obliged to protect the 
peremptory norms of IHRL, the commanders may be responsible for civilian protection tasks as 
included in the mandate, depending on the textual interpretation of the UNSC resolution. This 
means that the expectation of what their TCC must do to fulfil its treaty obligations under IHRL 
and what the peacekeeping commanders might be required to do by the mandate may differ. With 
a different interpretation of ‘protection’ under both sources, the peacekeeping commanders are 
put under considerable pressure to fulfil different expectations of protection. The civilian 
population with whom the troops are in frequent contact will expect the troops to protect them 
however, which is demonstrated by civilians often seeking refuge on UN compounds.
711
 
Positioning troops in a conflict as human rights protectors increases the risk of the troops and 
civilians becoming more vulnerable to attacks by the warring parties. Although IHRL does not 
impose positive obligations of protection on the peacekeeping commanders directly, there is an 
expectation that the peacekeeping commanders will act. This follows partly from the idea that the 
state can only fulfil its human rights obligations through its state agents. 
 
However, support for the position that responsibilities held by the state directly apply to 
individuals belonging to the state has grown and therefore should not be left out of the 
discussion. Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann held that  
 
[t]he commitment made by a State not only applies to the government but also to any established 
authorities and private individuals within the national territory of that State and certain obligations 
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are therefore imposed upon them. The extent of rights and duties of private individuals is therefore 
the same as that of the rights and duties of the State.
712
 
 
If one extends this argument, one could argue that if the TCC has effective control over the area 
in which a PKO takes place, eg the compound, the human rights obligations of the TCC would 
also need to be upheld by the military commanders considered public officials. This would then 
be defined as indirect human rights obligations. Meron, who is considered a pioneer in 
advocating for individual human rights obligations, for example claimed that articles 5 and 20 of 
the ICCPR impose direct obligations on individuals.
713
 Looking more closely at his position leads 
us to consider that this is not unrealistic, provided these obligations are included and thus 
‘translated’ in criminal law. Meron referred to the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of Apartheid
714
 and the Genocide Convention
715
 as examples of ‘human rights 
instruments’716 which were, at the time of writing, advanced ways of assigning international 
criminal responsibility based on human rights norms.  
 
Nowadays, the criminalisation of human rights norms has become more common when we 
consider that the Rome Statute and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals contain provisions that 
were initially human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity.
717
 This 
indicates, to some extent, that over the years the expectation that individuals comply with human 
rights norms has increased, not only under domestic law, but also under international law.
718
 
Judge Buergenthal argued that the inclusion of individual responsibility under international 
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criminal law reflects on the scope of obligations under IHRL: 
 
These responses to new international realities [the establishment of international courts, among 
others], while still in a formative stage, suggest that the concept of international responsibility for 
massive violations of human rights is being expanded to include individuals and groups in 
addition to governments. If individuals are deemed to have ever greater rights under the 
international law of human rights, it makes sense to impose corresponding duties on them not to 
violate those rights and, if appropriate, to hold them internationally responsible for their 
violation.
719
 
 
Judge Buergenthal recognises the idea of such duties still being ‘in a formative stage’. Also, the 
development referred to here has mainly concerned the negative obligation not to violate human 
rights law. However, the Rutaganira judgment discussed in section 4.5.1 illustrated how human 
rights law may become the basis for a positive obligation to act under international criminal law, 
albeit a rather general norm ‘to protect human life’.720 The Court based Rutaganira’s failure to 
protect humanity not only on Rwandan law, but also on international law as the Trial Chamber 
argued that 'international law also places upon a person vested with public authority a duty to act 
in order to protect human life'.
721
 The Chamber apparently did not feel the need to specify which 
paradigm within international law forms the legal basis for such an obligation. Instead it arguably 
derived this from general norms of international law. Considering the serious implications 
criminal responsibility has, the Trial Chamber should have argued in more detail from which 
norms it derived this obligation.  
 
Using human rights norms to establish criminal liability for a serious international crime expands 
the interpretation of such norms and consequently complicates the assessment of accountability 
under both national and international law. It is after all unclear whether a violation to meet a 
positive human rights obligation may always result in criminal liability or only if domestic law 
contains a duty to protect. Where IHRL is a normative and idealistic area of law, international 
criminal law is different in nature with its focus on justice and retribution. Cross-referencing to 
paradigms within international law could result in fragmentation of the law. Fragmentation 
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means that the law can be diversified, expanded or that interpretations may conflict depending on 
the circumstances in which the law is being applied.
722
 A similar risk exists when human rights 
norms, which are mainly negative obligations to protect, are used to interpret the protective task 
or obligations of peacekeeping troops. After all, protection is considered affirmative action under 
a peacekeeping mandate.  
 
In conclusion, the UN has developed policy requiring political action by its entities if serious 
crimes are committed in a country where the UN is present. Diligence is also required in the 
assistance the UN provides to activities of other military forces. It is however not bound by IHRL 
and there is no positive obligation to prevent human rights violations by UN actors. Any positive 
obligation imposed on the TCC under IHRL has immediate bearing on the expectations placed on 
peacekeeping commanders as its representatives in the field. Their direct relationship with the 
civilian population means that peacekeeping commanders are approachable and can be asked to 
account for their actions or inactions. While the obligation is exclusively imposed on the TCC, 
we have seen how state agents as public officials could be considered to hold the same 
obligations, for example in Rutaganira. The extent to which the TCC’s obligations are fulfilled 
relies on the diligence of the troops and their commanders, which will also be perceived as such 
by the local population. This places peacekeeping commanders at risk and makes them a 
vulnerable target if the troops become too involved in the conflict. An additional risk of 
recognising such positive obligations for state agents under IHRL is that these norms could be 
used in (international or domestic) criminal law to support liability for failing to fulfil a human 
rights obligation. This contributes to diversification and thus fragmentation of the law, since both 
human rights law and criminal law are special regimes within international law; cross-referencing 
between these paradigms is not without risk if the purpose of the norm is different from the 
environment in which it is being applied.  
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5.5 International Humanitarian Law 
 
Where it is generally assumed that IHRL applies in situations of both peace and armed conflict, 
and thus always applies in PKOs, the application of IHL to peacekeeping has been subject of 
debate.
723
 It seems accepted that in order for IHL to apply during PKOs, not only should the 
context reach the threshold of an armed conflict,
724
 the peacekeepers should also be engaged in 
the conflict as if they were combatants.
725 
In those cases IHL would impose direct obligations
 
on 
peacekeepers.
726
 Later statements made by the UN, however, implied that the principles and spirit 
of IHL apply at all times, meaning that this should arguably be observed in times of peace as 
well.
727
 Given that peacekeeping has become more forceful over the last years, IHL is however 
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likely to apply in more situations than it did about ten years ago. For that reason, the critical notes 
regarding the application of IHL
728
 should arguably be read in the context of the traditional 
notion of peacekeeping. Whether or not IHL applies, and thus whether an armed conflict takes 
place, is above all a matter of fact,
729
 which means that the answer cannot be found in the 
peacekeeping mandate or the ROE. The mainstream opinion held however is that peacekeeping 
troops who engage in the conduct of hostilities become a party to an international armed conflict, 
with their TCC being a party to the conflict.
730
 As a result, the TCC’s troops are bound by the 
international conventions and treaties to which the TCC is a party.
731
 This includes the Geneva 
Conventions and their additional protocols. Although the UN is not a party to the Geneva 
Conventions nor to other treaties of IHL, it is bound by the customary rules of IHL if its troops 
are actively engaged in the conflict.  
 
It follows from these brief assumptions about the applicability of IHL to PKOs, that IHL 
arguably did not apply to the situations in Srebrenica and Kigali, because the troops were not 
involved in the armed conflicts as combatants. In contemporary PKOs however, IHL is more 
likely to apply considering the fact that these operations are carried out in situations in which the 
level of violence used is higher and may thus reach the threshold of an armed conflict more 
easily. The next section will first discuss the interpretation of ‘protection’ in regular combat 
operations (or armed conflict) and that of PKOs to illustrate that these definitions differ from one 
another. This distinction should be at the forefront in interpreting the obligations of peacekeeping 
commanders under IHL.   
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5.5.1 Protection in IHL and Peacekeeping: a Comparison 
 
There is a fundamental difference between the definition of ‘protection’ in PKOs on the one hand 
and ‘protection’ as part of IHL on the other hand. In peacekeeping, ‘protection’ refers to the 
affirmative task or objective to physically protect civilians from harm caused by others, whereas 
in a regular armed conflict, the IHL notion of ‘protection’ indicates that combatants need to avoid 
harm to non-combatants as much as possible. Whereas protection in PKOs is more similar to a 
positive obligation of protection, in IHL this is most often a negative obligation. The notion that 
protection may have a different meaning in the context of peacekeeping was reflected in the 
views of Weiner and Ní Aoláin, whose article on the legal framework of peacekeeping in 1996 
has been an important contribution to the exploration of individual obligations and 
responsibilities in PKOs: 
 
With protection as the overarching goal, it follows that peacekeepers' legal obligations should 
reflect the notion that they will affirmatively seek to prevent misdeeds occurring within their 
jurisdiction (for lack of a better word). That this may stretch beyond the humanitarian portfolio of 
the typical soldier is a logical consequence of an imperative that is different from the combatant's 
typical role.
732
 
 
This also indicates that the protective norms that may apply to peacekeeping commanders would 
not necessarily apply to a military commander in a combat operation. That follows from the 
mandate being an additional instruction to the mission to offer protection to civilians from 
possible harm; one that is distinct from the protective provisions in IHL. The interpretation of 
‘protection’ in the context of peacekeeping is not defined by IHL or IHRL, but refers to ‘physical 
protection of beneficiaries, usually through cooperation with host country security forces (…) to 
provide security inside camps and protect the recipients of humanitarian aid from attacks by third 
parties’.733 
 
Weiner and Ní Aoláin argued the following regarding positive obligations of protection held by 
peacekeepers: 
 
                                                          
732
 Weiner and Ní Aoláin (n 189) 319–320. 
733
 Conor Foley, ‘What Do We Mean by Protection?’ (2015) 23 Michigan State International Law Review 701, 721. 
163 
  
While it is right to insist on a more protective orientation for the peacekeeper than the warrior, the 
former should be required to act only where it appears that effective protective action can be taken 
without undue risk. (…) [A]doption of a limiting rule - based on the ability to act effectively 
without unreasonable risk - would avoid imposing unworkable burdens on peacekeepers. One can 
imagine a hierarchy of appropriate responses that takes into account the gravity of the harm and 
the potential risks to the peacekeeper.
734
  
 
The authors stressed the importance of the objective of protection in PKOs, but also argued that 
peacekeepers cannot be expected to do the impossible. Instead, an argument is made in favour of 
a reasonable approach to positive obligations for peacekeepers. Peacekeeping commanders will 
have a different role in PKOs than military commanders generally have, because of their 
impartial position vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict, which gives them protected status. As such, 
peacekeeping commanders take on humanitarian tasks, as was also the case in the Dutch and 
Belgian missions. This distinguishes them from commanders deployed in an armed conflict to 
which his or her troops are a party.  
 
This distinction is often dealt with by interpreting IHL differently if applied to peacekeepers. For 
example, Bothe argued that IHL may be interpreted differently according to the context in which 
it is used.
735
 In doing so, Bothe considers the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) a part of the type of 
relief operations that he considers peacekeeping to be and advocates an interpretation of IHL that 
benefits the objective of civilian protection.
736
 Where the aim is to improve the humanitarian 
circumstances for the civilian population, as part of R2P, ‘IHL must be adapted to the necessities 
of such operations’.737 The reference to the general notion of R2P is however not entirely 
appropriate in the context of peacekeeping. An important difference between R2P and civilian 
protection in PKOs is that R2P is limited to the crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity, whereas in peacekeeping protection of any type of physical harm is 
the norm.
738
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A disadvantage of the contextual interpretation of IHL is the complex use of IHL principles in the 
context of peacekeeping when there is no armed conflict taking place and IHRL is thus the 
primary paradigm applicable.
739
 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) observes 
in its latest report on Violence and the Use of Force that  
 
[u]tmost attention must be paid to the obligation of law enforcement officials to respect and 
protect the life and security of all persons: Art. 6 (1) and 9 (1) ICCPR, Art. 2 CCLEO, Preamble 
(para. 3) of BPUFF and BPUFF No. 5. (…) For that purpose – as in all other law-enforcement 
activities – the authorities must abide by the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and 
precaution.
740
 
 
The report later acknowledged that ‘some principles, such as those of necessity and 
proportionality, are referred to in connection with both law enforcement and armed conflict in 
completely different senses’.741 The reference to principles such as military necessity and 
proportionality as being applicable in peacekeeping can be overly confusing, in particular if they 
are considered to have a contextual meaning. To illustrate the confusion, Bothe wondered with 
regard to the principle of proportionality  
 
[w]hat type of collateral damage could be considered as “non excessive” and, therefore, 
acceptable under IHL if it is done to the very persons and objects a peacekeeping operation is 
meant to protect? Is the balance sheet which governs the operation of the proportionality principle 
really the same in the case of peacekeeping operations?
742
  
 
There is no confusion as to the application of IHL in situations in which peacekeeping troops are 
a party to the armed conflict, which also takes away the protected status of the peacekeeping 
commanders. The complexity increases however if peacekeeping troops combine tasks related to 
humanitarian assistance and civilian protection, while authorised to use force to protect civilians. 
In those circumstances the peacekeeping commander’s status (protected or combatant) becomes 
blurred, and so is the interpretation of IHL. Since the rationale behind PKOs is inherently 
different from regular combat operations with a military objective, a careful approach should be 
taken in using a contextual interpretation of IHL. ‘Protection’ under IHL could then be 
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interpreted as affirmative action when read in conjunction with a PKO’s mandate. Expanding the 
interpretation of protective norms under IHL could affect the way in which IHL is interpreted in 
contexts other than PKOs.  
 
5.5.2 IHL Provisions: Expansive Interpretation in the Context of PKOs?   
 
As mentioned, some scholars interpret IHL in the context of peacekeeping, which means that the 
negative protection referred to in IHL is explained as a positive obligation in PKOs. This expands 
the practical application of IHL beyond the initial scope of application. This section discusses the 
provisions which are often interpreted as positive obligations in the context of peacekeeping. 
  
For example, common article 3 to the GCs may apply to peacekeeping troops if engaged in a 
non-international armed conflict. Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is interpreted by 
some as a human rights norm included in IHL to the extent that it prohibits murder, torture and 
inhumane treatment and the taking of hostages.
743
 It furthermore contains an obligation to treat 
vulnerable persons in need of protection humanely as part of customary international law
744
 as 
well as the Geneva Conventions.
745
 Weiner and Ní Aoláin interpreted common article 3 as 
‘another legal prism through which to articulate the positive protective duties which peacekeepers 
and enforcers ought to be undertaking, in operations where protection and rights implementation 
are the stated aims of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions’.746 Wills for example referred to 
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Akayesu
747
 to justify the expansive interpretation of protection under this article, in particular the 
idea that individual peacekeepers would be expected to comply with common article 3.
748
 While 
it is sensible to accept the explanation in Akayesu that the provision should be interpreted widely 
to broaden its protective effect, this should not change the meaning of a predominantly negative 
obligation of protection into a positive one. The Trial Chamber’s argumentation that the scope 
includes individuals, eg public officials, mandated to ‘to support or fulfil the war efforts’ 
indicates that the individual should have a direct connection to the armed conflict. This should 
therefore be considered applicable to peacekeeping commanders directly involved in the conflict, 
but not to those who are a third party to the conflict. Moreover, a ‘conflict’ to which 
peacekeeping troops are a party would seldomly qualify as a non-international armed conflict but 
is more likely to be an international armed conflict, to which common article 3 does not apply. 
Two aspects should furthermore be considered here. That is first, that IHL normally prevails over 
human rights law because it is considered ‘special law’, which is more closely related to the 
subject-matter of war. In relation to PKOs however, IHL appears more distant from the 
circumstances: although it concerns a military operation, the objective of PKOs is more focused 
on positive norms of protection than regular combat missions are. This underlines my second 
point: that PKOs have positive protective aims, as Weiner and Ní Aoláin address, only 
demonstrates that peacekeeping is a separate type of military action. It does not indicate that the 
application of IHL should either be widened or that its provisions should be read in a different 
light when applied to peacekeeping commanders. 
 
This is somewhat different where it concerns the protective obligations under the law of 
occupation, in particular article 4 of GC IV. This article is principally applicable where there is a 
relationship between the civilian population and the ‘occupying power’.749 The ICRC stated even 
                                                          
747
 The ICTR Trial Chamber held in Akayesu that ‘due to the overall protective and humanitarian purpose of these 
international legal instruments’ the scope of common article 3 ‘should not be too restricted’. It therefore extended 
the scope of the duties and responsibilities under common article 3 to include ‘individuals who were legitimately 
mandated and expected, as public officials or agents or persons otherwise holding public authority or de facto 
representing the Government, to support or fulfil the war efforts’, Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) (n 478) 
para 631. 
748
 Wills, Protecting Civilians (n 723) 97 ff. 
749
 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces, Geneva 11-12 
December 2003’ (2003) 13 ff. See also Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (n 213) 246; Marten 
 
167 
  
that  
 
from the moment that a force has de facto control over a territory and its inhabitants, the law of 
occupation should apply. Another expert agreed with this conclusion, stressing that if international 
humanitarian law is applicable to UN-mandated operations and the forces involved exercise 
control over a territory, then, in principle, the Fourth Geneva Convention should also apply.
750 
 
 
In Mukeshimana, the Brussels District Court confirmed that the refugees in the ETO had the 
status of protected persons under article 4 of GC IV.
751
 The Court argued that article 136quater of 
the Belgian Penal Code intends to force those with the material power to intervene to prevent 
violations of IHL.
752
 The Court came to the remarkable conclusion that article 4 of GC IV would 
apply to the conflict in Rwanda. This provision usually applies to international armed conflicts, 
whereas the conflict in Rwanda was classified as a non-international armed conflict.
753
 As 
clarified in the judgment, Belgian legislature applied the incriminations provided for international 
armed conflict also to acts committed in a non-international armed conflict.754 This explains why 
the Belgian Court applied the notion of protected persons to the refugees under Belgian control. 
Article 4 of GC IV defines the notion of ‘protected persons’ as ‘those who, at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands 
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’.755 Also, the 
Belgian implementation of this rule refers to crimes that ‘affect by act or omission, the protection 
of people and property’, which arguably even more than article 4 of GC IV places the protection 
of people, in either international or non-international armed conflict, at the forefront of the sphere 
of application of this provision. Here, one could say that if the peacekeeping commanders are in a 
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similar situation to the occupation commanders, this law may apply by analogy.  
 
Article 58 (c) of AP 1 refers to the obligation to ‘take (…) other necessary precautions to protect 
the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the 
dangers resulting from military operations’.756 Nasu argued that ‘[a]lthough, strictly speaking, 
those provisions are only addressed to the parties to a conflict, the failure of the state parties to 
shoulder their primary responsibility to protect civilians arguably results in shifting the holder of 
the responsibility to the international community’.757 He argues that peacekeepers may be among 
the actors taking over this responsibility.
758
 In his opinion: 
 
this legal responsibility will potentially apply in all conflict areas where peacekeepers are 
deployed insofar as they are bound by the “principles and spirit” of international humanitarian 
law. The precautionary obligation to protect civilians may even arise before violence is actually 
committed by virtue of the nature of the obligation. However, the reach of the legal responsibility 
is qualified by such languages “as far as military considerations allow”, ‘‘to the maximum extent 
feasible’’ and “under their control”, which (……) defines the extent to which action is required.759  
 
The type of protection article 58 (c) of AP 1 refers to is a negative form of protection, whereas 
Nasu translates this into a positive obligation for peacekeepers. Where Nasu refers to the 
feasibility of such legal responsibilities and also to the factor of control, Weiner and Ní Aoláin 
limit the scope of the duty to that what is reasonable and within the capacity of the 
peacekeepers.
760
 By reasoning that the ‘capacity to effectively address the problem create[s] a 
specific duty for [the soldier] to intervene’ and that the ‘individual position triggers the direct 
applicability of humanitarian norms’761 they recognise that having the ability to act may give rise 
to a duty to act in situations in which such humanitarian norms apply. If capacity however lies at 
the basis of reasoning that peacekeeping commanders should act, I would define it as a moral 
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obligation rather than a legal one. This will be addressed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7. The 
reference to the humanitarian character of peacekeeping, also referred to by Bothe, indicates once 
more that peacekeeping has a distinct character. It therefore seems inappropriate to use IHL to 
establish positive obligations of protection for peacekeeping commanders, besides in those 
situations similar to occupation. 
 
In sum, IHL only gives rise to a legal obligation of protection in PKOs if the situation is 
analogous to that of occupation. If not however, there is only the negative obligation to protect 
under IHL which would not require peacekeeping commanders to undertake affirmative action to 
protect civilians. However, some scholars have arguably read a positive obligation into IHL by 
interpreting IHL through the lens of peacekeeping. This contributes to conflation of different 
norms of protection in peacekeeping and IHL, and would severely compromise IHL if applied in 
such a contextual way.  
 
5.5.3 The Risk of Fragmentation of the Law 
 
Turning protective IHL and IHRL norms into positive obligations for peacekeeping commanders 
could further the fragmentation of international law by expanding the original scope of these 
laws. This is of particular concern if such an expansive interpretation of a norm would then be 
used to establish criminal liability. These norms will then be developed outside their original 
paradigms and the interpretation given to the provisions can be altered in the different contexts in 
which they are being applied. An example of how courts may influence the application and 
interpretation of a doctrine is the judgment of the American 9th circuit court in Hilao v Estate of 
Marcos.
762
 The Court ruled that the international law's objective to ‘protect civilian populations 
and prisoners from brutality’ is similar to that of IHRL and that, as a result, command 
responsibility applies also in peacetime. Similarly, Mukeshimana gave a different interpretation 
to command responsibility in the domestic context.
763
 Although a contextual application of 
international law may seem desirable, it does not contribute to a universal idea of what the 
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provisions entail. However, recognising the difference between different contexts is sometimes 
necessary; Mettraux may have a point in arguing that the situation in peacetime is inherently 
different from the situation of chaos in wartime,
764
 and that we cannot judge one's behaviour the 
same in both situations. Similarly, the position that peacekeeping commanders have towards the 
conflict and the local population is difficult to define along the narrowly defined lines of peace 
and armed conflict, and thus IHRL and IHL. This appears to be an incentive to consider the 
development of law that is context-sensitive to ensure that it provides effective protection for the 
interests prioritised in that particular context, as will be discussed in chapter 8.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
That the conduct of the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders in Srebrenica and Kigali 
was questioned and brought under legal scrutiny, raised the question of whether peacekeeping 
commanders are subjected to legal obligations under international law. Scholars have argued that 
peremptory norms included in both IHL and IHRL in conjunction with a civilian protection 
mandate may give rise to an obligation to act on part of the peacekeeping commander. The 
mandate only creates an individual obligation to use force if the wording used indicates this. 
Peacekeeping commanders may be required to fulfil certain tasks to which explicit reference is 
made. This may include an expectation to monitor, report and undertake steps to request further 
support for the civilians under threat. 
 
This chapter has furthermore criticised the contextual interpretation of international law and the 
expansion of the interpretation of protective norms under IHL and IHRL to support a duty to 
protect in PKOs. The overly broad interpretation of the law could complicate military operations 
other than PKOs if negative obligations are explained as positive ones depending on the context 
in which they are applied. ‘Protection’ has a distinctive meaning in PKOs, one that should not be 
confused with protection in IHL or IHRL. Doing so contributes to the diffusion of IHL and 
IHRL norms by expanding the scope of application of the relevant norms, and by disregarding 
the purpose of the relevant law. This may result in conflicting and incoherent interpretations of 
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norms. Ironic as it may sound, establishing a special regime for PKOs would ensure a context-
specific interpretation of the peacekeeping commanders’ conduct without modifying the 
interpretation of IHL and IHRL norms. 
 
As discussed here, the expectations imposed on peacekeeping commanders do not stem from the 
law per se, but are based on their position as state agents and public officials or on the mandate. 
Peacekeeping commanders may therefore have a moral duty to act, similar to the one mentioned 
in Rutaganira. The professional quality of the peacekeeping commander as a public official 
creates the expectation that he or she acts in response to violations of the law. Chapter 6 discusses 
the notion of bystander liability, which stresses the moral expectations that stem from the 
profession of the military commander and pays attention to the impact of the commander’s 
inaction on the main perpetrator.  
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Chapter 6: The Peacekeeping Commander as Bystander: A Moral 
Obligation to Act? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In little more than half an hour, a middle-class neighbourhood in New York City passively 
witnessed how Kitty Genovese was stabbed to death on the street. The fact that her screams for 
help were left unanswered, allowed the attacker to return to the scene of the crime two more times 
to make sure that the stabbing would result in her death.
765
 As became clear in the trial of 
Genovese’s murderer, he had actually felt encouraged in his commission of the crime, due to the 
lack of response.
766
 Winston Moseley, her attacker, was initially convicted to a death sentence,
767
 
but this was later reduced to life imprisonment.
768
 The murder of Kitty Genovese left the United 
States in shock: why did no one prevent this woman’s death? All it would have taken to save her 
life was a phone call as soon as her distress was noticeable to the public. Instead, people waited 
until the damage was already done. Some of the neighbours declared later that they were afraid to 
get involved.
769
  
 
What sets this situation apart from the omissions discussed in chapters 3 and 4 is the 
neighbourhood not having a specific duty to act vis-à-vis Kitty Genovese, but that not intervening 
encouraged the perpetrator in the commission of his crime. Therefore, it is possible to argue that 
the neighbours’ inaction contributed to the crime by means of a positive act rather than a negative 
act. It is sometimes perceived as offering moral support or moral encouragement and is generally 
more focused on the mental element (mens rea) than omission liability. Since this form of liability 
requires no legal duty, it may be a suitable alternative to omission liability. Bystander liability 
considers the effect the inaction had on the mental state of the perpetrator. It also pays more 
attention to the mental state of the bystander. Whereas omission liability is mainly based on an 
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objective standard, namely a failure to fulfil a duty to act, bystander responsibility will take into 
account the fact that the bystander made a choice to witness the commission of a crime without 
attempting to intervene. This is then considered a culpable decision. If the bystander could have 
made a difference, this is particularly worthy of blame. At least, this is how this type of 
responsibility is approached in theory. This chapter will assess whether bystander liability in 
practice does indeed focus on the positive effect of the inaction. This is done by establishing 
which elements are the main determinants for bystander responsibility in both theory and practice, 
on the domestic level. In chapter 7 we will make the same assessment on the international level. 
 
We will consider the possibility that the inaction of the Dutch and Belgian commanders can be 
perceived as such ‘bystander conduct’. If we focus on the effect of their passive behaviour on the 
main perpetrator, a different type of liability may be established than in chapters 3 and 4. This 
chapter therefore provides insight into another rationale behind the criminalisation of inactive 
conduct, which may explain on what grounds the Dutch and Belgian commanders could have been 
held liable apart from basing criminal liability on their failure to fulfil a duty to act. Yet, bystander 
responsibility is partly based on the same elements as omissions; as this chapter will point out, the 
ability to act and the profession of the commander are also important in establishing bystander 
liability. The difficulty is that not all systems distinguish between omission liability and bystander 
liability. At times, the distinction made in this thesis may therefore seem artificial to advocates of 
the viewpoint that both subcategories are part of the broader category of omission liability. I 
presume here that without a legal duty to act, there can be no liability for omissions.  
 
I will first define the concept of a ‘bystander’ and consider what can be expected from a 
bystander. That expectation is referred to as the general duty of the bystander, which is mostly 
linked to his or her authority or ability to act; that authority might stem from his or her profession. 
The next section then addresses the moral duty that underlies the notion of bystander. In the 
sections that follow, I will discuss how this type of responsibility is perceived in civil and 
common law and how the elements of actus reus and mens rea are defined for bystander liability. 
Then the degree of liability incurred by the defendants, and thus potentially the Dutch and Belgian 
commanders, will be analysed.  
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Chapter 7 will later address the differences and similarities between domestic and international 
criminal law. In the context of peacekeeping, the domestic view is of interest as the TCC has the 
primary right to deal with peacekeeping conduct that could reach the threshold of criminal 
conduct. In addition, domestic law may provide jurisprudence that could contribute to the 
development of general principles of international law.
770
 
 
6.2 Bystander: A Definition 
 
The term ‘bystander’ is used frequently, but when used in a legal context the definition should be 
established in more detail. The general definition of bystander is ‘someone who is standing near 
and/or watching something that is happening but is not taking part/participating in it’.771 However, 
regarding the crime of genocide, Vetlesen defined bystanders in a broad sense: ‘every 
contemporary citizen cognizant of a specific ongoing instance of genocide, regardless of where in 
the world, is a bystander’.772 Laura Fletcher defines  
 
bystanders [as] those who did not participate in crimes but nonetheless did not intervene to stop the 
carnage. They may have been silent supporters or opponents of the political and military forces that 
waged the war, but their role in the events is defined by their inaction and passivity.
773
  
 
Where the former definition refers to a mental aspect, cognizance, the latter refers to the physical 
component of inaction. Both elements may be relevant for bystander liability though. If we want 
to apply the notion of bystander to the peacekeeping cases discussed in chapter 2, we will need a 
more specific definition that clearly separates peacekeepers as a third party from the actual parties 
to the conflict. This is where Vetlesen’s notion of ‘bystanders by formal appointment’ is useful. In 
this scenario, the bystanders are ‘professionally engaged as a “third party” to the interaction 
between the two parties directly involved in acts of genocide’.774 Just as peacekeepers are 
instructed to be, these bystanders by appointment will usually take a neutral and impartial stance 
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to the parties involved. This notion of bystander responsibility, where a profession or a certain 
form of control or authority is relevant, distinguishes bystander liability from pure omissions. 
Interestingly, Barlett referred to the specific response of bystanders to the commission of serious 
crimes. He indicated that only two responses to mass killing can be expected from bystanders: ‘to 
join in the fray, or turn their heads the other way’.775 He then continued by holding that 
‘[r]elatively few (...) resist mass killing. The majority will either willingly join in the violence, or 
they will comply, submit, and remain passive when faced by brutality’.776 The impartial stance is 
therefore not likely to be maintained. The confrontation with crimes of this nature and scale will 
likely push bystanders in either the active or inactive group. Either way, a distance with the 
victims is created and the crimes are ‘allowed’ to continue, which means that they could be either 
bystanders or more actively involved in the commission of the crime(s).  
 
Bystanders are usually defined as such, because they had the ability to act or power to intervene. 
Especially if the bystanders were formally appointed, like peacekeepers, this is a realistic option. 
As the next sections point out, the inaction combined with one of the required factors establishes 
this type of liability. The factors required are physical presence, control or authority as part of the 
objective element and a mental element. These factors may give rise to the culpability of the 
bystander as not intervening in the commission of war crimes may be interpreted as a signal of 
approval or encouragement. With that comes the decision to stay inactive, which implies that the 
bystander must have considered the likely consequences of remaining passive. 
 
6.3 Bystander Liability: A Moral Duty to Act 
 
The peacekeeping commander is expected to exercise his profession diligently. Where this may be 
a basis for a legal duty to act, as argued in chapter 3, it could also result in a moral obligation to 
act. Whether this can result in legal responsibility is debatable. However, I argue that the 
responsibility framed as encouragement or tacit approval is arguably based on failing to fulfil a 
moral obligation to act. This does not exclude the option that the inaction facilitated the 
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commission of the crime, which could be considered a positive contribution to the crime. The 
main reason for exploring this alternative rationale for bystander liability is that the jurisprudence 
indicates that bystanders may be held responsible based on a special quality, eg authority. This 
will be more visible on the international level in chapter 7 than on the domestic level however.  
 
Bystander liability may be perceived as a middle-way between liability for omissions and 
command responsibility. The main difference with the legal duty required for omissions is that 
there is no specific legal relationship between the defendant and the victim in this type of 
obligation. One could rather speak of ‘a failure to fill an assumed role’.777 The law is therefore 
unnecessary to establish that duty; neither is this obligation derived from a relationship; it belongs 
to the profession. Take for example the reference made by Chiesa to a decision of the High Court 
of Puerto Rico in which a police officer was held liable as an accomplice to homicide for failing to 
prevent the killing of an innocent person despite having the time to intervene.
778
 Although there is 
an expectation that the police officer should have acted, there was no specific relationship between 
the police officer and the victim in place. Yet, he may be held responsible as a party to the 
commission of homicide. The responsibility would be based on the fact that he ignored the ability 
he had to intervene. If the police officer also fulfils the required mens rea, this could result in 
complicity.
779
 
 
Such a general, moral duty can also be connected to the military commanders. In theory, this could 
result in bystander liability if the commander’s inaction would imply that he approves or 
encourages the commission of a crime by the main perpetrator. Rowe refers to the general duty 
imposed on every soldier and civilian to come to the aid of the civil power to enforce law and 
order when necessary.
780
 This may give rise to an obligation to act on part of the military 
commander when ‘in very exceptional circumstances, a grave and sudden emergency has arisen 
which in the opinion of the commander demands his immediate intervention to protect life and 
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property’.781 The reference to ‘very exceptional circumstances’ may distinguish an obligation to 
prevent ‘any crime’ from the obligation to act when witnessing mass atrocities. We discussed in 
chapter 5 how certain expectations from military commanders in PKOs may be higher than what is 
expected from military commanders in regular warfare, in particular if the operations have a 
civilian protection mandate. Although military commanders are expected to act adequately in 
situations of distress,
782
 also absent a specific instruction, this would be expected even more from 
a peacekeeping commander considering his role as a guardian of the overall security situation. A 
failure to meet a moral obligation may constitute a positive contribution to the crime, if the 
expectation of intervention was so high that the decision not to intervene implies that the 
commander allowed the crime to take place or carelessly accepted the likely consequences of his 
or her inaction. This was also held by the Dutch Court of Appeals in Mustafić & Nuhanović v 
Karremans, Franken & Oosterveen.
783
 One can see how the moral obligation-approach presented 
here may still result in the encouragement or approval that bystander liability is based on in 
theory. The next section sets out the different forms of ‘actus reus’ for bystander liability in 
domestic criminal law. 
 
6.4 Typology of Bystander Liability and the Required Elements 
  
Having clarified the concept of bystander conduct and now we have assessed how a moral 
obligation to act (as distinct from a specific duty) may be connected to the resulting 
encouragement or approval of the commission of the crime, this section considers the elements to 
establish criminal liability for bystander conduct in more detail. In the domestic sphere, this is 
often referred to as moral or psychological aid,
784
 abetting or ‘not distancing oneself from the 
crime’. Each individual approach contains similar elements and aspects. These sub forms of 
bystander liability mainly differ in the effect they have. While morally or psychologically aiding 
and abetting are similar in that they mainly encourage the main perpetrator to commit the crime, 
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‘not distancing oneself from the crime’ contains a positive contribution to the crime.785 As will 
become clearer in this section, the presence is then considered voluntary; in other words, the 
choice to be present creates the will for the crime to happen.  
 
The first type of bystander liability is characterised by the defendant having control or authority 
vis-à-vis the principal.
786
 In most cases, we will see that a court assumes that the inaction signals 
that the defendant approves, encourages or does not oppose the commission of the crime. In case 
of PKOs, not using the control or authority may be based on other rationales like fear, risk 
calculation and other external factors. We will here consider the way bystander liability is 
established in the domestic sphere. This type of liability is considered aiding and abetting the 
commission of the crime, provided that the required elements are fulfilled. Different jurisdictions 
may however apply different requirements; with differing standards for participation in civil and 
common law systems, the outcomes may thus vary.  
 
The next section discusses the main similarities and differences between the two systems. This 
includes, as in chapters 3 and 4, the required actus reus, consisting of encouragement through 
control, authority and presence, and the mens rea required for bystander responsibility as well as 
the degree of liability that results from the interpretation of these elements. Causation is left out of 
the equation, because it is not part of bystander liability as such.
787
 I will take the scenarios in 
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Srebrenica and Kigali as examples to see how the application of the law could affect the potential 
responsibility of the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders. 
 
6.4.1 Actus Reus 
 
In both civil and common law, the presence of the defendant is an important element in 
establishing the actus reus required for bystander liability.
788
 Overall, presence can be interpreted 
in two ways. First, moral support can be seen as approval of the principal perpetrator’s conduct, 
when someone is present while having authority or control over the principal perpetrator of the 
crime committed. This may strengthen the principal in his or her belief that his or her actions are 
approved of or may encourage the defendant while committing the crime.
789
 Second, there is the 
type of support that will require a more tangible physical act. The responsibility is then not just 
based on the moral influence, but also on the effect someone’s presence may have had on the main 
perpetrator. In those cases, authority or control as a complementary factor is not relevant. Instead, 
one should be able to draw the positive act from the defendant’s inactive behaviour. This is for 
example the case if the defendant does not distance him- or herself from the crime or if it can be 
argued that the presence is voluntary. Both notions of actus reus for bystander liability and the 
required elements are discussed below. 
 
6.4.1.1 Presence and Control or Authority as Approval or Encouragement 
 
This first form of bystander liability has been recognised in both civil and common law. Under 
common law, this is the so-called failure to use a certain form of ‘empowerment’. Someone might 
have the power or ability to control something or someone’s behaviour without having the legal 
duty to do so.
790
 It represents the defendant’s ability to act and is therefore close to an omission. 
The lack of a duty to act however distinguishes this type of bystander liability from omission 
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liability. A typical example of this type of bystander liability is the owner of a car who allows a 
friend to drive his car and does not intervene when he or she drives carelessly.
791
 Jurisprudence 
shows that this likely results in abetting the crime or misdemeanour committed by the principal.
792
 
This liability is based on the fact that the owner had the ability to intervene, leading to him or her 
becoming culpable as soon as he or she realised that the driver was driving dangerously. The UK 
Law Commission referred to these situations specifically as ‘failing to exercise an entitlement 
right of authority to prevent or control the actions of [the perpetrator]’.793  
 
A problematic aspect in this type of bystander liability (or the actus reus thereof) is whether actual 
encouragement is required. The landmark case Du cros v Lambourne indicated that the driver of 
the car need not feel encouraged by the other’s lack of intervention.794 It is instead seen as 
allowing the crime to take place,
795
 which in international criminal law would be considered tacit 
approval.
796
 This is not undisputed however as Sullivan held that in these cases failing to exercise 
control should have assisted or encouraged the driver.
797
 Neither the jurisprudence nor the 
literature shows a unitary approach regarding this failure to exercise control and the required 
effect this must have.
798
 The New Zealand Court of Appeal concluded in Witika that a failure to 
intervene in these cases must encourage the principal in committing the crime.
799
 Similarly, in 
Clarkson the mere presence of two soldiers in a room where two of their fellow soldiers raped a 
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woman could not result in liability for abetting rape, because it was not clear that the soldiers who 
stood by actually encouraged the rape.
800
 Military officials can be held responsible on this basis 
under section 47 of the British Armed Forces Act. Section 47 also includes the option to 
criminalise presence if it had an encouraging effect or was intentional.
801
 Canadian law finds the 
effect of the contribution irrelevant, but also bases this type of responsibility on the intent of the 
defendant.
802
 Colvin and Annand indicate that encouragement must have been effective.
803
 While 
the jurisprudence is divided, a majority recognises the actual encouragement requirement. Most 
literature, however, takes the opposite approach.
804
 I argue that actual encouragement cannot be a 
formal requirement, since it is difficult to demonstrate that the defendant encouraged the main 
perpetrator. The influence of the defendant is then hypothetical. It seems realistic to argue that the 
defendant may or could have encouraged the defendant. This can be based on more objective 
factors like the possession of authority or control. That would also be in line with the rationale 
used in civil law systems. 
 
In civil law, reference was made to situations in which the defendant was present and possessed a 
certain level of authority. That someone who might be expected to intervene does not actually 
intervene creates the impression that the defendant allows the main principal to commit the crime 
or approves of that crime being committed. It is therefore considered a form of approval that 
carries additional weight because of that authority.
805
 It is not the absence of intervention despite a 
duty to act that is criminalised, but the expression of agreement and approval that the silent 
presence represents.
806
 This was for example the argument used in two Belgian cases in which a 
father was expected to act against a crime committed by his son and an older defendant was 
expected to stop his younger friend from committing a crime.
807
 Their authority created that 
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expectation to act. Not acting against the commission of these crimes created approval of the 
committed acts. In both cases, the defendants were held responsible as co-perpetrators.
808
 These 
cases were classified as omissions in textbooks on Belgian criminal law.
809
 However, there is no 
indication that there was a clear legal obligation to prevent criminal acts. There is no legal duty 
requiring a parent to prevent criminal acts committed by their children. This was also not the 
argument used by the Court. Instead, the criminality was based on the approving effect that 
contributed substantially to the commission of the crimes.
810
 That the defendant had the power or 
ability to do something, but refrained from doing so, was considered culpable in both scenarios.  
 
The British Armed Forces Act also contains control as a form of authority. In addition to its 
reference to presence as a form of encouragement, section 47 of the British Armed Forces Act also 
refers to liability for inaction while having the ability to exercise control.
811
 I argue here that this is 
not control as the car owner held towards the driver of the car, but that this control refers to the 
authority that is part of the military profession. As such, a military official could be liable for 
inaction based on a failure to exercise his or her authority, which shows strong similarities with 
command responsibility. However, it does not reflect the special nature of the PKO in which a 
peacekeeping commander is deployed, and is therefore less focused on a duty of care. Without 
defining over whom or what the service member ought to have had control, this provision can be 
interpreted as broadly as seems desirable. That this provision does not refer to a specific person or 
group over whom the military official should have exercised authority, distinguishes this 
‘obligation’ from a legal duty that could result in an omission. The generality of the provision 
indicates an increased expectation of the military official to act diligently where he or she could 
have done so. This may include situations in which peacekeeping commanders are able to 
influence a third party from harming people under their care, which would be in line with the idea 
that a military official may have a general moral obligation, as discussed in section 6.3.  
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In assessing how this interpretation of the actus reus could, in arguendo, be applied to the Dutch 
and Belgian commanders, it should thus be established 1) whether their presence could or may 
have encouraged the principals or 2) whether they failed to exercise their ‘entitlement right of 
authority to prevent or control’ while standing by and as such approved of the crimes committed.  
 
In discussing the first option, that the Dutch and Belgian commanders may or could have 
encouraged the commission of crimes, it is important to take into account that the Belgian 
commanders were not actually present during the commission of the crimes. They left before the 
crimes were committed. It follows that the Belgian commanders did not encourage the principal 
perpetrators with their presence, and the authority held by the commanders was not of a nature that 
could amount to encouragement. In Srebrenica, one could argue the same. Although the Dutch 
commanders were present while the men and women were separated, their relationship with the 
BSA was not one that would have resulted in encouragement. Despite their authority over the area 
in which the civilians resided, the relationship was arguably not close enough to influence the 
commanders of the BSA.  
 
In both Kigali and Srebrenica one could argue that leaving the potential victims in the hands of the 
aggressor could be a failure to exercise their ‘entitlement right of authority to prevent or control’ 
which sent out a signal of tacit approval. Although the commanders were not able to control the 
main perpetrators or the means used to commit the crimes, one could argue that the commanders 
held authority regarding the access to the area in which the refugees resided. Giving the aggressors 
access to the victims could be interpreted as facilitating the commission of the crimes that 
followed and arguably as approval of or agreement with the foreseeable fate that awaited the 
refugees. This does not imply that the commanders wanted the crimes to happen, but rather that 
they accepted the likelihood that these crimes would take place. Based on the example of an owner 
of a car who is expected to take over control from a friend who is driving dangerously, one could 
argue that the commanders should have exercised their authority or control over the area under 
their effective control.  
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6.4.1.2 Presence as an Active or Effective Contribution to the Crime 
 
The second type of actus reus for bystander liability is presence that expresses that the defendant 
does not distance him- or herself from the crime. It gives the impression that the choice to be 
present was voluntary and therefore he or she is culpable.
812
 This observation can be used to argue 
that the participant shares the intent of the perpetrator, which could result in co-perpetration rather 
than complicity. It is therefore also relevant to the mens rea which will be discussed in the next 
section. In this scenario, this type of presence can be interpreted as encouragement of the main 
perpetrator to commit the crime.
813
 Presence does not serve as a stand-alone element and a 
conviction will therefore always require other supporting evidence of the defendant’s involvement 
in the commission of the crime.
814
 This additional evidence can be a positive contribution to the 
crime, also considered an ‘effective contribution’. French and German courts have applied this 
effective or active contribution requirement in their judgments.
815
 For the German courts, it is less 
important whether the presence of the defendant influences the mental state of the main 
perpetrator; instead the main issue is whether the defendant’s presence can be considered a 
physical contribution to the commission of the crime.
816
 This is in contrast to the stance taken in 
Canadian law, where the mental aspect is most relevant.
817
  
 
An example of how presence was considered an effective contribution to the commission of an 
offence is the Belgian case Luik 9 April 1992.
818
 A group of young people attacked a man; while 
the group was standing around the victim, some members of this group were actively using 
violence. Others stood by and did nothing. In the opinion of the Court, the bystanders made the 
circle denser, which could be interpreted as encouraging the physical perpetrators in the group and 
was therefore considered an active contribution to the crime. All individuals in the group were 
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convicted as co-perpetrators for the use of violence.
819
 Another example is the German case BGH 
2 StR 84/95.
820
 The German Federal Court stressed here that ‘mere presence at the commission of 
the principal crime cannot in itself establish assistance’821 and requires an ‘active contribution to 
the crime’.822 This is for instance the case if the defendant ‘accompanies the principal perpetrator 
while knowing of his plan to commit the crime, and joins him therein, and his presence reinforces 
the principal perpetrator in his decision to commit the crime and gives him a feeling of increased 
safety’.823 This arguably coincides with the Dutch position that requires a ‘conscious, close and 
comprehensive cooperation’ to establish co-perpetration.824 The Dutch Supreme Court clarified in 
December 2014 the exact distinction between co-perpetration and complicity.
825
 The Court held 
that co-perpetration requires an intellectual or material contribution that carries sufficient weight, 
also defined as a ‘significant or essential contribution’, whereas any less substantial contribution 
can be classified as complicity.
826
  
 
This brings us to the passive presence of the commanders in Srebrenica and Kigali and the 
question how that could be explained in the light of this second interpretation of the actus reus 
element. Although it seems unlikely that the conduct of both the Belgian and the Dutch 
commanders could be classified as such an active contribution to the crime, it cannot be ruled out 
that an objective assessment of the facts would allow this behaviour to be explained in such a way. 
The rationale behind the ‘not distancing’ argument is that the defendant accepts the commission of 
a crime and lets it occur, even if he or she does not agree but does not act against it. That arguably 
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happened in Srebrenica and Kigali. The killings seemed inevitable, and because the commanders 
felt unable to intervene effectively, they let it happen. In the case of Kigali, the commanders 
withdrew their troops. One could point at the Dutch and Belgian commanders being in highly 
complex and difficult situations, which may justify their bystander conduct to some extent. 
However, the defence raised in the case Mukeshimana that the Belgian commanders took 
measures to protect the civilians was considered irrelevant to the conclusion that their conduct was 
culpable.
827
 
 
6.4.2 Mens Rea 
 
Whether the commanders acted culpably by being present during the deportation (Srebrenica) or 
leaving the ETO (Kigali) in the hands of militia also depends on the mental state required for 
bystander responsibility. This section discusses first, the use of a recklessness and/or awareness 
standard in common and civil law and second, the voluntary presence as a way of fulfilling the 
mens rea element. 
 
6.4.2.1 Recklessness and/or Awareness 
 
Something often seen in common law is that the law requires knowledge or intent as the threshold 
for the mental element, but that lower standards may suffice in practice. For example, in English 
law the presence required for aiding and abetting by encouragement (‘bystander liability’) should 
have been aimed at encouraging the commission of the crime,
828
 which means that intent is 
required, but the Law Commission later indicated that this intent may be fulfilled by advertent 
recklessness.
829
 The intent itself is then not relevant to establish liability; instead the probability of 
the consequences occurring and the overall evidence available indicate the defendant’s guilt.830 
This means that the defendant did not have to desire the consequences per se to demonstrate his or 
her intent.
831
 An additional requirement in New Zealand is that the defendant knew of the 
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‘essential matters’ of the principal’s crime.832 Canadian law requires specific intent, which creates 
a high threshold for bystander liability.
833
 
 
Dolus eventualis, or conditional intent, is sufficient to constitute the required intent in Germany, 
the Netherlands and to some extent also in Belgium.
834
 This means it should be demonstrated that 
with his or her conduct the participant accepted the ‘reasonable chance’ that the result would occur 
in the ordinary course of events.
835
 This means that a standard similar to recklessness applies in 
practice. This was for example the mental element applied in Bacchus,
836
 the landmark case in 
Dutch law. Two brothers and their brother-in-law were kicked out of a club, after which the three 
men went to brother Z’s house to get his gun before going back and demanding access to the club 
again. When they were still not allowed entrance to the club, brother F fired shots at the club; as a 
result, two girls were killed. Brother Z was held responsible as a co-perpetrator in the commission 
of homicide, because he did not distance himself from the crime, knowing there was a chance that 
his brother would actually use the gun. With dolus eventualis being sufficient to fulfil the intent 
requirement, the Court argued that Z consciously accepted the considerable chance that his brother 
would use violence to realise their common objective of getting access to the club.
837
 The Court 
concluded that this proved that the defendants intended to kill the victims. It neither explained 
how the brothers fulfilled the required double intent for co-perpetration nor did the Court refer to a 
joint intent that is presumably included in the close and conscious cooperation required for co-
perpetration. 
 
The joint intent requirement was important in the German case BGH 3 StR 398/81.
838
 Here the 
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defendant was held responsible for aiding extortion, despite claiming in his defence that he was 
only silently present. The Court argued that the defendant was indeed quietly sitting alongside his 
co-defendants, but could not establish a joint intent to commit the crime.
839
 It merely found an 
agreement of intent aimed at the result; this led the Court to believe that the defendant, considering 
his limited involvement, intended his assistance to the commission of the crime, but did not intend 
to commit the crime himself.
840
 His silent presence was considered encouragement of the crime of 
extortion.
841
 Distancing himself from the crime or actively intervening in the course of events 
could have avoided that effect from taking place.
842
 In BGH 5 StR 492/90, the defendant was 
however held responsible as a co-perpetrator based on dolus eventualis despite distancing himself 
from the crime.
843
  
 
In contrast, the German Federal Court could not establish assistance on other occasions because 
the required intent was not found. In BGH 3 StR 455, the defendant joined the principal for a ride 
to Düsseldorf.
844
 During the ride, the principal told the defendant that he had cocaine in the back 
of his car. The defendant was obviously not aware that getting in the car with the principal 
perpetrator meant that he would get involved in an illegal drugs transport. He did not have that 
intention; he just needed a ride to Düsseldorf. Therefore, the question of whether the defendant 
aided the principal in his illegal drugs transport was answered negatively by the Court. The only 
aspect that could be considered blameworthy is that he did not force the principal to pull over the 
car when he learned of the true aim of the ride.
845
 It seems likely that the difference between this 
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case and the German extortion case, to which reference is made above,
846
 is that in that case the 
defendant probably was aware of the chance that extortion might be the result. Awareness was 
also the mental element applied in a number of other German and Belgian cases.
847
  
 
One could argue that as soon as the defendant becomes aware of the crime being committed, the 
defendant is expected to act; at least to create a distance between him- or herself and the crime and 
at most to intervene to halt the ongoing events. This was also the argument used by The Hague 
District Court regarding the assistance offered by the Dutch battalion to the BSA in evacuating the 
UN compound.
848
 The Court confirmed that the cooperation with the BSA should have been ended 
when there were clear signs that the men who were escorted to the buses by Dutchbat were at 
serious risk of being killed in a genocide. From the moment that the awareness of that risk arose, 
their assistance could become a positive contribution to the crime committed. 
 
The different interpretations of what is considered culpable and how the troops should have acted 
may be confusing. Not distancing oneself from the crime is considered culpable here, because it 
amounts to passive presence. In chapter 2 however, we considered passive presence as a protective 
measure that could have had a deterrent effect on the main perpetrators of the crime.
849
 One could 
argue that where the defendant had authority or control, merely distancing oneself does not suffice 
to be relieved from culpability. Rather, the defendant would be expected to intervene. This 
particularly applies if the commission of the crime is foreseeable or is ongoing and the defendant 
remains passive. Passive presence as a deterrent mechanism is, despite the reference to 
passiveness, a type of intervention that would be appropriate. The intervention is then passive in 
the sense that using force is unnecessary, but the commander or defendant is expected to verbally 
express disagreement with the foreseeable or ongoing commission of a crime, and/or should 
attempt to discourage the perpetrator from committing the crime. 
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6.4.2.2 Voluntary Presence as Mens Rea 
 
We have just discussed how the awareness or foreseeability of the commission of crimes may 
raise an expectation to act and may create culpability if the defendant refrained from acting. The 
voluntary presence of the defendant is then sometimes considered a choice.
850
 In certain situations 
the choice to be or stay present equals accepting the risk that he or she might be associated with 
the crime.
851
 Technically, a physical component is then used to establish the mental element 
required for this type of liability. Referring back to the example of Genovese, it is clear how the 
lack of intervention may encourage the perpetrator to continue or to go even further in his criminal 
behaviour. Turning a blind eye to what happens or is likely to happen may thus, from a legal 
perspective, create the will for it to happen. This refers back to the statement made by Barlett that 
there is no such thing as impartiality.
852
 Knowing or being aware that a certain result may likely 
occur and refraining from trying to prevent that result from occurring creates the impression that 
the defendant accepts that result. Without being even remotely involved in the commission of the 
crime, this type of inaction may be classified as complicity in the commission of a criminal act.  
 
The question that arises is how voluntary presence can fulfill the mens rea, considering that 
complicity in most civil law countries such as Germany and the Netherlands requires double 
intent.
853
 Double intent means that the participant should have intended both his own contribution 
to the commission of the crime and the commission of the crime itself. In German and Dutch law, 
the intent of the accomplice then follows the intent of the principal, giving him or her the intent 
that belongs to the crime eventually committed by the principal perpetrator.
854
 This is different for 
co-perpetration, where the co-perpetrator is judged based on his or her own intent. For co-
perpetration, the defendant must have wanted the joint perpetration combined with the 
commission of the crime itself.
855
 The double intent requirement establishes a connection between 
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the defendant and the crime committed for both complicity and co-perpetration. 
  
However, as concluded in the previous section, recklessness or dolus eventualis is often used to 
establish the mens rea for bystander liability. This means that the defendant does not have to 
share the principal’s intent. The foreseeability of the result and the acceptance of the risk that the 
criminal result may occur is sufficient to hold that the defendant wanted the result to occur. This 
although it only shows the awareness that a criminal result may follow. In the Danish case 
reported at TFK 2002.164 Ø, the defendant’s passive behaviour (despite having the ability to act) 
was explained as amounting to a ‘prior intention’ to bringing the result about.856 Here, the Court 
blamed the defendant for not foreseeing that his friend would use excessive violence. Although 
the two men cooperated with the aim to steal the victim’s moped, the defendant should have 
known, based on the fact that his friend carried a wheel and a crash helmet with him, that it was 
likely that these items would be used to attack the victim.
857
 One may notice that this is closely 
related to co-perpetration in the German and Dutch system and joint criminal enterprise as 
recognised by the ICTY. However, the defendant was considered an accessory based on the 
rationale that the foreseeability of the result and his ability to act together created the defendant’s 
‘prior intention’.858  
 
Dutch commentators already pointed out that the physical component of co-perpetration is often 
used to explain both the actus reus and the required intent in Dutch law.
859
 That the defendant did 
not distance him- or herself from the crime is then considered sufficient to establish the intent. 
This although the Dutch Supreme Court stressed in a recent explanatory judgment that ‘not 
distancing oneself from the crime’ should not be weighted too heavily in establishing a conviction 
for co-perpetration.
860
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The Dutch Supreme Court attempted to limit the importance of ‘not distancing’ by overturning a 
judgment in which co-perpetration was based on this aspect. The Court of Appeals had argued that 
the defendant did not distance himself, ‘despite having sufficient possibility to do so, for example 
by attempting to prevent his co-defendant from committing the intended robbery or by warning 
the victims or by taking sufficient distance from the scene where the crime would take place at a 
time before the crime took place’.861 Although the Dutch Supreme Court stated that using this 
reasoning to establish co-perpetration was in this case incorrect,
862
 other judgments regarding 
presence at the scene of the crime have also indicated that there may have been an implicit 
obligation to intervene because of the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime and his or her 
ability to act. The only requirement for co-perpetration that is discussed in Dutch case law is the 
conscious, close and comprehensive cooperation, which can be fulfilled tacitly by non-
distancing.
863
  
 
To return to the main point discussed in this section, the mens rea, one can conclude that 
awareness or recklessness seems sufficient to establish liability for both complicity and co-
perpetration for bystanders. The main difference with omission liability is that negligence is 
hardly used as a requirement, despite the important role of the profession and the control and/or 
authority of the defendant. Without a duty to act and a clear physical, objective requirement, one 
would expect a more substantial mental element. It is therefore sensible to use a threshold slightly 
higher than negligence. Bystander liability as such is not part of omission liability, but should be 
recognised as a separate type of liability, as it includes no legal duty to act and applies a higher 
threshold for the mental element. 
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6.5 Degree of Liability 
 
As in chapter 3, the main problem in establishing a fair degree of liability for the defendant is that 
in common law systems there is no differentiation between participants and principal perpetrators 
of crimes, because they will both be held liable for the crime committed. The degree of 
responsibility is then the same in both situations. However, differentiation may still be applied in 
the sentencing stage: the punishment will be lower for an accomplice than for a principal.
864
 
Besides the lower sentence, the stigma imposed on the defendant is still that of being responsible 
for the main offence.
865
 The connection between the defendant and the criminal result is 
established because of the relatively strict adherence in common law to the idea that actual 
encouragement is required for bystander liability. In addition, the double intent requirement for 
participation in civil law countries and New Zealand also justifies the conclusion that the 
participant is held responsible for the result of his or her inaction.
866
 That some countries have 
applied this principle more diligently and others have been reluctant in doing so complicates the 
assessment of the degree of criminal liability applied here.  
 
Remarkable is the conclusion that in most civil law cases the defendant is held responsible as a co-
perpetrator. German law requires at least more objective evidence to be held liable as a co-
perpetrator in the sense of moral support. Still, there seems to be a general tendency to distil the 
culpability either from a factor like authority or from a speculative influence on the commission of 
the crime. The ‘not-distancing’ form of bystander liability in civil law was often based on the idea 
that acceptance of the commission of the crime fulfils both the physical and mental element 
required.  
 
In considering how this could potentially be applied to the Dutch and Belgian commanders, we 
have to consider their special position as military officials, which is likely to influence their 
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criminal responsibility. It has been argued that authority coupled with presence is likely to come 
across as approval of the commission of the crime. Although we have considered examples where 
this may have been the case, I consider it unlikely that this could be the reasoning in assessing the 
Dutch and Belgian commanders’ conduct. It appears reasonable to argue that the Dutch and 
Belgian commanders involuntarily accepted the likely consequences of not-intervening, which 
differs slightly from ‘approving’ of the crimes being committed. Considering that the subjective 
element is less relevant than the objective elements (presence and authority), the lack of intent 
may not be an obstacle to a conviction per se. However, as will become more evident in chapter 7, 
the lack of a clear and predictable application of the law in cases of bystander conduct makes 
liability under these conditions unpredictable and not sufficiently foreseeable for the commanders. 
Also, it is difficult to see how the Dutch and Belgian commanders would be justly connected to 
the crime without adequate evidence supporting that connection. Although acceptance of the 
criminal result arguably creates that connection, how that connection is established has not been 
sufficiently supported in the cases dealing with bystander liability. 
 
6.6 Comparative Perspective and Concluding Remarks 
 
A few remarks can be made regarding the similarities and differences in common law on the one 
hand and civil law on the other hand. The first noticeable conclusion is that under civil law most 
situations of bystander responsibility will result in liability for co-perpetration rather than 
complicity. This is based on the argument that the inaction constituted a positive contribution to 
the crime, often sufficient to argue that the defendants jointly perpetrated the crime. Yet, in 
common law the lack of differentiation makes the defendant responsible for the result, regardless 
of which ‘label’ is used.867 Additionally, both systems have applied a relatively low threshold for 
the mental element: recklessness or awareness. This although the civil law countries under review 
require double intent, for which dolus eventualis suffices in most instances.  
 
The second observation is that common law uses ‘control’ as factor to establish encouragement, 
where civil law applies ‘authority’ as an equivalent. The initial concept is however the same. The 
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control or authority will also have an encouraging effect, although the conviction often rests on the 
theory that it might have encouraged the principal. Another form of actus reus applied was 
interpreting presence as a voluntary choice as opposed to distancing oneself from the crime. 
Therefore, presence would be considered blameworthy. Most convictions for bystander conduct in 
civil law have been based on the latter form where the presence as such was said to be a voluntary 
choice which creates the will for the crime to be committed. In common law, convictions for 
bystander liability were mostly based on the reasoning that the defendant encouraged the 
perpetrator in committing the crime. In the civil notion of bystander liability, an objective 
contribution to the crime is then required. These objective contributions were however not always 
sufficiently demonstrated. 
 
The presence of military commanders during the commission of a crime can be considered more 
culpable compared to people who do not fulfil such a public function. This combines the rationale 
presented in the beginning that bystander liability focuses on the effect of someone’s presence, 
with the moral obligation to act that this creates because of the authority held by the defendant. 
This moral obligation may be stronger if it concerns a peacekeeping commander who has been 
assigned protective tasks. To some extent, these protective tasks may be derived from the 
authority that comes with the commander's profession. But, as discussed in chapter 5, the UNSC 
mandate may also create the expectation that the peacekeeping commanders carry out such tasks. 
In addition, an expectation of protection may be created by the obligations of the TCC under 
international law. The peremptory norms of IHRL apply in all types of PKOs, but establish no 
legal duty to act on part of the peacekeeping commanders but rather on their TCC. These 
obligations can only be fulfilled through their state agents, who are the main point of contact for 
the civilian population. In both domestic systems failing to fulfil such a ‘moral obligation’ may 
then result in direct responsibility for the result: in civil law, because it is evident from the 
jurisprudence that acceptance or approval of the crime being committed follows from the presence 
of the defendant, which is sufficient to consider the defendant a co-perpetrator; in common law 
because the accomplice had an encouraging effect on the principal, which is sufficient to consider 
him or her a party to the main offence committed.  
 
In the cases of the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders however, the facts do not 
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demonstrate to a satisfactory extent that the commanders either approved of the crime taking place 
or accepted it by their presence. This was the result of the incompetency of the commanders to act 
against the crimes likely to be committed. Due to a lack of a relationship between the commanders 
and the aggressors it also appears unlikely that they encouraged the main perpetrators with their 
inaction. Where the defendant had authority or an ‘entitlement of control’ , one could speak of a 
moral duty to act, because the effect of the inaction was distilled from the element of authority, 
control or capacity. It could be argued that the peacekeeping commanders should have used their 
authority over the compounds where the refugees resided to keep the aggressors away from their 
potential victims. This does not necessarily establish a positive effect, but could simply be 
considered a moral duty to act. Failing to fulfil such a moral obligation would be punished too 
severely by the mode of liability discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Bystander Conduct in International Law: “aiding and abetting 
through tacit approval or encouragement” 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
While on the domestic level the bystander position of the Dutch and Belgian commanders was 
explained by drawing a parallel with a police officer, the possibility of holding peacekeeping 
commanders responsible as bystanders in the international context will be easier to picture. On the 
international level, aiding and abetting through tacit approval or encouragement has been used 
rather frequently in conjunction with command responsibility. For obvious reasons, the two 
approaches are linked through the authority required and the element of inactive conduct. This 
type of bystander responsibility is however considered a mode of liability and therefore has to 
fulfil the requirements for aiding and abetting as briefly touched upon in chapter 4.
868
 In addition, 
the elements that result in tacit approval or encouragement need to be fulfilled. Combining the 
specific requirements for bystander liability with the requirements for aiding and abetting means 
that to constitute aiding and abetting by moral support or encouragement the defendant should 
have been present while being in a position of authority (actus reus), this must have had a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime,
869
 but requires no causal relationship between 
the assistance and the crime committed.
870
 In the following sections, we will discuss these 
elements in more detail. 
 
7.2 Actus Reus 
 
7.2.1 Authority 
 
The authority of the defendant as part of the actus reus of aiding and abetting by encouragement 
or tacit approval seems more dominant in international law than in the domestic law reviewed. 
This could be explained by the fact that the international judgments deal almost exclusively with 
alleged war criminals who have a certain level of authority over others. That authority affects the 
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commission of crimes comes from the Einsatzgruppen case
871
 in which the defendant Captain 
Felix Ruehl’s authority was considered too low to be of influence on the commission of crimes: 
‘Ruehl’s position (…) was not such as to “control, prevent, or modify” those activities. His low 
rank failed to “place him automatically into a position where his lack of objection in any way 
contributed to the success of any executive operation”’.872 The concept of authority as such, is 
however vague if there is no tangible yardstick to measure authority. The ICTY Trial Chamber 
confirmed in Furundžija873 that ‘the supporter must be of a certain status for [presence] to be 
sufficient for criminal responsibility’,874 but in Akayesu the ICTR Trial Chamber failed to 
elaborate on the exact requirements for authority. The Trial Chamber held that  
 
the Accused, having had reason to know that sexual violence was occurring, aided and abetted the 
following acts of sexual violence, by allowing them to take place on or near the premises of the 
bureau communal and by facilitating the commission of such sexual violence through his words of 
encouragement in other acts of sexual violence which, by virtue of his authority, sent a clear 
signal of official tolerance for sexual violence, without which these acts would not have taken 
place: [. . .]
875
 
 
That the authority held by the Dutch and Belgian commanders was substantial, was recognised as 
such by the Dutch and Belgian courts.
876
 Given that there is no clarity as to the level of authority 
required to have an effect on the commission of the crime, it is difficult to determine whether the 
authority held by peacekeeping commanders may have been sufficient. The SCSL Appeals 
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Chamber reasoned as follows in Gbao regarding the level of authority required:  
 
Gbao’s position of authority was a factor in the Trial Chamber’s determination that he tacitly 
approved Kallon’s assault on Jaganathan and thereby aided and abetted Kallon’s conduct, however 
the Trial Chamber did not, and need not have, relied upon findings that he was “the senior RUF 
commander” (i.e., as Gbao states, the most senior RUF commander) with “the largest number of 
fighters” at the Makump DDR camp in order to find that his conduct amounted to aiding and 
abetting.
877
 
 
At this point therefore, it is not clear what the exact level of power or authority should be to exert 
influence. Although a ‘more senior position is not required to exert influence’, it may serve as an 
aggravating circumstance in addition to the responsibility for aiding and abetting. This was the 
case in both Prosecutor v Krnojelac and Prosecutor v Aleksovski. The ICTY Trial Chamber 
reasoned in Krnojelac as follows: 
 
The Trial Chamber considers that the Accused’s aiding and abetting of the cruel treatment and 
persecution of the detainees is aggravated by the fact that he held the most senior position in the 
KP Dom. This is a case in which the Accused chose to bury his head in the sand and to ignore the 
responsibilities and the power which he had as warden of the KP Dom to improve the situation of 
the non-Serb detainees. The sentence in this case must make it clear to others who (like the 
Accused) seek to avoid the responsibilities of command which accompany the position which they 
have accepted that their failure to carry out those responsibilities will still be punished. The extent 
of that aggravation in the present case must nevertheless be tempered to at least some extent by two 
possibly countervailing factors.
878
 
 
The ICTY Trial Chamber refers implicitly to the concept of wilful blindness as the culpable factor 
combined with the defendant’s senior position in the chain of command. This judgment does not 
clarify entirely whether ‘responsibilities of command’ should be interpreted as having a duty to 
act, but this duty is not explicitly mentioned here, as the Chambers usually do in other cases if 
appropriate. Also in relation to Krnojelac’ inability to exercise his authority, the Trial Chamber 
argued that this does not mitigate his responsibility, since he ‘voluntarily accepted this position of 
authority’.879 This judgment also limited Krnojelac’ responsibility to liability for crimes 
committed in the geographical area in which he exercised that level of authority, namely the KP 
Dom. Aleksovski however demonstrated that this is not necessarily restricted to crimes committed 
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within that area, as the ICTY Trial Chamber considered Aleksovski’s involvement in crimes 
committed outside of the prison territory.
880
 The Trial Chamber argued that 
 
the accused contributed substantially to the practice being pursued by not ordering the guards over 
whom he had authority to deny entrance to HVO soldiers coming to get detainees and by 
participating, be it on an on-and-off basis, in picking out detainees. Likewise, by his attitude 
towards Witness Novalic and his passive presence when the detainees were taken away to serve as 
human shields, he manifested his approval of this practice and contributed substantially to the 
commission of the crime.
881
 
 
This argument did not lead to a conviction as the Trial Chamber failed to establish that Aleksovski 
participated directly in the mistreatment of detainees. This was in contrast with the Furundžija and 
Akayesu judgments that never required direct participation.
882
 The Appeals Chamber overturned 
the Trial Chamber’s ruling on this count and considered that ‘insufficient weight [was given] to 
the gravity of the conduct of the Appellant and [the Chamber] fail[ed] to treat his position as 
commander as an aggravating feature in relation to his responsibility under Article 7(1) of the 
ICTY Statute’.883 The Appeals Chamber held that the Appellant aided and abetted the 
mistreatment by HVO soldiers of detainees outside the prison compound, and therefore can be 
held criminally responsible under article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.
884
 It is clear from this judgment 
that the Appeals Chamber considered the contribution of the commander grave, partly because of 
his position of authority. That seemed to outweigh other considerations, like whether his authority 
was still perceived as such outside of the compound.  
 
The main aspect these cases lack is a detailed explanation of how the commanders actually 
encouraged or influenced the principal in committing the crime. Where ‘presence’ was an 
important element in the domestic law under review, the notion of presence has not been 
interpreted strictly in the cases under review; instead, authority was the main consideration on 
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which the conviction for bystander responsibility was based. As a result, I argue that according to 
current practice, the fact that someone fulfilled an authoritative position is often sufficient to 
consider that person responsible for the crimes committed. These cases have so far not 
demonstrated what factors limit this type of responsibility, as both presence at the scene of the 
crime and authority are objective factors. That the requirement of presence was interpreted in a 
rather liberal manner also means that this need not be interpreted strictly in the peacekeeping cases 
under review. In the context of Srebrenica, the fact that part of the killings was committed outside 
the immediate area under Dutch control, does not necessarily relieve the commanders from 
responsibility. The same can be held regarding the Belgian commanders in Kigali who had left by 
the time that the killings actually took place. The required level of subordination between the 
commanders and the perpetrators and the establishment of the required mental element may be 
factors that could limit the suitability of bystander responsibility for our peacekeeping cases. 
 
7.2.2 Authority: Subordination 
 
It is important to establish whether the relationship between the defendant and the principal 
perpetrator should be a relationship of subordination in order to aid and abet a crime as bystander. 
In Prosecutor v Perišić, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that in cases of moral encouragement, the 
defendant usually ‘held a position of authority over the principal perpetrator and was present at the 
scene of the crime’.885 This is however not a requirement, as other judgments have demonstrated. 
The ICTR Appeals Chamber held in Muhimana that ‘[f]or an accused to be convicted of abetting 
an offence, it is not necessary to prove that he had authority over the principal perpetrator’.886 
More recently, the SCSL Appeals Chamber elaborated on this point of view in its Gbao judgment: 
 
Gbao’s argument that he did not possess the requisite superior authority or effective control over 
Kallon and Kallon’s men is misconstrued. In the context of aiding and abetting by tacit approval 
and encouragement, the aider and abettor need not be a “superior authority” or have “effective 
control” over the principal perpetrator. Rather, cases typically involve an accused who holds a 
position of authority and is physically present at the scene of the crime, such that his 
nonintervention provides tacit encouragement to the principal perpetrator. As a Trial Chamber of 
the ICTY has put it, ‘an approving spectator who is held in such respect by the other perpetrators 
that his presence encourages them in their conduct, may be guilty of complicity’. It may be that, in 
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practice, the aider and abettor will be superior to, or have control over, the principal perpetrator; 
however, this is not a condition required by law.
887
 
 
That a relationship of subordination is not required was also confirmed in the Bisengimana trial 
judgment
888
 which specified that aiding and abetting can take place through encouragement (’a 
significant encouraging effect’) ‘particularly if the individual standing by was the superior of the 
principal offender or was otherwise in a position of authority’ and had a decisive effect on the 
crime.
889
 Authority can thus be defined in a broad sense; there is no requirement of a strict 
superior-subordinate relationship. In the Brđanin trial judgment, which is also considered an 
authority on this matter, the Court focused on the ‘public attitude’ of the defendant: 
 
There is also ample evidence that throughout the entire period when the Accused was President of 
the ARK Crisis Staff, not only did the Accused not take a stand either in public or at the meetings 
of the ARK Crisis Staff but that he adopted a laissez-faire attitude. In the light of his position as the 
President of the ARK Crisis Staff, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his 
inactivity as well as his public attitude with respect to the camps and detention facilities constituted 
encouragement and moral support to the members of the army and the police to continue running 
these camps and detention facilities in the way described to the Trial Chamber throughout the 
trial.
890
 
 
It seems fair to argue that there are no strict requirements for this type of aiding and abetting. The 
requirements set are open to a relatively wide interpretation, since the authority is not limited to a 
relationship of subordination or control. In a number of cases, presence at the exact location of the 
crime was not even required to establish aiding and abetting by encouragement.
891
 By considering 
presence to be an element that needs to be interpreted ‘against the background of the factual 
circumstances’892 there is scope for a broad interpretation of what someone’s presence means for 
the commission of the crime and how this needs to be assessed. 
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7.2.3 Actus Reus: How do Authority and Presence Result in Encouragement or Approval? 
 
Due to the lack of strict requirements regarding this specific type of aiding and abetting, authority 
can arguably be seen as a contextual factor,
893
 as the Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeals Chamber 
made clear by referring explicitly to ‘the Accused’s failure to oppose the killing’ which it held 
‘constituted a form of tacit encouragement in light of his position of authority’.894 The inaction 
equals not using the opportunity to intervene, which is similar to an omission, except for the fact 
that it does not require having the legal duty to do so. The authority is used to implicitly 
demonstrate the defendant’s contribution to the crime. Authority thus becomes the foundation of 
the liability imposed on the commander. This would be different if the judgment had elaborated on 
how the principal was encouraged by the defendant’s presence.  
 
In other cases, however, the Court expressed more clearly how silent presence may have a positive 
effect on the commission of the crime, as in Kalimanzira where ‘sous-préfet Ntawukulilyayo 
instructed the refugees to move to Kabuye hill, promising them protection. [As] Kalimanzira stood 
next to the sous-préfet, saying nothing, he showed his tacit approval, lending credibility and 
authority to the sous-préfet’s assurances of safety’.895 In Ndahminana the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
also based aiding and abetting the crime of genocide and extermination on tacit approval.
896
 
Besides pointing Ndahimana at his authority, the Court also held that ‘Ndahimana’s attendance at 
meetings held prior to 16 April 1994 ‘conveyed the impression of him as an “approving spectator” 
and that Ndahimana could not have ignored that the fact that he did not openly object to the 
killings would likely be considered as tacit approval of the attacks’.897 The Court’s explanation 
shows that the notion of approval relies primarily on two factors: the defendant is present and he 
has authority. Besides ‘not openly objecting to the killings’, there is no reason to conclude that 
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Ndahimana contributed to the crime in an active manner. It is thus similar to the notion of ‘not 
distancing oneself from the crime’ which was used to explain that this is similar to accepting the 
criminal consequences, which creates the will for those consequences to occur. It could however 
be argued that in the domestic notion of ‘not distancing’ the defendant at least agreed to undertake 
criminal conduct with the principal perpetrator, whereas being near the commission of any of the 
core crimes as a military commander does not require such agreement per se. 
 
7.2.4 Actus Reus of Aiding and Abetting: Substantial Contribution 
 
The analysis so far shows there is a lack of strict requirements regarding this mode of liability. 
Only the general elements for aiding and abetting could provide limitations to the factors of 
‘presence’ and ‘authority’. The question of whether the defendant has contributed substantially to 
the crime is important in that light, which will also give insights into the connection between the 
defendant and the crimes committed.
898
 In chapter 4 we have discussed the substantial 
contribution requirement in relation to omissions. The requirement may be applied differently if it 
concerns a positive contribution to the commission of a crime. The rationale used in Furundžija 
was that ‘facilitation’ should be the threshold for aiding and abetting, which does not require ‘the 
conduct of the aider and abettor to cause the commission of the crime’.899 This was furthermore 
confirmed by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Milutinović and others: 
 
Although the practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support provided by the accused must 
have a substantial effect upon the commission of the crime or underlying offence, the Prosecution 
need not prove that the crime or underlying offence would not have been perpetrated but for the 
accused’s contribution.900 
 
It is clear that the conduct need not be a conditio sine que non for the crime to have been 
committed. If we take the defendant’s presence out of the causal chain, the result may still occur.  
 
The exact meaning of the substantial contribution required in this context is difficult to define 
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since the jurisprudence shows that different terms have been used to define the contribution 
required. In Furundžija the ICTY Trial Chamber held that: 
 
the relationship between the acts of the accomplice and of the principal must be such that the acts 
of the accomplice make a significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by the 
principal. Having a role in a system without influence would not be enough to attract criminal 
responsibility.
901
 
 
It follows that the Court requires that a contribution made a ‘significant difference’ but that it 
should not have been essential for the result to occur. It was confirmed that causation is not 
required to constitute this type of aiding and abetting. These two factors seem difficult to reconcile 
with one another. The lack of a causation requirement is sensible on the one hand as causation 
would connect the defendant to a crime to which he or she was little more than a silent witness, 
yet it is difficult to perceive how a substantial contribution that made a significant difference is not 
causal to the crime itself. Although it is in line with the idea that aiders and abettors are generally 
considered less culpable than the principal perpetrators, it should be kept in mind that not 
requiring causation lowers the threshold for liability considerably.  
 
The question that arises is how passive behaviour can have a substantial or significant effect 
without being essential for the crime to be committed. A good example of a case in which this 
assessment was made is the SCSL’s Gbao Appeal judgment. Augustine Gbao was a former police 
officer and commander of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.
902
 Gbao ’s 
remote presence from the scene of the crime was considered to have a substantially contributing 
effect on the commission of the crime. The Chamber noted that Gbao was outside of the prison 
camp when the crimes within the camp took place. The Trial Chamber had established that his 
culpable behaviour consisted of being a passive bystander and that Gbao took up arms while being 
away from the camp. The principal perpetrator was in the camp and he did not seem to know that 
Gbao took up arms. The question posed by the Appeals Chamber was ‘whether Gbao’s presence 
outside the camp can be said to have had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime’.903 
The Appeals Chamber took the view that ‘it is within the discretion of a reasonable trier of fact to 
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hold that such presence did have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the offence’.904 
Although the Court referred to ‘presence’ as creating the substantial effect, the Court fails to 
explain how the presence contributed significantly to the commission of the crime. It seems 
unreasonable for the Court to assume that Gbao’s presence outside the camp would have 
encouraged the main perpetrators in the camp. As long as the defendant was aware of the possible 
effect of his presence on the commission of the crime, liability for aiding and abetting may be 
incurred by the defendant. The defendant is then linked to the result without the actus reus 
supporting that satisfactorily. 
 
It is also worth noting here that the specific direction requirement, discussed in chapter 4,
905
 could 
increase the barrier for this type of responsibility. This was for example applied in Ndahimana. 
Here, the ICTR Appeals Chamber required specific direction and a substantial effect to constitute 
aiding and abetting by encouragement and/or tacit approval.
906
 An interesting parallel can be 
drawn between Prosecutor v Ndahimana and the cases of the Dutch and Belgian commanders. In 
this case, an estimated group of 1000-2000 Tutsi’s from the Kivumu community sought refuge at 
Nyange parish while facing genocide. As the mayor of this community, Ndahimana was present 
while the people in the parish were killed in the course of ten days. The Appeals Chamber 
observed that the Trial Chamber ‘relied on the authority [Ndahimana] exerted, his prior conduct, 
and the fact that he did not openly object to the killings’.907 Ndahimana was eventually charged 
with genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity.
908
 Regarding the contribution of 
Ndahimana to the commission of the crime, the Court confirmed once more that proof of a cause-
effect relationship was not required.
909
 Obviously, the relationship between Ndahimana as a 
political figure and the population differs from the relationship between peacekeeping 
commanders and the civilians under their care. In both situations, however, a type of moral 
responsibility expects them to act, even though this is framed as a direct contribution to the 
commission of the crime. 
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7.3 Mens Rea 
 
The mental element is one of the most uncertain aspects of aiding and abetting by presence. As 
was also visible in the review of domestic law regarding bystander liability, presence is not 
necessarily an indication of wanting the crime to happen, but might still be interpreted as such. 
Given the vague interpretation of the objective elements required for bystander liability, a clear 
and preferably higher threshold for the mental element is necessary to avoid a claim that this type 
of liability amounts to vicarious liability. The mens rea in Furundžija, our starting point, was 
described as knowledge that the defendant’s actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission 
of the crime.
910
 It is unnecessary to share the intent of the perpetrator or to contribute with the 
purpose of committing the crime.
911
 In other judgments, it was held that, in addition, the defendant 
should be aware of the essential elements of the crime.
912
  
 
The specific mens rea applicable to bystander liability relies, just like the actus reus, strongly on 
the presence of the defendant. Not distancing oneself from the crime after becoming aware of the 
crime being committed will eventually lead to the same result as active participation in the 
commission of the crime: the crime will be committed anyway. The only way to avoid this is to 
actively intervene after becoming aware of the crime about to be committed. It can therefore be 
argued that, as soon as the awareness arises, the defendant is required to make a conscious 
decision to either a) witness a crime if not actively contributing to it; or b) make efforts that could 
halt the commission of the crime. Being present while being aware of the crimes (likely to be) 
committed may be interpreted as the defendant’s choice to be present, as Prosecutor v Mpambara 
also confirmed.
913
 The ICTR Trial Chamber held that ‘by choosing to be present, the accused is 
taking a positive step which may contribute to the crime. Properly understood, criminal 
responsibility is derived not from the inaction alone, but from the inaction combined with the 
choice to be present’.914 It follows that the mental state of the defendant may provide evidence for 
                                                          
910
 Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 476) para 245. 
911
 Ibid para 274. 
912
 Aleksovski (Appeal Judgment) (n 503) para 162; Vasiljević (Trial Judgment) (n 522) para 71; Lukić & Lukić 
(Appeal judgment) (n 592) para 426. 
913
 Mpambara (Trial Judgment) (n 483) para 22. 
914
 Ibid. 
208 
 
the commission of a positive act.
915
 It links the presence of the defendant to the crime committed, 
arguably creating a connection between the defendant and the crime through the mental element.  
 
Interestingly, it is not just ‘presence’ that plays an important role in both the actus reus and the 
mens rea of bystander liability. Authority has also been mentioned in both contexts. The ICTR 
Trial Chamber in Bisengimana held that ‘if the aider and abettor is in a position of authority, his 
mens rea may be deduced from the fact that he knew his presence would be interpreted as a sign of 
support or encouragement’.916 Although this refers to knowledge of the likely effect of the 
defendant’s presence, the authority is mentioned as a conditional element. Different from the 
regular approach to aiding and abetting is that requiring knowledge that the presence combined 
with authority may be perceived as support or encouragement does not necessarily equate with 
knowing that one assists or facilitates the commission of the crime. The latter might be one step 
further.  
 
The connection to the crime was however made in Boškoski & Tarčulovski, in which the ICTY 
Trial Chamber referred to the required mens rea as ‘knowledge that, by his or her conduct, the 
aider and abettor is assisting or facilitating the commission of the offence, a knowledge which 
need not have been explicitly expressed and may be inferred from all the relevant 
circumstances’.917 The latter part of this citation is however rather vague. It implies there is 
judicial discretion regarding the interpretation of what actually constitutes knowledge that one’s 
conduct facilitates or encourages the commission of the crime. Again, this provides no clear 
definition of how such knowledge can be established. That would arguably allow the inference of 
the mens rea from being present silently, without establishing clear guidelines as to how this 
knowledge should be demonstrated.  
 
In Ndahimana, the ICTR Trial Chamber actually adopted the approach taken in Boškoski & 
Tarčulovski by inferring the mens rea from the circumstances. In reasoning why Ndahimana’s 
presence amounted to blameworthy conduct, the ICTR Trial Chamber argued that Ndahimana 
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‘could not have ignored nor been ignorant’ of the fact that the main perpetrators intended to 
commit genocide.
918
 In doing so, the Trial Chamber inferred Ndahimana’s mens rea from the 
factual circumstances. It applied an objective approach to the mental element; an approach 
considerably more objective than usually required for aiding and abetting. This was also the 
conclusion regarding the knowledge of the Belgian commanders in Mukeshimana.
919
 The Brussels 
District Court held that the Belgian commanders could not have been ‘ignorant of’ the crimes’ that 
were (about to be) committed.
920
 In both Ndahimana and the case of the Belgian commanders, this 
is arguably undesirable as it appeared difficult to establish the culpable contribution of the 
defendants beyond reasonable doubt. Considering the parallel between the peacekeeping cases and 
Ndahimana, it would have been desirable to establish clear culpability regarding the required 
knowledge that genocide was about to be committed. ‘Could not have ignored’ implies that it 
could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances that the third party had an intention to 
commit genocide, and this should or must have been clear to the defendant. This is similar to the 
negligence standard used for command responsibility and omission liability. It once again points 
out how closely related omission liability, command responsibility and bystander liability are.  
 
The ICTR Trial Chamber confirmed moreover that ‘the accused’s presence is circumstantial 
evidence that can be taken into consideration to establish the mens rea of the approving 
spectator’.921 This supports my argument that both the mens rea and the actus reus are derived 
from objective circumstances. Ndahimana’s mens rea is not based on his actual mental state, but is 
established using an objective approach to determine his mens rea. This was also the approach 
used in Altfuldisch
922
 and is therefore also referred to as the ‘Altfuldisch approach’.923  
 
That the ad hoc courts have not been able to develop a unitary approach to the mental element 
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required for this specific type of liability was also clear in Brima and others.
924
 The SCSL Trial 
Chamber constructed Brima’s mens rea as follows: 
 
Brima’s presence at the scene gave moral support which had a substantial effect on the perpetration 
of the crime. In addition, given the systematic pattern of crimes committed by the AFRC troops 
throughout the District, the [Trial Chamber] is satisfied that the Accused Brima was aware of the 
substantial likelihood that his presence would assist the commission of the crime by the 
perpetrators.
925
  
 
The ‘awareness of the substantial likelihood that…’ is the mens rea used for ordering, instigating 
and planning the commission of a crime, which is a more direct contribution to the crime than 
aiding and abetting by presence is. This, again, is a low threshold to establish aiding and abetting; 
considerably lower than the usually required knowledge. The defendant’s desire to see the crimes 
take place is relatively strong if he orders, instigates or plans the commission of the crime. The 
defendant is then not just liable for accepting the crime to take place, but for clearly wanting the 
commission of the crime.
926
 The SCSL Appeals Chamber adopted the same approach in its Gbao 
judgement by referring to the ‘awareness of the substantial likelihood that his acts would assist the 
perpetrator in committing a crime’ as the minimum threshold for the mens rea.927 The Court thus 
considers it sufficient that the defendant accepts the risk that the defendant’s contribution may 
affect the commission of the crime. This is similar to recklessness, or dolus eventualis, and is a 
threshold lower than actual knowledge.
928
  
 
Another aspect that makes the mental element for aiding and abetting wide in scope is the 
approach adopted in Brđanin that ‘it is not necessary that the aider and abettor had knowledge of 
the precise crime that was intended and which was actually committed, as long as he was aware 
that one of a number of crimes would probably be committed, including the one actually 
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committed’.929 Again, this substantially widens the scope of this element and lowers the bar for 
aiding and abetting a crime. If the contribution was essential, this mens rea could under the Rome 
Statute (article 25(3) of the RS) even be sufficient to hold someone responsible as a co-
perpetrator.
930
  
 
Having established here that the mental element required for bystander liability is considerably 
low, similar to a negligence or recklessness standard, the question arises as to what explains the 
use of this low threshold. It is likely that the courts have weighted the authoritative position of the 
defendant as an important factor in their judgement. The lower threshold for the mens rea, similar 
to command responsibility, reflects that diligent conduct is expected from the commander. I 
referred to this earlier as a moral duty to act in section 6.3. This is arguably an aspect that 
command, bystander and omission liability have in common. Where this is less reflected on the 
domestic level, the international level demonstrates this because it mostly deals with the 
responsibility of public officials who have a certain level of authority.  
 
An objective standard is thus applied to demonstrate that more is expected from the commanders, 
but also to ensure that the commander’s conduct is assessed based on what was considered 
reasonable in the circumstances. That could explain the focus on the circumstantial factors. 
Without neither a clear contribution requirement nor a clear mens rea requirement, presence and 
authority as objective factors are most relevant in establishing bystander liability. If the presence is 
used to demonstrate that the commander wanted, agreed with or accepted the commission of the 
crime, a connection (albeit not causal) with the crime is established based on these factors. 
 
7.4 Degree of Liability 
 
Although there is no causation-requirement for bystander liability, the mental state of the 
perpetrator cannot be influenced by the defendant if there was not some kind of relationship 
between the defendant and the principal or between the defendant and the commission of the 
crime. In most judgments under review, authority and presence arguably established such a 
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connection between the defendant and the commission of the crime. If so, this also imposes a 
relatively high degree of responsibility to the defendant for what can objectively be defined as 
inaction. On the international level a moral obligation to act is arguably derived from the 
defendant’s authority. This is strengthened by the idea that inaction combined with authority and 
awareness of the crimes taking place is considered acceptance of the likely consequences. That 
acceptance, or sometimes even the will that these crimes are committed, connects the defendant to 
the overall crime(s) committed. As such, this does not create the alleviated degree of liability that 
one expects if the defendant was a bystander to the commission of the crime(s).  
 
Besides the fact that the inaction may encourage the principal perpetrator or suggest approval of 
the main perpetrator’s conduct, it is also likely that not intervening while this could be expected 
from the defendant, simply takes away an obstacle for the principal perpetrator in the commission 
of the crime(s). As such, the bystander facilitates the commission of the offence, which coupled 
with acceptance of foreseeable consequences may prove sufficient to incur liability by the 
defendant. The tendency to establish the mens rea for bystander responsibility using a relatively 
low standard furthermore stresses the importance of the superior position of the commander in 
establishing this responsibility. The combination of this low threshold for the mental element and 
the use of objective, circumstantial factors to fulfil the actus reus could facilitate a conviction of 
military commanders in PKOs who stand idly by while crimes are likely to be committed. It is not 
inconceivable that this could hypothetically place the Dutch and Belgian commanders in a position 
in which they may incur liability for their inaction.  
 
The commanders, however, cannot expect this low standard for the mental element to be used, as 
the law requires a subjective standard such as intent or knowledge. This means that applying 
bystander liability to the cases of the Dutch and Belgian commanders would be problematic, given 
the principle of legality that requires the law to be predictable and insightful to its subjects. In 
addition, it is debatable whether the commander would be held liable for his or her personal 
conduct if the inaction is connected to the criminal result. Only if encouragement or approval of 
the crimes would be realistic, this could be a justifiable conclusion. We already considered that 
this is not likely in the Dutch and Belgian cases under review. Whether involuntary acceptance by 
the Dutch and Belgian commanders of the crimes committed justifies liability for that result is 
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highly questionable. 
 
7.5 Comparative Perspective and Concluding Remarks 
 
In both domestic and international law, it has been accepted that the presence of someone in 
authority may have an approving or encouraging effect on the commission of the crime. In 
international law, it was more evident that, although tying it to the approving or encouraging effect 
on the principal, the commander’s authority creates an expectation of action and is a sufficient 
basis for the conclusion that the commander accepted or wanted the consequences of his or her 
inaction. In the case of the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders, this acceptance would 
most likely be involuntary and the suitability of this type of liability for the cases central to this 
thesis is questionable. Conclusions that the inaction had an encouraging effect on the principal 
perpetrator were often poorly argued. After all, when is it evident that someone’s inaction may 
have encouraged the principal? I therefore observed that conclusions regarding the liability of 
bystanders have the authority as a stable and less speculative element in common. In domestic law 
however, the majority of cases dealt with responsibility for encouragement in which authority was 
not always relevant, but either a factor of control was important or a volitional element was 
inferred from the defendant’s presence. This is related to the idea that someone who is present and 
aware of the intentions of the principal is effectively consenting the commission of the crime. On 
both the domestic and the international level it became apparent that awareness of the likely 
consequences may suffice.  
 
In the civil law systems under review, the will expressed through the presence of the defendant 
was often criminalised as co-perpetration; a relatively high degree of responsibility for a 
contribution that merely consists of passive behaviour. In both scenarios, with or without 
authority, the rationale seems to be that someone who is present at the scene, combined with 
awareness of the crimes about to be committed, and had an ability to act, had a moral obligation to 
act. It is controversial that this may lead to criminal responsibility, which is why some domestic 
systems require an active contribution to the crime such as encouragement or approval. 
 
Both omission and bystander liability can be seen as modes of liability in which the objective part 
214 
 
of the defendant’s behaviour (duty+failure to act, presence+authority) is crucial. For both 
omission and bystander liability the mental state of the defendant is difficult to determine; 
therefore, these modes of liability should normally not generate a high degree of criminal 
liability. But somehow they do, as was also brought forward in the submissions to Prosecutor v 
Kenyatta and others: ‘Crimes committed in this way have attracted substantial sentences at the ad 
hoc tribunals, belying the claim that crimes committed in this way are inherently of low 
gravity’.931 The main idea behind these types of liability seems to be that an authoritative position 
or an element of control raises expectations that make the application of the usual requirements 
for aiding and abetting less necessary. As such, it is possible to argue that liability for inaction 
forms a category of its own. That includes command responsibility, omission liability and 
bystander liability.  
The options available under both domestic and international law to impose liability on the 
peacekeeping commanders for their inaction are limited. Omission liability would be difficult to 
establish because the legal duty required for omission liability could not be found in chapter 5. 
Regarding bystander liability, one could conclude that the moral obligation to act which appears to 
be the basis for bystander liability could be established on part of the Dutch and Belgian 
commanders, but their positive contribution to the crime would be limited. That contribution 
should be established by their presence having an encouraging or approving effect on the mental 
state of the main perpetrators. This seems unrealistic in the circumstances. Their awareness of the 
substantial likelihood that crimes would be committed indicates that they may have accepted the 
criminal consequences, but this appeared to be out of complete incompetence to act otherwise. 
The Belgians were not factually present when the crimes were committed, but their withdrawal 
symbolises a certain level of acceptance of the fate of the civilians under their care. Some might 
even label their decision to withdraw as ‘carelessness’. Despite the latter observation, the 
principles of legality and culpability are likely to halt potential verdicts for the commanders’ 
bystander conduct.  
 
In sum, despite the recognition of bystander liability in domestic and more so in international 
criminal law, it fails to deliver the moderate degree of liability expected for having a bystander 
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role in the commission of international crimes. Albeit understandable since the ‘bystander effect’ 
should not be underestimated, anything between omission liability and bystander liability cannot 
be accounted for in both domestic and international criminal law, unless it amounts to command 
responsibility. Alternative forms of responsibility should be considered in order to strengthen the 
impact of civilian protection mandates in PKOs.  
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Chapter 8: The Lege Ferenda Perspective on the Legal Framework of 
Peacekeeping 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the thesis, we have considered whether both domestic and international law require 
peacekeeping commanders to act against harm done to the civilian population under their care. 
This thesis subsequently assessed to what extent it is likely that not acting against the aggressors 
would result in individual responsibility for the commanders. Based on the cases discussed in 
chapter 2, the starting point in making that assessment was criminal responsibility for a failure to 
act, in contrast to the unsuccessful attempt to establish criminal liability for a positive contribution 
to the commission of crimes. This choice of perspective was further strengthened by the increased 
attention for the failure to act by peacekeepers in countries like South Sudan and the DRC. 
 
This chapter aims to present the reader with alternatives to the criminal law options discussed in 
this thesis. In cases to which IHL applies, the introduction of a separate type of command 
responsibility for peacekeeping commanders under international criminal law is an option. A 
second option is the use of domestic tort liability for failures to act. If the peacekeeping 
commanders would be subject to a duty to act, for example under domestic law as discussed in 
chapter 3,
932
 one could draw a parallel between the peacekeeping commander’s failure to act and a 
state’s failure to meet a due diligence obligation. Focusing on the commander’s responsibilities as 
obligations of due diligence would have certain benefits, eg the responsibility that follows is based 
on the commander’s failure to act within the means available to him or her. A third option 
discussed is the development of a separate legal paradigm for peacekeeping that could be used in 
all situations of peacekeeping, irrespective of whether the commanders are involved in the 
conflict; this could be a special regime that complements IHL and IHRL.  
 
The second section sheds light on the need for accountability for a failure to act. One may 
question why this seems so pertinent to peacekeeping, even though we had to recognise that the 
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options assessed in the thesis would not be suitable to use in relation to peacekeeping conduct. 
Then, the third section considers the development of a new or separate doctrine for peacekeeping 
conduct within criminal law, which could be similar to occupation command responsibility. 
Command responsibility serves as an example of a separate doctrine developed to fill a gap in 
international criminal law, because the existent law was not deemed applicable to a failure to fulfil 
a duty by superiors. I will also explain the benefits this would have for international criminal law. 
Section 8.4 considers the use of civil responsibility as a reasonable alternative to criminal liability. 
Another option is the development of special law governing PKOs, which will be discussed in 
section 8.5. 
 
8.2 A Failure to Act: Why Accountability on the Individual Level?  
 
The outcome that the current modes of liability addressing inaction are not suitable to be applied 
to peacekeeping commanders raises the question of whether individual accountability is 
necessary in situations in which peacekeeping commanders failed to act.  
 
Two points underline the need for liability. That is, first, the assumption that liability increases 
the effectiveness of civilian protection mandates. Without liability on the individual level, states 
are the only actors that can be held to account for a failure to act in PKOs, since the UN relies 
heavily on its immunity. As a result, there is no incentive to act adequately on the individual 
level, since protection can be framed as ‘not our responsibility’, but that of the state or the 
organisation authorising the mission. This is also referred to as ‘passing the buck’.933 Individual 
liability would end the claim that protection is only of concern to the higher chains of 
command,
934
 which always made it an ‘institutional’ rather than an individual matter. Also, the 
lack of sanctions for inaction makes a passive response to misconduct in the mission area a 
feasible alternative to action. The OIOS report indicated that the fact that inaction is not punished 
lowers the incentive to take action, since '[t]here are penalties for action, but no penalties for 
inaction'.
935
 Action increases the risk of using excessive forms of violence or violating 
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international law, which prevents peacekeepers from acting even though they are capable of 
doing so.
936
 The legal actions taken by the plaintiffs in the Dutch and Belgian cases under review 
demonstrate how peacekeeping failures should not be taken for granted and that redress should 
also be sought on the individual level. 
 
That peacekeepers and their commanders may be hesitant to act because of the risk of sanctions 
reinforces the need to look into how peacekeeping commanders could be encouraged to act 
within their capacity to protect civilians. In both domestic and international law there appears to 
be a gap between the law dealing with inaction and the failure to fulfil certain tasks diligently. 
This does not indicate that a failure to do so by peacekeeping commanders is ‘thus not worthy of 
punishment’. In part, the lack of suitable forms of liability results from the inconsistent and 
incorrect application of the law, which increases the degree of liability to a great extent. 
Judiciary appear uncomfortable adjudicating inaction, as their attempt to link liability for 
inaction with the criminal result demonstrates. Command responsibility is a good example of an 
attempt to fill the gap between liability for positive conduct and inaction by criminalising the 
separate failure to act. Tort liability is another alternative to direct criminal liability for a serious 
crime. Both options will be discussed below.  
 
The second point that supports the need to consider individual liability for a failure to act is that 
civilian protection has become a focus point in peacekeeping policy and in the politics of 
peacekeeping. The law however is lagging behind in its development towards prioritising 
civilian protection in PKOs. In 2015, the Ramos-Horta report stressed the following: 
 
Protection of civilians is a core obligation of the United Nations, but expectations and capability 
must converge. Significant progress has been made in promoting norms and frameworks for the 
protection of civilians. And yet, on the ground, the results are mixed and the gap between what is 
asked and what peace operations can deliver has widened in more difficult environments.
937
  
 
In his response to this report, the UN Secretary-General wrote that ‘[e]very peacekeeper – 
civilian, military, police – must do all they can when civilians are under imminent threat’, and  
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[w]here missions have an explicit mandate to protect civilians, uniformed personnel must play 
their part, including, where necessary, through the use of force. This has been defined to mean 
preventive, pre-emptive and tactical use of force to protect civilians under threat of physical 
violence. The source and the nature of violence are not the determinant for action.
938
 
 
The 2015 DPKO Policy brief on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping 
reflects this position by referring to a responsibility for peacekeepers to act ‘within their 
capabilities’ ‘where the state is unable or unwilling to protect’:939  
 
Where the state is unable or unwilling to protect civilians, or where government forces themselves 
pose such a threat to civilians, peacekeepers have the authority and the responsibility to provide 
such protection within their capabilities and areas of deployment. Particularly, peacekeepers will 
act to prevent, deter, pre-empt or respond to threats of physical violence in their areas of 
deployment, no matter the scale of the violence and irrespective of the source of the threat.
940
 
 
UN policy expresses a strong will to protect the civilian population by affirmative action, even 
though the law does not demonstrate a similar intent. The recently established ‘Kigali 
Principles’941 furthermore express the intention to strengthen civilian protection mandates. Each 
member state endorsing the principles pledges to  
 
be prepared to use force to protect civilians, as necessary and consistent with the mandate. Such 
action encompasses making a show of force as a deterrent; interpositioning our forces between 
armed actors and civilians; and taking direct military action against armed actors with clear hostile 
intent to harm civilians
942
 
 
(…) 
 
Not to hesitate to take action to protect civilians, in accordance with the rules of engagement, in 
the absence of an effective host government response or demonstrated willingness to carry out its 
responsibilities to protect civilians.
943
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The Netherlands and main troop contributor Bangladesh are among the 19 countries that have 
endorsed the principles. The exact meaning of this is difficult to determine if the principles are 
non-binding after enforcement. Although the UN increasingly works towards a stronger civilian 
protection mechanism in PKOs, the lack of any legal rules contributing to such a mechanism 
makes it overly ineffective.
944
 As Besmer rightly stated in relation to the effectiveness of codes of 
conduct and other forms of self-regulatory measures: 'codes, whether self-imposed or not, are 
only as meaningful as their enforceability'.
945
  
 
Establishing some form of liability ultimately contributes to a sense of justice for the relatives of 
those who have been killed despite the UN’s intentions to protect them. Justice can be a powerful 
solution to conflict; a solution that is often overlooked if political efforts are more readily 
available.
946
 Relatives however mainly seek justice for the loss they have suffered,
947
 even if the 
ones they hold responsible did not take direct part in the conflict. This was visible in the 
aftermath of the Srebrenica and Kigali affairs, in which ‘justice’ was sought at all possible levels: 
from the TCC to the individual commanders. A balance should then be struck between the need 
to legally address those extreme cases in which peacekeepers and their commanders could have 
reasonably acted, but failed to do so, and those situations in which peacekeeping commanders 
were incapable of acting. The legal sanctions should be suitable to the specific circumstances in 
which peacekeeping commanders operate. The establishment of an accountability system that 
respects both the victims’ claims and the position of the peacekeepers would be a fundamental 
contribution to the legal framework governing PKOs.  
 
8.3 ‘Failure to Protect’ as a Separate Offence in Criminal Law?  
 
It can be argued that with no connection to the criminal result, international courts or tribunals 
would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate these inactive contributions to the commission of 
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serious crimes.
948
 Command responsibility is a good example of a failure to act that falls within 
the jurisdiction of the international courts despite lacking such a direct connection with the 
criminal result. This section explores first how command responsibility can be classified as a 
separate offence. Then, this section looks into command responsibility as an example of a 
doctrine prioritising civilian protection within international criminal law. 
 
8.3.1 Command Responsibility as an Example of a Separate Failure to Act 
 
Command responsibility illustrates how a failure to act can be criminalised without linking the 
commander to the criminal result per se. Two arguments support the idea that command 
responsibility is, in contrast to omission and bystander liability, considered a separate offence. 
First, the argument that the requirements for command responsibility are, in theory, different 
from the modes of liability included in the statutes. A second argument is that causation is not 
always required for command responsibility to arise. 
 
It is first argued here that the requirements for command responsibility are inherently different 
from the modes of liability included in the statutes. Both article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute and 
article 28 of the RS refer to a commander who ‘failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent’949 a crime committed by the superior’s subordinates. This creates a separate 
actus reus that differs from the one required for complicity in ICTY jurisprudence, which is 
defined as ‘practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the crime’.950 The RS lacks a reference to an actus reus for complicity, 
which according to Ambos (writing in 1999) made sense as the jurisprudence seemed undecided 
on the exact requirements for aiding and abetting.
951
 However, it may be inferred from the 
limited practice of the ICC that a contribution to the crime should be ‘substantial’952 which is 
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then again based on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. There is no reason to assume that 
the ICC would deviate from the point of view taken by the ad hoc tribunals.
953
  
 
The mens rea for command responsibility is described as knowledge or ‘had reason to know’ in 
the ICTY Statute which is again broader than the mens rea required for complicity. It represents 
the expectation that a commander may have or may have been able to have information available 
to him, based on which he should have known that crimes were about to be committed. The 
Rome Statute has incorporated this provision but changed the wording slightly to ‘should have 
known’ in article 28 of the RS. Although it only implies a slight change in meaning, it triggered a 
debate regarding the imposition of a duty to know on commanders.
954
 Whereas ‘had reason to 
know’ seems more similar to a type of ‘wilful blindness’ by reproaching the commander that he 
ignored the knowledge he had, the ‘should have known’ clause seems to blame the commanders 
for not obtaining the knowledge, depending on how one interprets the language used. Confusion 
is caused by the mental element required for aiding and abetting under the RS, knowledge, 
whereas the jurisprudence has demonstrated that more objective standards like awareness, or 
recklessness may suffice.
955
 The negligence standard in command responsibility is lower than the 
thresholds used for aiding and abetting by omission. The ‘should have known’ requirement 
stretches the scope of the mental element further than a ‘could have foreseen’ or ‘could have 
known’ requirement that the awareness and recklessness standard used in the jurisprudence on 
aiding and abetting by omission represent.  
 
Regarding the second argument, that causation is not always required for command 
responsibility, it should first be noted that article 28 of the RS requires a causation requirement 
because it creates responsibility for crimes ‘committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or 
her failure to exercise control properly over such forces’. This provision was however explained 
                                                          
953
 Héctor Olásolo and Enrique Carnero Rojo, ‘Forms of Accessorial Liability under Article 25(3)(b) and (c)’ in 
Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 579. 
954
 Harmen Van der Wilt, ‘The Duty to Know: enkele beschouwingen over het leerstuk van Command 
Responsibility’ in Nico Corstens, GJM Groenhuijsen, MS Keijzer (eds), Rede en recht : opstellen ter gelegenheid 
van het afscheid van Prof. mr. N. Keijzer van de Katholieke Universiteit Brabant (Gouda Quint 2000); Arnold (n 
28); Delalić and others (Appeal Judgment) (n 503) paras 228-241. 
955
 See above sections 4.5.4 (Ch. 4) and 7.3 (Ch. 7). 
223 
  
by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba as ‘only relat[ing] to the commander’s duty to prevent the 
commission of future crimes’.956 The Chamber argued that ‘[a]s punishment is an inherent part 
of prevention of future crimes, a commander's past failure to punish crimes is likely to increase 
the risk that further crimes will be committed in the future’.957 The ICC Trial Chamber 
confirmed that it agrees with the Pre-Trial Chamber and held that the text of article 28 ‘does not 
require the establishment of “but for” causation between the commander’s omission and the 
crimes committed’.958 We may infer from this that the causation requirement refers to the duty to 
punish and not to the duty to prevent. If the causation requirement does not connect the 
commander to the crimes already committed but only to future crimes, this would lead to the 
same problematic outcome as seen in the previous chapters: with little or no active involvement, 
the commander would be held responsible for crimes committed by another actor.  
 
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute does not include a causation requirement. Therefore, the ad hoc 
tribunals have rejected causation in some of the landmark cases on command responsibility. In 
Delalić and others for example, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that 
 
[n]otwithstanding the central place assumed by the principle of causation in criminal law, 
causation has not traditionally been postulated as a conditio sine qua non for the imposition of 
criminal liability on superiors for their failure to prevent or punish offences committed by their 
subordinates. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber has found no support for the existence of a 
requirement of proof of causation as a separate element of superior responsibility, either in the 
existing body of case law, the formulation of the principle in existing treaty law, or, with one 
exception, in the abundant literature on this subject.
959
 
 
A similar opinion was expressed in Prosecutor v Halilović where the ICTY Trial Chamber held 
that command responsibility ‘as a sui generis form of liability, (……) is distinct from the modes 
of individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1), [and therefore] does not require a causal 
link’.960 Alternatively, one can argue that its status as a separate offence does not take away the 
requirement of a causal link.
961
 With the clear stance taken by the ICTY and the approach 
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adopted by the ICC in Bemba there is in practice sufficient support to argue that causation is not 
required for past crimes, only for future crimes. As such, the duty to prevent is arguably a 
separate offence, not related to the crime committed. The commander’s responsibility is 
therefore considered separate from the crime committed by his or her subordinates, arguably 
defining it as a separate offence rather than a mode of liability. This is supported by the idea that 
classifying command responsibility as a mode of liability would render command responsibility 
superfluous in international criminal law.
962
 It would be a variant of aiding and abetting by 
omission:
963
 the outcome would be the same, but slightly different elements would be applied. 
 
8.3.2 Command Responsibility: the Prioritisation of Civilian Protection 
 
There is a notable similarity between peacekeeping commanders and commanders who have 
been convicted for command responsibility thus far. Some of the earliest convictions for 
command responsibility referred to the protection of civilians as an important task of the 
commander.
964
 In Yamashita, Yamashita’s duty to ‘take such measures as were within his power 
and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population’ was 
explicitly mentioned.
965
 The judges in High Command even held the following: 
 
With regard to the second aspect of this order, that is the obligation to prosecute soldiers who 
commit offenses against the indigenous population, this obligation as a matter of international law 
is considered doubtful. The duty imposed upon a military commander is the protection of the 
civilian population.
966
 
 
The judges were not sure how this duty should be fulfilled, but ascribed liability for failing to 
prevent or punish the libelled conduct of the commander's subordinates against the civilian 
population. In High Command, the military tribunal further stressed the importance of the 
protective duties of the commander when it based the responsibility of General Hermann Hoth 
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on the fact that ‘he turned over (…) large numbers of the civilian population over whom he had 
power and whom he was under a duty to protect’.967 Also in more recent jurisprudence we have 
seen references to a superior’s duty to protect the civilian population or a duty to protect basic 
principles of humanity.
968
 The ICTY Trial Chamber referred to superior responsibility as 
‘[aiming] at obliging commanders to ensure that subordinates do not violate IHL, either by 
harmful acts or by omitting a protective duty’.969 This indicates that, where the commander 
cannot control the perpetrators of the crime directly, his or her duty to protect does not cease to 
exist.  
 
The obligations held by occupation commanders are a good example thereof. The separate 
command responsibility doctrine for occupation commanders is exemplary for how 
‘peacekeeping command responsibility’ could be constructed.970 Commanders deployed in an 
area occupied by their home state have executive powers in this geographical area. This means 
that they also fulfil certain duties normally exercised by the public administration. One can also 
think of the protection of human rights obligations in that regard.
971
 Occupation commanders 
have the specific duty to ‘maintain order and protect the civilian population against illegal 
acts’.972 Peacekeeping commanders are, more than combat commanders, tasked with monitoring 
the overall security situation in the mission area, which may include civilian protection as 
discussed in chapter 5. The comparison between peacekeepers and occupation commanders is 
not flawless however. Arnold already pointed out the difference between tactical level 
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commanders, such as the peacekeeping commanders of national contingents, and the executive 
commanders in situations of occupation.
973
 The executive commander has the duty to supervise a 
geographical area rather than troops under his or her command.
974
 The nature of this typology of 
command responsibility is therefore genuinely different from regular command responsibility: it 
does not establish responsibility for the crimes committed by his subordinates. It is focused on 
the protective obligations and maintenance of law and order in the area under his control. The 
executive commander’s duties were described in the Hostage trial case as  
 
maintaining peace and order, punishing crime and protecting lives and property, subordinations 
are relatively unimportant. His responsibility is general and not limited to a control of units 
directly under his command. Subordinate commanders in occupied territory are similarly 
responsible to the extent that executive authority has been assigned to them.
975
 
 
The national contingent commanders in PKOs operate at the tactical level of command, but the 
circumstances in which the commanders in Srebrenica and Kigali operated may have been 
similar to occupation. This would depend on the factual situation, but also on the tasks assigned 
to the peacekeeping troops, and thus on the language used in the mandate. We considered in 
chapter 5 that there was no explicit obligation to act or protect, but that peacekeeping 
commanders may be expected to monitor the overall security situation and fulfil a duty to report. 
The very fact that a peacekeeping mission may have civilian protection as its main objective 
gives rise to an expectation of protection. In peacekeeping even more than in situations of 
occupation the relationship of trust between the population and the commanders creates that 
expectation. 
 
In sum, command responsibility is an example of a doctrine used to punish a failure to fulfil 
protective duties. Weigend even argued that 'post WW 2 tribunals were more focused on less 
specific (undifferenzierte) moral responsibilities'.
976
 As such, there is scope to argue that the 
different nature of peacekeeping does not necessarily rule out liability for failing to fulfil a 
(moral) obligation of protection that is similar to that of command responsibility in its early 
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stages. The command responsibility doctrine demonstrates that the punishment of the failure to 
prevent may be of a separate nature than the other forms of liability, sufficiently so to establish a 
separate doctrine like command responsibility arguably is. The doctrine could be defined in such 
a way that it represents the peacekeeping commander’s moral duty to report or monitor certain 
conduct in line with the instructions given by the mandate. It would be placed between bystander 
and omission liability. However, it would only apply if the peacekeeping commanders are 
involved in the armed conflict and their involvement triggers the application of IHL. 
 
The principle of legality would be respected if the doctrine clearly prescribes the circumstances in 
which it applies and what elements need to be fulfilled. The principle of fair labelling would be 
met if the doctrine would balance the blameworthiness of the commander and the label addressed 
to him or her. For example, the peacekeeping commander would be reproached for failing to fulfil 
a duty to report or monitor that may have had serious consequences, but would not be labelled as 
an accomplice in the commission of war crimes.  
 
8.4 Civil Responsibility 
 
Another alternative to the options discussed in this thesis, and more restricted in scope is using 
civil law to establish individual liability. The peacekeeping commanders’ conduct could then be 
classified as a tort, for example if the peacekeeping commanders violated IHRL. As concluded in 
chapter 5, it seems currently unlikely that peacekeeping commanders are directly responsible for 
fulfilling positive obligations under IHRL. However, the responsibility of the state does not 
exclude claimants from bringing suit against the individual state agents, as Kaya v Turkey 
confirmed: 
 
If an act is found to be illegal or tortious and, consequently, is no longer an “administrative” act 
or deed, the civil courts may allow a claim for damages to be made against the official concerned, 
without prejudice to the victim's right to bring an action against the authority on the basis of its 
joint liability as the official's employer.
977
  
 
A good example of domestic civil redress for human rights violations is the American Alien Tort 
Statute, in which tort liability is based on a combination of criminal and international law, and 
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liability is based on the 'breach of a customary international criminal norm'.
978
 The main 
differences with criminal liability are the financial compensation for damages instead of criminal 
sanctions, the lower intent requirement of knowledge, the burden of proof, the fact that a private 
person can initiate these cases and the fact that it is being dealt with in 'courts of general 
jurisdiction'.
979
 Let us first consider how civil claims are handled in domestic courts. 
 
Civil claims for compensation may be brought before a domestic civil court. This can be a court 
in the host state where it concerns personal conduct committed outside the scope of the 
peacekeepers’ duties, but when it involves conduct related to their official capacity, the TCC has 
the right to exercise civil jurisdiction.
980 
That clarifies why the alleged civil responsibility of the 
Belgian commanders was brought before a Belgian court. Individual civil responsibility for 
human rights violations is rare, but the Alien Tort Statute has been invoked in several cases. In 
Kadic v Karadžić,981 victims of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed compensation 
from the former Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadžić under this Statute and the 
Torture Victims Protection Act. The case was controversial because the Court confirmed that 
private individuals can be held responsible for breaches of ‘the law of nations’. As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held: ‘[w]e do not agree that the law of nations, as 
understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain 
forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the 
auspices of a state or only as private individuals’.982 In Filártiga v Peña-Irala983 the (American) 
Second District Court limited the responsibility of individuals for violations of international law 
to state officials, a limitation not applied in the Kadic v Karadžić case.984 In Filártiga v Peña-
Irala, the Court analysed historical examples of individual responsibility for human rights 
violations and found that piracy and slave trade were examples for which also non-state actors 
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were held accountable.
985
 The important implications drawn from the Kadic v Karadžić case are 
that state obligations may be obligations of individuals, and that individuals can enforce their 
(human) rights, at least under the Alien Tort Statute.
986
 The possibility of individual 
responsibility for human rights violations under domestic civil law as seen in the US by means of 
the Alien Tort Statute is however rather unique.
987
  
  
Yet, the (interim) responsibility incurred by the Belgian commanders in Mukeshimana was also 
based on civil law. The Court used domestic criminal law to establish this type of responsibility, 
and not human rights law as referred to above. Cross-referencing to criminal norms in 
establishing tort liability in a domestic court of general jurisdiction, as seen in Mukeshimana, 
may have negative consequences. The interpretation of legal norms may be modified and 
expanded if used in a court that lacks the specialised knowledge and experience in dealing with 
norms of that specific regime. Also, the interpretation of norms of an international character in a 
domestic context and vice versa could be altered, which potentially weakens the universality of 
these norms.
988
 For example, American jurisprudence on the Alien Tort Statute refers directly to 
international criminal jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of customary international law 
on several occasions.
989
 However, certain concepts in criminal law and civil law are inherently 
different from one another and cannot be interpreted similarly in both contexts. Drumbl points at 
the risk of changing the requirements for aiding and abetting as a mode of liability, the elements 
required for crimes against humanity and genocide, and the debatable use of command 
responsibility in a private context (eg in private companies).
990
 In chapter 4, we discussed how 
controversial the specific direction requirement is within international law, but the differing 
interpretation of this requirement in the jurisprudence on the Alien Torts Statute has complicated 
this even further. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court held on to the specific direction 
requirement, whereas the District of Columbia Circuit did not apply this requirement since 
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customary international law does not recognise it as part of aiding and abetting.
991
 Cross-
referencing the law may result in expansion of the interpretation and impact of the law, which 
means that the law is developed outside its own normative environment. This is what Drumbl 
calls ‘an extracurricular movement’.992  
  
Alternatively, if the peacekeeping commanders commanders are expected to fulfil a certain task 
or objective and they fulfil to do so within the means available to them, it should be considered 
whether this amounts to tort liability similar to a state’s responsibility for its failure to exercise 
due diligence in carrying out its obligations. This may seem far-fetched, but due diligence shows 
strong resemblances with omission and bystander liability without being an obligation of result.
 
The obligation to act diligently is one of conduct or ‘best efforts’.993 It is also similar to 
command responsibility, besides the fact that it creates civil liability and not criminal 
accountability. Criminal liability was in practice often based on lower thresholds like 
foreseeability, recklessness or negligence, which violated the principle of legality. Tort liability 
would be a reasonable alternative to criminal liability, as it assigns a lower degree of 
responsibility to the commanders by not framing them as criminals. In addition, the use of a 
knowledge threshold for tort liability will at least be foreseeable for peacekeeping commanders. 
In our analogy, liability for a failure to meet a due diligence obligation would thus result in 
responsibility for not having used the means available to the peacekeeping commanders, rather 
than being linked to the criminal result. These two elements are beneficial in considering the 
development of such an obligation and a concomitant form of responsibility. 
 
Whether a domestic court sanctions violations of IHRL by its nationals under civil or criminal 
law is up to the discretion of the state.
994
 Article 2(2) of the ICCPR deals with the enforcement of 
human rights law in domestic courts and requires the signatories to arrange the enforcement of its 
provisions in the domestic legal order, without specifying what type of liability it should provide 
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for. In chapter 2 we have also considered how domestic authorities have a duty to investigate any 
potential violations of article 2 of the ECHR in areas where it exercises effective control in the 
meaning of  the ECHR.
995
 If both local courts and the TCC involved have no jurisdiction, a 
failure to act can be sanctioned by establishing a UN claims commission.
996
 This option is laid 
down in paragraph 51 of the Model SOFA for PKOs which applies to 'damage caused by 
members of the force in the performance of their official duties and which for reasons of 
immunity of the organization and its members could not have been submitted to local courts'.
997
 
Claims against the UN as an organisation can be made based on General Assembly Resolution 
52/247. However, ‘if (…) loss, damage, death or injury arose from gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct of the personnel provided by the [TCC], the [TCC] will be liable for such claims’.998 
Damage caused by necessary actions in the light of the mandate or considered necessary to fulfil 
the peacekeeping duties, is excluded from liability. 
 
In sum, civil liability, whether or not similar to the concept of due diligence, is beneficial because 
of the lower intent requirement and the fair degree of responsibility it would impose on the 
peacekeeping commanders. However, cross-referencing the law to establish tort liability may 
result in the undesirable expansion and incoherent interpretation of the applicable norms. The 
next section therefore explores the development of special law for peacekeeping. 
 
8.5 A Separate Paradigm for Peacekeeping? 
 
To support my argument that peacekeeping may need law specifically tailored to the context 
of peacekeeping, I will first refer back to the main issue encountered in applying international 
law to PKOs discussed in chapter 5. In this chapter, the contextual interpretation of the law 
was criticised, by indicating that the use of norms outside their normative environment could 
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result in a modified interpretation of the law, to such an extent even that its meaning and scope 
of application are altered. Several authors have suggested alternative solutions to the 
complicated application of IHL and IHRL to PKOs. For example, Clapham, Murphy and 
Hadden argued that peacekeeping should mainly be governed by human rights.
999
 Murphy 
even concluded that 'mainstreaming human rights in peace operations should be the priority 
and an international human rights framework outlined governing all UN operations'.
1000
 
Ensuring compliance with IHRL in PKOs could for example be achieved through establishing 
a bulletin that explicitly deals with IHRL.
1001
 
 
The problem with an IHRL-dominated approach is that IHL and IHRL may continue to apply 
alongside each other, even if peacekeepers would not be bound by IHL directly. Also, 
‘protection’ could still be interpreted in conflicting ways, with three definitions (IHL, IHRL and 
peacekeeping) applying to the same circumstances. It is imperative to consider the objectives of 
IHRL and IHL and carefully assess how each norm should be applied without losing the purpose 
of the law out of sight. This is of particular importance if these laws are used to establish criminal 
accountability. As also addressed in chapter 5, IHRL prioritises the protection of human beings 
generally, whereas (international) criminal law aims to end impunity and to contribute to 
retribution for the harm done.
1002
 IHL on the other hand, aims to protect individuals who take no 
direct part in the conflict.
1003
 As such, these paradigms address different legal subjects.
1004
 Where 
IHL and IHRL share their focus on protection and are open to an expansive interpretation of their 
norms if it benefits the aim of protection, (international) criminal law aims to establish individual 
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culpability and the general principles of criminal law protect the law from expansion.
1005
   
 
With peacekeeping having its own norms and principles, there is scope to argue that it could be 
regulated by law tailored to peacekeeping. Two ways of developing special law can be 
considered. That is first, by codifying a certain contextual interpretation of IHL and IHRL to 
make sure that it is applied consistently in cases of peacekeeping and is only applied as such in 
that particular context. Special law may develop when exceptions to certain rules become so 
regular that the law is recognised as being distinct from the general law.
1006
 A second option is 
that the law of peacekeeping is established as a self-contained regime, that has its own principles 
and rules of application.
1007
 This would offer more effective protection to the specific aims and 
objectives of peacekeeping by developing a context-specific set of rules. The principles of 
impartiality, consent and the non-use of force could then be taken into account,
 1008
 if these 
principles are still considered valid in contemporary peacekeeping. Developing special law for 
peacekeeping would respond to the issue of applying IHL and IHRL in a context that does not 
seem fit for these areas of law to be applied to without taking the specific nature of peacekeeping 
into account. 
 
The more tailored a rule is to a specific situation, the more likely it is that the rules are complied 
with.
1009
 Now peacekeeping commanders are predominantly trained in IHL prior to deployment. 
Making the assessment of which law applies when in the field is often cause for confusion. If 
peacekeepers would be governed by a specific set of rules, the confusion and insecurity that is 
often cause for inaction in PKOs would be minimised. It could also reduce the gap between 
peacekeeping policy and the law. Without wanting to define the parameters of special law, one 
could think of a set of rules better equipped to work alongside a civilian protection mandate by 
adopting the same definitions as currently used in the mandate and ROE. In addition, the 
paradigm could incorporate clear rules regarding the use of force and in what circumstances that 
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force should be used, focus in more detail on the protective tasks of peacekeepers and consider 
the ROE applicable to PKOs generally. A duty to report and a duty to monitor the overall security 
situation could be defined. The rules should clearly explain in what situations action is required 
and in what circumstances inaction is deemed inappropriate. Most important however, the rules 
should be clear on how the law will be enforced, what legal sanctions peacekeepers can expect in 
what circumstances and whether the TCC or the UN is responsible for holding peacekeepers 
accountable for violations of these rules.  
 
8.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter aimed to assess how impunity for peacekeeping commanders’ failure to act could be 
avoided by considering alternative means to sanction a failure to act. I first argued that 
accountability is necessary, because it could motivate peacekeeping commanders to act where 
otherwise an inactive position would be taken to avoid criminal liability for excessive behaviour. 
Also, the UN has strengthened its commitment to civilian protection in PKOs in its policy, but 
the law has not developed accordingly. This results in a gap between peacekeeping policy and the 
law regulating PKOs which complicates a peacekeeping commander’s assessment of the action 
required of him or her. 
 
Three alternatives to omission and bystander liability were then discussed. That was first, the 
option of developing a type of command responsibility for peacekeeping commanders by arguing 
that command responsibility was also created to sanction a failure to protect as a distinct type of 
liability in international criminal law. Another option discussed was tort liability for a failure to 
act. I even considered the option of imposing a type of due diligence obligation on peacekeeping 
commanders similar to that of states. Although this may seem far-fetched in our current 
understanding of the law, due diligence would fill the gap between bystander and omission 
liability. It would create tort liability rather than criminal liability. Tort liability has two main 
advantages over criminal liability: it requires knowledge as the threshold for the mental element 
and as a due diligence type of liability, it would create liability for the commander’s separate 
failure to act and not for the serious crimes committed by others. This results in a fair degree of 
liability.  
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However, that tort liability in domestic courts may be based on criminal law, as was the case in 
Mukeshimana, or international law could cause further diffusion regarding the interpretation of 
legal norms, in particular if the norms are modified outside their normative environment. To 
avoid the interpretation of IHL and IHRL norms being expanded to support a positive obligation 
of protection in the context of peacekeeping, further development of the law is necessary, ideally 
resulting in the development of special law governing PKOs. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
9.1 Overview 
 
This thesis posed the question of whether peacekeeping commanders can be held responsible for 
their failure to protect civilians against serious harm committed by third parties. The starting 
point for this assessment was the conclusion by the Hague Court of Appeal that the Dutchbat 
commanders could not be convicted for their alleged participation in the commission of serious 
crimes against the late relatives of Nuhanović and Mustafić. We therefore considered that 
framing the conduct of the Dutch and Belgian peacekeeping commanders as negative conduct 
could be more successful. For liability for a criminal omission to arise, a legal obligation to 
protect the civilians would have been required. This gave rise to the question whether 
peacekeeping commanders have an obligation to act against serious crimes being committed 
under international law. 
My research studied the literature, the law and relevant jurisprudence to draw conclusions 
regarding the questions posed. Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7 consisted of a comparative study, 
comparing the findings in common and civil law systems within the domestic law chapters with 
the outcome of the chapters focusing on international criminal law. A main gap in the 
scholarship and practice of international criminal law was addressed in the introduction: 
command responsibility only applies to conduct committed by the commander’s subordinates 
and would therefore not apply if the commander is a third party to the perpetrator(s) of the crime. 
The literature and jurisprudence often use ‘control’ as a factor to determine whether the 
commanders could be held liable, which is why this study aimed to explore other approaches to 
sanctioning the peacekeeping commander’s failure to protect the civilian population. The post-
Second World War jurisprudence focused on a duty to take care of the civilian population, albeit 
it in a context of armed conflict rather than peacekeeping. Admittedly, my work touches upon a 
range of different issues that may not always evidently relate to each other. On the one hand, this 
research reflected upon the relationship between omission, bystander and command 
responsibility and discussed how each doctrine would be difficult to apply in the context of 
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peacekeeping. Omission and bystander liability establish a connection with the criminal result 
principally committed by someone else, whereas command responsibility establishes 
responsibility for the commander’s failure to prevent or punish conduct committed by a 
subordinate. On the other hand, the relationship between IHL and IHRL formed an important 
part of this study, in particular the complex application of norms stemming from these paradigms 
to PKOs. The norms applicable to PKOs appear to be distinct from those in IHL and IHRL. Both 
of these observations are relevant to international law. The conclusions drawn illustrate that 
peacekeeping is distinct from both peace and warfare, making the application of international 
law to this type of military operations not as simple as is sometimes believed. At the same time, 
the conclusion that peacekeeping has a distinct nature also supports the idea that omission and 
bystander liability would impose too high a degree of liability on the peacekeeping commander; 
he or she was after all not directly involved in the commission of serious international crimes. 
Without taking into account the specific nature of peacekeeping, international law is not 
sufficiently tailored to be applied to PKOs. 
Applying international law to peacekeeping in a contextual way, as some scholars apparently do, 
has considerable drawbacks. It would, first, expand the interpretation of IHL and IHRL norms 
without taking into account the initial purpose of the paradigm to which these norms belong. 
This potentially affects their application in contexts other than peacekeeping. Second, it is 
precisely the modification of the law by scholarship and judicial interpretations that places 
criminal law at risk of becoming unpredictable and unforeseeable for its subjects. The general 
principles of criminal law provide a benchmark to secure a fair and just result of an assessment 
of criminal accountability; it keeps the interpretation of criminal law within certain pre-
established boundaries. Establishing a specific paradigm with clear rules of interpretation and 
benchmark criteria would benefit peacekeeping and international law by making the contextual 
interpretation of international law redundant.  
My work contributes, first, to the literature on international criminal law by continuing the 
discussion on the scope of the command responsibility doctrine as initially held by Bakentas and 
Mettraux among others.
1010
 Where an adapted version of the doctrine has been used to apply to 
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occupation commanders, we have observed whether a similar adaption could be made for 
peacekeeping commanders by using the analogy often made between situations of occupation 
and peacekeeping. In doing so, I have added a different angle to the debate by focusing on the 
obligations of the peacekeeping commander vis-à-vis the local population, which sets them apart 
from military commanders in combat operations. Also, I placed command responsibility in a 
wider context by arguing that it is a combination of omission and bystander liability, but distinct 
because of its characterisation as a separate offence. Ideally, the responsibility for peacekeeping 
commanders should combine elements of command responsibility and bystander responsibility, 
focusing more on authority and expectations stemming from both the profession and the civilian 
protection mandate without requiring a legal duty. Although a relationship of care between the 
peacekeeping commanders and the local population would make omission liability a suitable 
paradigm, such a relationship could not be established, at least not to the extent that it would 
amount to a legal obligation on the international level.  
Second, this thesis contributes to the ongoing debate among those who study the law on 
peacekeeping that focused on the extent to which the troops are legally obliged to undertake 
civilian protection tasks. My research looked more in-depth at the obligations held by 
peacekeeping commanders as opposed to the troops, and focused on establishing individual 
accountability for failing to fulfil an obligation. I recognised that there has been a conscious 
effort by scholars such as Wills and Khalil to advocate that troops may be obliged to use force 
(Khalil) or to fulfil the specific instructions given to them in the mandate (Wills). Some authors 
support their argument by expanding the protective scope of IHL or IHRL. Additionally, 
scholars such as Meron and Kaelin argued that IHL and IHRL are intertwined to such an extent 
that together they form the basis for certain positive norms of protection. The main issue their 
approach gives rise to is that ‘protection’ has distinctive meanings in both IHL and IHRL and 
each paradigm has a distinctive nature and purpose. Distinguishing between the two paradigms is 
therefore necessary, also because not doing so complicates the enforcement of norms stemming 
from these paradigms. 
Where peacekeeping policy has developed at the same pace as the reality of peacekeeping has, 
the law is still lagging behind. The outlook perspective offered in chapter 8 indicated that 
developing law tailored to the situation of peacekeeping is recommended.  
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9.2 Suggestions for Further Research and Outlook Perspective 
 
Despite the increased attention in international law scholarship for obligations and the 
responsibility of peacekeepers, further knowledge should be gathered regarding this matter. The 
development of special law for peacekeeping should be explored in more detail, as it was beyond 
the scope of this thesis to make an in-depth assessment of the content of such law. Therefore, 
further normative research might well be conducted in order to define a) the parameters of special 
law for peacekeeping, b) how such a paradigm would relate to IHL and IHRL, c) how matters of 
enforcement and accountability would be dealt with within that paradigm and d) how it would 
address the dual legal role of peacekeepers. Particular attention should go out to clarifying the 
relationship between the peacekeeping commanders and the civilian population, as UN policy 
implicates that commanders are expected to protect civilians within the mission area. If the UN 
commits itself to strengthening civilian protection in PKOs to such an extent, the law should 
reflect that intent in order to ensure that law and policy do not contravene each other. The 
division of civilian protection tasks within the chain of command must be clarified, as well as the 
extent to which the different levels of command share responsibility for not fulfilling these tasks. 
This should prevent the actors from ‘passing the buck’ when legal accountability is brought under 
consideration. More attention for the special nature of peacekeeping and the impact this has on 
the application of international law would furthermore deepen the academic debate on failing to 
protect civilians in the context of peacekeeping.  
With the emerging point of view that individuals should be recognised as actors in international 
law, the role of individual peacekeepers or peacekeeping commanders should be addressed more 
prominently in scholarship on peacekeeping and international law. With the exception of a few 
scholars who argued in favour of looking at the obligations of individual peacekeepers in more 
detail,
1011
 this view often remains overlooked in the context of peacekeeping. Overemphasising 
the responsibility of states may have negative consequences in relation to peacekeeping, if we 
consider that PKOs depend on the voluntary contributions of UN member states. The 
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unsuccessful attempt of the relatives of the victims in Mothers of Srebrenica to question the legal 
responsibility of the UN as the main organisation responsible and the arguable conclusion that 
individual criminal responsibility could not be incurred by the Dutch commanders, remind us of 
the fact that states are currently the only actors that can be held accountable. This is an important 
first step in moving towards a more effective approach to civilian protection in PKOs, although it 
may have considerable disadvantages. A broad perspective in assessing accountability for 
potential failures in PKOs is necessary; that includes considering the role of the TCC, the UN and 
the individual peacekeeping commanders in carrying out peacekeeping tasks diligently. Making 
peacekeepers and the organisation that indirectly employs them immune from legal sanctions 
may not be in the best interest of international justice. 
The prospect of tort claims as seen in the cases of Kigali and Srebrenica may decrease the 
willingness of states to contribute troops to PKOs even further. This is not unlikely, considering 
that this has been a trend for a considerable period of time now. PKOs are nowadays primarily 
carried out by less developed countries whereas in the 1990s peacekeeping was dominated by 
developed countries.
1012
 This will eventually complicate the future of peacekeeping and would 
make it increasingly difficult to protect civilians from serious harm where the host state is not 
capable of doing so.  
9.3 Conclusions 
 
The main conclusion in this thesis is that international law in its current state is not sufficiently 
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tailored to hold peacekeeping commanders accountable for their failure to protect civilians if they 
were tasked to do so. Although some have argued that international law should then be applied to 
PKOs in a contextual way, this would result in an expansive and incorrect interpretation of 
existing legal norms. This does not contribute to a fair outcome of an assessment of the 
peacekeeping commander’s accountability for a failure to act. Therefore, this thesis concludes 
that the development of special law for peacekeeping is desirable, although other options such as 
the use of tort liability or the development of an alternative form of command responsibility may 
suffice. These recommendations should be read in the light of current PKOs still failing to protect 
civilians on a regular basis. As such, this is not a phenomenon of the 1990s. Although inaction 
can in part be ascribed to the lack of effective means to protect, and to confusion regarding whose 
responsibility it is to do so, the absence of legal instruments regulating peacekeeping more 
effectively also contributes to the continuation of this practice. 
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